Justia New Mexico Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A jury found that Child-Respondent Antonio M. (Child) committed felony murder, attempted armed robbery, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, child abuse, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The State charged Child as a participant in the fatal shooting of Fabian Lopez (Victim) at Frenger Park in Las Cruces. Uncontested evidence at Child’s adjudicatory hearing established that M.M. and two other participants killed Victim in his car in the course of a drug deal. During opening statements and closing arguments, defense counsel’s theory of the case was that the State could not present sufficient evidence of Child’s participation in the crime and that the robbery and resulting homicide were unplanned and unintended results of a simple drug purchase. Defense counsel did not challenge Child’s presence in the car that transported M.M. to and from the park. On appeal, Child challenged the admission of three in-court identifications under federal and state due process. The Court of Appeals reversed for plain error, finding that the in-court identifications were impermissibly suggestive and thereby violated Child’s due process right to a fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The New Mexico Supreme Court determine that identity was not at issue regarding the testimony of the three relevant witnesses and thus that Child’s due process rights were not violated by the relevant in-court identifications. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. View "New Mexico v. Antonio M." on Justia Law

Defendant Franklin Begaye was convicted of nonresidential burglary and breaking and entering. He contended these convictions violated his right to be free from double jeopardy. The district court determined that the nonresidential burglary and breaking and entering charges did not violate double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that its guidance in New Mexico v. Porter, 476 P.3d 1201, resolved the issue, this appeal indicated that confusion persisted within the Court's double jeopardy jurisprudence warranting further clarification. The Court concluded here that Defendant’s right to be free from double jeopardy was violated when he was convicted for both breaking and entering and nonresidential burglary because the underlying conduct was unitary and, under the State’s theory, the burglary offense subsumed the breaking and entering offense. “[I]f we determine that one of the offenses subsumes the other offense, the double jeopardy prohibition is violated, and punishment cannot be had for both.” Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "New Mexico v. Begaye" on Justia Law

Q Link Wireless LLC (Q Link) petitioned the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission (Commission) for designation as an eligible telecommunications carrier (ETC). The designation would have made Q Link eligible to access certain federal funds for providing telecommunications services to underserved communities in New Mexico. Following lengthy and protracted proceedings before the Commission’s hearing examiner, Q Link filed a motion to withdraw its petition. The hearing examiner filed an Order Recommending Dismissal of Proceeding with Prejudice (Recommended Decision). The recommendation was to dismiss the petition and to ban Q Link from ever again filing a petition to obtain an ETC designation. The Commission adopted the Recommended Decision in full. Q Link appealed, and the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the Commission lacked express or implied statutory authority to ban Q Link from ever again seeking an ETC designation. View "Q Link Wireless LLC v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm'n" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Petitioner Mario Rudolfo of first-degree murder under a general verdict. The jury instructions contained two alternative theories for the jury to use as a basis for the first-degree murder conviction: (1) felony murder predicated on shooting at or from a motor vehicle and (2) willful and deliberate murder. Twelve years after Petitioner’s conviction, the New Mexico Supreme Court issued New Mexico v. Marquez, 376 P.3d 815, holding that “the crime of shooting at or from a motor vehicle may not serve as the predicate felony in support of a felony murder charge.” Appealing, Petitioner argued the Marquez holding applied retroactively and argued his conviction had to be vacated. The NEw Mexico Supreme Court held that Marquez announced a new substantive rule which applied retroactively. As a result, the Court set aside the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus, vacated Petitioner’s first-degree murder conviction, and remanded the case for a new trial on first-degree murder. View "Rudolfo v. Steward" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff’s home sustained water damage in a hailstorm, he asked his insurer Allstate to cover the loss; consequently, Steamatic was hired to perform water abatement and mold remediation services. Plaintiff claimed that the mold was not remediated properly and that he developed a severe and permanent lung condition as a result. New Mexico does not permit a civil plaintiff to recover duplicate compensatory damages for the same injuries. The collateral source rule presents an exception to the prohibition of double recovery, permitting a plaintiff to recover the same damages from both a defendant and a collateral source. The New Mexico Supreme Court has held that the payor of the prejudgment settlement of a claim qualifies as a collateral source and that the payment does not reduce the same damages the plaintiff may recover from an adjudicated wrongdoer. The issue this case presented for review centered on whether a payment in postjudgment settlement of a claim by an adjudicated wrongdoer qualified as a collateral source. The Court clarified that the collateral source rule had no application to a postjudgment payment made by an adjudicated wrongdoer. Here, the Court held that the payment, which Plaintiff received in a postjudgment settlement with Allstate satisfied a portion of Plaintiff’s damages and extinguished Plaintiff’s right to recover the same damages from Steamatic. The Court explained that the share of damages fully satisfied by Allstate must offset the damages Plaintiff may recover from Steamatic. View "Gonzagowski v. Steamatic of Albuquerque" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Romero alleged that his Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury was violated because one of his jurors revealed during voir dire that he knew the investigator in the case. Defendant did not inquire into the juror’s potential bias during jury selection, did not challenge the juror for cause, did not use an available peremptory challenge on the juror, and did not otherwise object to the juror during jury selection. The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that the juror’s statements did not violate Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, and that Defendant both failed to preserve and waived any objection to the juror’s alleged bias. View "New Mexico v. Romero" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that an heirship judgment that conveyed mineral rights to a good faith buyer’s predecessor in interest was void for lack of jurisdiction. The issue presented for the New Mexico Supreme Court was whether the buyer was entitled to rely on the void judgment in its claim of bona fide purchaser status. In accordance with its Court’s decision in Archuleta v. Landers, 356 P.2d 443, the Court concluded that a party who purchases property sold under a judgment that is not void on its face is entitled to bona fide purchaser status. The Court further clarified that extrinsic evidence of lack of jurisdiction was not permitted to overcome the rights of a purchaser who properly relied upon the order of the court as “an authority emanating from a competent source.” Here, the Court held that Respondent Premier Oil & Gas, Inc. (Premier) was a bona fide purchaser, and affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Premier Oil & Gas v. Welch" on Justia Law

Defendants Caprock Solar (Caprock) and Swinerton Builders (collectively, Defendants) and Intervenor Quay County (the County) contended that the New Mexico Court of Appeals erred by reversing the district court and creating an additional requirement to establish a public prescriptive easement claim—namely, that a claimant had to prove frequency of use by the public and a minimum number of public users. The New Mexico Supreme Court agreed the Court of Appeals’ stricter proof requirement was improper and took this opportunity to clarify what was required to prove a public prescriptive easement claim. In doing so, the Court adopted the holding in Trigg v. Allemand, 619 P.2d 573, that “[f]requency of use or number of users is unimportant, it being enough if use of the road in question was free and common to all who had occasion to use it as a public highway” The Court also adopted the principle articulated in Luevano v. Maestas, 874 P.2d 788, that the public character of the road was key to establishing a public prescriptive easement claim. In this case, there was substantial evidence to support the district court’s finding of a public prescriptive easement over the disputed road. Therefore, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the district court. View "McFarland Land & Cattle v. Caprock Solar" on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Rodriguez pleaded guilty to felony offenses committed when he was sixteen years old under a plea and disposition agreement, and following an amenability hearing, the district court imposed an adult sentence. Defendant appealed the amenability determination, and on its own motion, the Court of Appeals held that under the plea and disposition agreement, Defendant waived his right to appeal. The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a juvenile waives the right to appeal an amenability determination by entering into a plea and disposition agreement. To this, the Court held that the right was not waived, reversed the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to decide Defendant’s appeal on the merits. View "New Mexico v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The New Mexico Supreme Court addressed whether the tolling provision contained in Rule 7-506.1(D) NMRA of the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the Metropolitan Courts applied to cases dismissed without prejudice by the court in addition to cases voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution. In 2018, Defendant Tito Lope was arraigned in the metropolitan court on charges including aggravated driving while intoxicated (DWI) and reckless driving. Rule 7-506(B) required Defendant’s trial to commence within 182 days of arraignment (July 20, 2018), assuming that no extensions of time were granted under Rule 7-506(C) and that no tolling was warranted under Rule 7-506.1(D). The case was initially set for trial on April 30, 2018, but continued to June 4, 2018. The arresting officer did not appear on June 4, and the State could not explain his absence. The State requested a continuance; Defendant moved to dismiss. The metropolitan court dismissed the case without prejudice because the State was not prepared for trial. On June 14, 2018, the State filed a notice of refiling of the dismissed complaint. Several days later, the metropolitan court sent a notice setting trial for July 18, 2018, but on the following day issued sua sponte a new notice to the parties resetting trial for July 24, 2018. One day before the scheduled trial date, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice for failure to prosecute under Rule 7-506(B), arguing that the State’s deadline to try Defendant was July 20. At the July 24 trial setting, Defendant arguing the tolling provision of Rule 7-506.1(D) applied only to voluntary dismissals, and that to apply the tolling provision in circumstances where the court dismisses a case as a sanction against the State would allow the State to benefit from its own mistake. The metropolitan court agreed with the State and concluded that the 182-day rule was tolled for ten days under Rule 7-506.1(D), extending deadline to bring Defendant to trial to July 30, 2018. After review, the Supreme Court held the tolling provision applied with equal force to cases dismissed by the court and to cases voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution and conclude that, with the benefit of the tolling provision here, the time for the State to bring Defendant to trial did not expire before Defendant entered into his conditional plea agreement. The Court therefore affirmed Defendant’s conviction. View "New Mexico v. Lopez" on Justia Law