Justia New Mexico Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Luciano Guerra was convicted of first-degree murder and tampering with evidence in the fatal stabbing of Andrew Gama during a fight in March 2010. In his direct appeal to the Supreme Court, he argued that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for tampering with evidence; (2) the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a new trial when two defense exhibits left on counsel table after closing arguments were not included with other exhibits provided to the jury during deliberation; (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to ensure the return of the two exhibits for delivery to the jury room; (4) there was insufficient evidence to support the first-degree murder conviction; and (5) through various other claimed errors the district court denied him due process of law. The Supreme Court used this opinion to clarify the standard for sufficiency of evidence to support tampering-with-evidence convictions and reversed Defendant's tampering conviction. The Court rejected the remainder of Defendant’s claims and upheld his first-degree murder conviction.View "New Mexico v. Guerra" on Justia Law

Paul Barber and his law firm, Barber & Borg, L.L.C. were the attorneys for Ellen Sam. Barber filed a lawsuit against numerous defendants for injuries Sam sustained when her car was struck from behind on Interstate 40. Barber also represented Sam in her capacity as the personal representative of the estates of her daughter and granddaughter, both of whom died from injuries they sustained in the collision. At some time during his representation of Sam, Barber learned that Sam had been drinking alcohol before the collision and that she had "parked at night with the lights off in a lane of traffic on [I-40], following which the car was struck by a truck." Barber also learned at some time during the litigation that Sam, who was a statutory beneficiary of her daughter's estate, took the position that the other statutory beneficiary, her ex-husband, Herman Spencer, was not entitled to share in any wrongful death proceeds because he had abandoned their daughter. Based on Sam's position, Barber approached Spencer in person with a settlement agreement, which Spencer ultimately signed, that reduced Spencer's entitlement to proceeds from the wrongful death litigation. Spencer later challenged the validity of the agreement. Barber filed a lawsuit against Spencer on Sam's behalf to enforce the agreement. Spencer counterclaimed against Sam and filed a third-party complaint against Barber for malpractice, fraud, collusion, and misrepresentation. The district court granted Barber summary judgment on the grounds that Barber did not owe a duty to Spencer as a statutory beneficiary because Spencer and Sam were adverse parties, and Barber represented Sam. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the following two questions: (1) "[w]hether the duties a lawyer owes wrongful death statutory beneficiaries are governed by the Rules of Professional Conduct"; and (2) "[w]hether an adversarial relationship precludes only contract based malpractice claims and not independent tort claims." Upon review, the Supreme Court ruled that: (1) the Rules of Professional Conduct provide guidance in determining lawyers' obligations to their clients, and that the statutory beneficiary may sue the personal representative's attorney when the attorney harms the statutory beneficiary by failing to exercise reasonable skill and care during the attorney's representation of the personal representative; (2) the adversarial exception may preclude a malpractice action, whether it is in tort or in contract, and that in this case, the adversarial exception does not preclude Spencer's malpractice claim against Barber because there existed genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Barber failed to exercise reasonable skill and care in his representation of Sam as the personal representative, and if so, whether such failure harmed Spencer. View "Spencer v. Barber" on Justia Law

The questions certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 34-5-14(C) (1972), required the Court to determine whether the primary or the secondary underinsured motorist (UIM) insurer, if either, should be given the statutory offset for the tortfeasor’s liability coverage. "[T]he short answer to the certified question is that neither the primary nor the secondary insurers are directly awarded the offset because under existing case law, the offset is applied before any UIM insurer is required to pay UIM benefits." View "State Farm v. Safeco Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case arose from an employee grievance at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC. After succeeding in arbitration, the employee, John Horne, filed a lawsuit in state district court in 2008, in which he alleged more expansive claims arising out of the same subject matter covered in the arbitration agreement. LANL objected, claiming that it should not have to defend against claims that either were subject to arbitration or were waived by the arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court took the opportunity of this case opinion to discuss the consequences that follow when an employee voluntarily contracts to arbitrate grievances and what the employee must do to preserve a subsequent lawsuit if that is his intention. In this case the Court sided with the district court's ruling in favor of LANL, and reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Horne v. Los Alamos Nat'l Sec., L.L.C." on Justia Law

In 2004, Amelia Martinez and Donald Espinoza were driving west on NM 502 toward Los Alamos to buy a car. Amelia, eight and a half months pregnant at the time, was driving and Donald was in the passenger seat. Tragically, they did not make it to Los Alamos. The New Mexico Department of Transportation (DOT), which has legal responsibility to maintain NM 502, was sued for negligently failing to remedy a dangerous condition when it chose not to replace the open center lane with crossover barriers on the road, after it was allegedly put on notice of that risk by post-construction accidents and other events. The Court of Appeals held as a matter of law that DOT was immune from suit for such negligence, a decision which the Supreme Court reversed "as being at odds with our jurisprudence." The case was remanded for a new trial. View "Martinez v. N.M. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether "Crawford v. Washington" (541 U.S. 36 (2004)) and subsequent related case law precluded a forensic pathologist from relating subjective observations recorded in an autopsy report as a basis for the pathologist's trial opinions, when the pathologist neither participated in nor observed the autopsy performed on the decedent. The Court answered this question affirmatively and concluded that there was a Confrontation Clause violation because: (1) the autopsy report contained statements that were made with the primary intention of establishing facts that the declarant understood might be used in a criminal prosecution; (2) the statements in the report were related to the jury as the basis for the pathologist's opinions and were therefore offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted; and (3) the pathologist who recorded her subjective observations in the report did not testify at trial and Defendant Arnoldo Navarette did not have a prior opportunity to cross-examine her. The Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. The Court did not address remaining issues raised by defendant as without merit. View "New Mexico v. Navarette" on Justia Law

The underlying case in this matter concerned a property dispute between BNSF Railway (BNSF) and Roy D. Mercer, LLC (Mercer) and the interpretation of an easement. BNSF claimed a right to construct large berms on Mercer's property (to divert water from railroad tracks) pursuant to a 1936 easement granted to BNSF's predecessor in interest by Mercer's predecessor in interest. BNSF hired Gandy Dancer, LLC to construct the new berms. Mercer objected and threatened to remove them. Relying upon its easement claim, BNSF filed suit in state court against Mercer seeking to enjoin Mercer from removing the berms and requesting damages. Mercer filed a counterclaim against BNSF for tort damages and inverse condemnation, and joined Gandy Dancer as a party defendant for trespass, negligence, and prima facie tort. Once joined as a party, Gandy Dancer, through its attorneys Riley, Shane & Keller, P.C. (Riley Law Firm), removed the matter to federal court. Upon removal, Mercer hired the Wagner Ford Law Firm. At that time, the firm consisted of attorneys Kenneth Wagner and Lisa Ford. Although the firm was named "Wagner Ford," Ford was only an associate. In January 2010, Mercer added another law firm, Law & Resource Planning Associates, P.C. (the LRPA Law Firm) to represent it in the state court proceeding because of water law issues involved in that case. The Wagner Ford Law Firm ceased representing Mercer in late 2010. In late June 2012, while the state court proceeding was ongoing, the LRPA law firm learned via the Riley firm's website that the Riley firm had hired Ford as a new associate. LRPA promptly sent a letter to the Riley firm raising Ford's conflict of interest and stating that the Riley firm could no longer represent Gandy Dancer in the litigation with Mercer, Ford's former client. The Riley firm filed a motion in the state case seeking judicial approval of a Rule 16-110(C) screening process for Ford that Riley believed would allow its continued representation of Gandy Dancer. The court found that Ford had previously represented Mercer in the same or a substantially similar matter, her role was substantial, and she had a conflict of interest. Nevertheless, the district court found that the equities favored Gandy Dancer and declined to disqualify the Riley firm. Mercer appealed the district court's decision not to disqualify the Riley Firm. In interpreting and applying the rule to this case, the Supreme Court held that when an attorney has played a substantial role on one side of a lawsuit and subsequently joins a law firm on the opposing side of that lawsuit, both the lawyer and the new firm are disqualified from any further representation, absent informed consent of the former client. "We also specifically conclude under the same rule that screening the new attorney from any involvement in the lawsuit is not an adequate response to the conflict." View "Mercer v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

Defendant Bruce Hall was convicted of a sex crime in California pursuant to a plea agreement. He then moved to New Mexico and was charged with the fourth-degree felony of failing to register as a sex offender. The New Mexico Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) requires a person convicted of any of twelve enumerated sex offenses, or who is convicted of an sheriff for the New Mexico county in which that person resides. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was what constituted an equivalent offense and how a court makes that determination. Upon review, the Court held that an offense is "equivalent" to a New Mexico offense for purposes of SORNA, is if the defendant's actual conduct that gave rise to the out-of-state conviction would have constituted one of the twelve enumerated offenses requiring registration. View "New Mexico v. Hall" on Justia Law

Petitioner Joseph C. Perry, Petitioner, was a prison inmate at the Penitentiary of New Mexico serving sentence at the Lea County Correctional Facility for battery against a household member as well as for a parole violation for fraud over $2,500. In 2006, Petitioner was transported to the Otero County Detention Center for an arraignment relating to the fraud charge. While at the Otero Center, Petitioner raped inmate Joshua Sommer. Upon discovering Petitioner’s pending criminal charge for rape in Otero County District Court, the New Mexico Corrections Department (NMCD) pursued disciplinary action against him for the same rape incident. A disciplinary hearing was scheduled at the Lea County Facility. A hearing officer conducted the hearing, documenting the proceedings and the evidence in a form entitled "Disciplinary Summary of Evidence and Proceeding," the tape of which was lost. The hearing officer ultimately concluded that Petitioner committed rape and threats to other inmates. NMCD forfeited Petitioner’s earned good time (69 days) and placed him in Level VI Disciplinary Segregation at a maximum security facility for a period of 455 days. In 2007, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus at the Santa Fe District Court, asserting five grounds for habeas relief. Just over three weeks later, Petitioner was convicted in Otero County on second-degree felony of criminal sexual penetration and the third-degree felony of bribery or intimidation of a witness, based on the same rape incident. Approximately a year later, the State filed an amended response to an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus and attached the judgment and sentence from Otero County. The central issue at the evidentiary hearing was whether NMCD had violated Petitioner’s due process rights by denying him an opportunity to call witnesses or otherwise elicit written testimony at his prison disciplinary hearing. At the conclusion of the habeas hearing, the district court agreed with Petitioner’s contentions and issued an order granting remedies with respect to its earlier findings of due process violations. Notwithstanding Petitioner’s intervening criminal convictions for rape and witness intimidation, the district court ordered NMCD to (1) restore Petitioner’s good-time credits, (2) remove the disciplinary hearing findings from Petitioner’s record, (3) never use findings of the disciplinary hearing against Petitioner in any way, including in present and future decisions relating to classification and placement within the prison system, and (4) never pursue the same factual allegations that were the subject of the disciplinary hearing in later proceedings against Petitioner. The NMCD appealed; the Supreme Court reversed: "In focusing on Petitioner’s procedural due process rights, the district court appears to have lost sight of the reason for such a hearing. The court failed to appreciate the significance of the intervening criminal convictions - not to whether due process was violated - but, pivotally, to what remedy was appropriate under the circumstances." View "Perry v. Moya" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case was whether NMSA 1978, Section 72-2-9.1 (2003), provided a constitutional delegation of authority for the Office of the State Engineer to adopt new regulations to administer water resources according to administrative interim priority determinations based on a number of factors. The district court and Court of Appeals concluded that it did not and that the State Engineer’s lawful authority to supervise water allocations could be exercised only on the basis of licenses issued by the State Engineer and adjudications in court. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and held that the Legislature delegated lawful authority to the State Engineer to promulgate the challenged water administration regulations. Furthermore, the Court held that the regulations were not unconstitutional on separation of powers, due process, or vagueness grounds. View "Tri-State Generation & Transmission Assn., Inc. v. D'Antonio" on Justia Law