Justia New Mexico Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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The issue presented in this appeal was whether Defendant's requested involuntary manslaughter jury instruction was properly denied by the district court. Defendant Clinton Skippings was convicted in a jury trial of voluntary manslaughter. Defendant's conviction arose from a series of interactions with Christy Rogers (Victim) that ultimately culminated in her death. At Defendant's trial, the jury was instructed regarding second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. The district court denied Defendant's requested involuntary manslaughter instruction. The jury returned a conviction on the voluntary manslaughter charge. Upon review of the trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that where there is sufficient evidence of both criminal negligence and accident, it is proper to grant an involuntary manslaughter instruction. The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, which found that the district court improperly denied the instruction. The Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "New Mexico v. Skippings" on Justia Law

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Carol Sloan, a New Mexico Public Regulation Commission (PRC) Commissioner, was convicted and subsequently sentenced for aggravated battery and burglary. That same day, the Attorney General filed a petition for a writ of quo warranto asking the Supreme Court remove Ms. Sloan from office because of her felony convictions. Although Ms. Sloan did not dispute that she was convicted and sentenced for two felony offenses, she nonetheless maintained that those convictions did not disqualify her from continuing to hold public office until the expiration of the term for which she was elected. Ultimately the Court found that because Ms. Sloan was a convicted felon, forfeiture of her office was automatic. View "State ex rel. King v. Sloan" on Justia Law

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Petitioners are organized labor representatives actively involved in representing public employees. They sought a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court to prohibit the Governor from removing two members of the Public Employee Labor Relations Board. Those members had responsibility to adjudicate the merits of disputes that involved the Governor. The Governor appointed those members and now she sought to remove them. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that none of the PELRB members served at the pleasure of the Governor, though the Public Employee Bargaining Act obligates the Governor to appoint them. The Court found that constitutional due process required a "neutral tribunal with members who were free to deliberate without fear of removal by a frequent litigant" such as the Governor. The Governor was enjoined from removing the PELRB members.