Justia New Mexico Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Alicia Gonzales got into her car after a night of heavy drinking and began to drive to the Albuquerque International Sunport to pick up her husband. On the interstate, Defendant, sideswiped one vehicle and plowed into the back of another in which two children, Manuel Delfino and Deandre Fortune, were riding. While the adults in the front seats were uninjured, one of the children died from their injuries, and the other received minor injuries. Defendant was later indicted on multiple charges stemming from the crash. She was charged with one count of intentional child abuse resulting in death (or negligent in the alternative), one count of intentional child abuse not resulting in death or great bodily harm (or negligent in the alternative), one count of aggravated DWI, and one count of leaving the scene of an accident. "Curiously," the State did not charge Defendant with vehicular homicide. Defendant was convicted of negligent child abuse, but that charge was later reversed by the Court of Appeals for lack of substantial evidence. She was also convicted of DWI and leaving the scene of an accident. The State, barred by double jeopardy from retrying Defendant for child abuse, then sought to prosecute Defendant for vehicular homicide. The Court of Appeals did not allow the vehicular homicide charge, again, on double jeopardy grounds. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviewed only that portion of the Court of Appeals opinion denying the State a new trial for vehicular homicide. The Court of Appeals concluded that under the facts of this case, vehicular homicide was a lesser included offense of negligent child abuse resulting in death, and as a result, double jeopardy barred a new trial. The Supreme Court did not find it necessary to decide whether vehicular homicide was such a lesser included offense. Instead, the Court came to a similar conclusion based on the related principle of joinder. "This is not a case in which the charge the State now [sought] to bring, vehicular homicide, was unknown at the time Defendant was indicted. The State had at least three different opportunities to join these offenses." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals but on somewhat different grounds. View "New Mexico v. Gonzales" on Justia Law

Defendant Paul Wayne Lovett was charged with murdering two women in two separate, unrelated incidents as well as criminal sexual penetration with respect to one of the victims. Pursuant to Rule 5-203(A) NMRA the two murder charges were joined in one complaint, indictment or information with the intent to try the two murder charges together in one trial. Pursuant to Rule 5-203(C) NMRA Defendant moved to sever the two murder charges into two separate trials. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to sever, and Defendant was subsequently convicted of both counts of first-degree murder in one joint trial. Upon review of the case, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred when it failed to sever the murder charges into separate trials. Because the error constituted reversible, non-harmless error in relation to one of the murder convictions, the Court vacated that conviction while upholding the other first-degree murder conviction as well as the conviction for criminal sexual penetration.View "New Mexico v. Lovett" on Justia Law

Defendant Greg Collier was indicted in August 2006 for fourth-degree extreme cruelty to animals after a horse he owned died. A jury acquitted Defendant of felony extreme cruelty to animals but was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor cruelty to animals, on which the district court, at the State's request, instructed the jury without objection from Defendant. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the State could retry Defendant for the lesser offense, which was not explicitly charged in the indictment, without running afoul of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the State could retry Defendant for the lesser included offense because retrial after a mistrial caused by jury deadlock does not violate the constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy. Furthermore, the Court held that the applicable statute of limitations did not bar retrial on the lesser included offense. View "New Mexico v. Collier" on Justia Law

Respondents the State of New Mexico and Warden Erasmo Bravo appealed the district court's grant of Petitioner George Quintana's petition for writ of habeas corpus. The district court granted the petition based exclusively on the allegations contained in petitioner's amended petition, together with a supporting affidavit from one of petitioner's trial counsel admitting to being ineffective in her representation of him. The district court's rationale for this "unorthodox" decision was Respondents' failure to timely file a response to the amended petition and their failure to appear at a scheduled motions hearing, despite having received notice of the hearing. The reason for Respondents' failure to file a response and appear at the hearing was due to a conflict of interest that arose when the attorney affiant went to work for the District Attorney in the same jurisdiction. The district court was aware of the conflict and the confusion regarding whether an attorney from the Attorney General's office or an attorney from a district attorney's office from another jurisdiction would represent Respondents. Despite acknowledging the existence of the conflict and the confusion about who would represent Respondents, the district court vacated petitioner's convictions and granted him a new trial. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the conduct of the District Attorney and the Attorney General did not rise to the level of stubborn resistance to the district court's orders that would justify the extreme sanction of vacating petitioner's jury convictions without both considering a response from Respondents and after having had a full evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Quintana v. Bravo" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the construction of a single word, "sudden," within a pollution exclusion clause in a series of liability insurance policies barring coverage for certain damages unless the events causing those damages were "sudden and accidental" (an issue of first impression in New Mexico). Concluding that "sudden" lacks a single clear meaning, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' holding that the word unambiguously signifies "quick, abrupt, or a temporarily short period of time. . . .Under well-established principles of insurance law," the Court construed this ambiguity in favor of the insured, Petitioner United Nuclear Corporation, and interpreted the term "sudden" in the insurance policies at issue in this dispute to mean "unexpected." the case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "United Nuclear Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The City of Santa Fe (City) charged Julio Marquez with two violations of the Santa Fe City Code (SFCC), including Operating a Motor Vehicle Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor or Drugs (DWI). After the City rested its case at trial, the district court sua sponte ruled that the arresting officer's DWI investigation was unlawful and on that basis entered an order suppressing all evidence from the investigation, therefore dismissing the DWI charge against Marquez. The City appealed. Under New Mexico law statutes, constitutional double jeopardy principles bar the City from retrying Marquez and therefore the appeal should have been dismissed. The Court nonetheless wrote to cast light on the unintended consequences that could follow (and, in this case, did follow) from waiting until trial to consider suppression issues; to clarify that the Rules of Criminal Procedure require a motion to suppress evidence to be made within twenty days of entry of a defendant's plea, absent good cause shown; and to expand the applicable rule to require district courts to adjudicate the suppression of possibly illegally obtained evidence prior to trial, unless good cause exists for delaying such rulings until trial.View "City of Santa Fe v. Marquez" on Justia Law

The Judicial Standards Commission filed a petition for discipline against Espanola municipal court judge Respondent Stephen S. Salazar. David Vigil, the son of a member of Respondent’s church and an acquaintance, manufactured a custom chopper motorcycle which he allowed John Martinez to test ride. Vigil did not produce a title to the vehicle prior to allowing Martinez to test ride it. Ohkay Owingeh police towed the motorcycle during the course of a criminal case for domestic violence against Martinez. The seized motorcycle was towed by George and David Luna d/b/a Aces Towing and Recovery, LLC. Vigil phoned and later visited Respondent for help in recovering the motorcycle. Respondent directed Vigil to have his attorney draft an ex parte order regarding the motorcycle. Vigil delivered the order to Respondent in the lobby of the courthouse and Respondent signed it. In the order, Respondent directed George Luna and Aces Towing to return Vigil’s motorcycle. The order falsely stated that Respondent had held a hearing on the matter. Respondent did not give notice or an opportunity to be heard to the Lunas or their company. In addition, Respondent embossed the official seal of the Espanola Municipal Court upon the order even though there was no case pending or court file existing in that court for the matter. Respondent also failed to inquire if Vigil’s matter was pending in Rio Arriba County Magistrate Court or was part of any other action in any other court; Martinez’s case was, in fact, pending in Rio Arriba County Magistrate Court. When Respondent signed the order, he was on probation with the Commission following a trial before the Commission in November 2009. George Luna and Aces Towing filed a Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Superintending Control in the district court seeking to quash Respondent’s order. The First Judicial District Court granted the writ petition and quashed the order. The Supreme Court issued an order accepting the Commission’s recommendation for discipline suspending Respondent without pay for ninety days, placing Respondent on probation for the remainder of his current term of office, requiring Respondent to pay restitution to the injured parties, requiring Respondent to pay all costs associated with the disciplinary process and ordering a public censure of Respondent. View "In the Matter of Salazar" on Justia Law

While aimlessly driving around Roswell in 2008, Defendant Julian Tafoya shot and killed Andrea Larez, and shot and injured Crystal Brady. Larez and Brady were sitting in the front of the car and Defendant and his girlfriend, Kaprice Conde, were sitting in back. Defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder with the predicate felony of "shooting at or from a motor vehicle," attempted first degree murder, and tampering with evidence. The trial court also found Defendant guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm after the jury issued a special verdict finding that Defendant committed the above crimes with a firearm. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment plus seventeen and one-half years. Defendant appealed his convictions to the Supreme Court. Principal among Defendant's contentions on appeal, he argued: (1) that his felony murder conviction should have been reversed because shooting entirely within a motor vehicle is neither shooting "at" nor "from" a motor vehicle and therefore cannot serve as the predicate felony for his felony murder conviction; (2) that shooting at or from a motor vehicle cannot serve as the requisite collateral felony for a felony murder conviction; (3) that there was insufficient evidence of deliberation to support his conviction for attempted first degree murder. Upon review, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court to vacate the felony murder conviction and enter judgment for second degree murder. The Court did not reach Defendant's second argument on appeal. Furthermore, the Court found sufficient evidence to support his conviction for attempted murder.View "New Mexico v. Tafoya" on Justia Law

Two cases were consolidated for the purposes of this opinion. In the first, Defendant Abdul Muqqddin was charged with five separate counts when a police officer discovered him lying under a car in an attempt to drain the gas tank: auto burglary; criminal damage to property; possession of burglary tools; larceny; and concealing identity. A jury trial was held. At the close of the State’s case, Defendant moved for a directed verdict on all charges. The district court granted the motion in regard to the possession of burglary tools charge, but denied the motion in regard to the other charges. The jury returned a guilty verdict on all the remaining charges, including auto burglary. Before his trial, Defendant Edgar Dominguez-Meraz filed a motion to dismiss the burglary charge filed against him. He was charged with burglary for allegedly removing the two rear wheels of a vehicle and the lug nuts of the front wheels. The motion acknowledged that Defendant Dominguez-Meraz was one of two individuals apprehended near a vehicle missing two rear tires and lug nuts from the front wheels. He argued, however, even if those facts were true, as a matter of law he could not be convicted of burglary for those actions because there was no entry as required by the statute. The district court agreed with Defendant Dominguez-Meraz and ordered the burglary charge dismissed. The issue presented before the Supreme Court by these cases concerned the "outer limits" of New Mexico’s burglary statute. In more than 40 years, the Court issued only one burglary opinion. Over that same time, the Court of Appeals has issued numerous opinions that significantly expanded the reach of the statute without any parallel change in the statute itself. The Court took the opportunity to review "the unprecedented scope of that expansion." Ultimately, the Court concluded that New Mexico case law had "gone astray." The Court reversed the two cases upon which these appeals relied as authority, vacated Muqqddin's conviction and affirmed the dismissal of the burglary charge against Domminquez-Meraz.View "New Mexico v. Muqqddin" on Justia Law

Santa Fe Pacific Trust, Inc. (SFPT) and Bigbyte are Florida corporations doing business in New Mexico. SFPT owns land and an office building on Central Avenue in Albuquerque and leases most of its commercial space to Bigbyte. In 2006, SFPT filed a four-count complaint against the City of Albuquerque (the City) alleging that the City periodically stated its intention to condemn the Central Avenue property owned by SFPT and claiming damages for inverse condemnation and taking, deprivation of due process, and tortious interference with contract. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as to Bigbyte because all of Bigbyte's claims had been disposed of by summary judgment one year earlier, making a November 2010 notice of appeal untimely. The Supreme Court addressed whether the interlocutory appeal language in the year-old summary judgment, which Bigbyte requested, should have been interpreted to mean that the summary judgment was not a final order. If the year-old summary judgment was not a final order, the Court of Appeals should not have dismissed the appeal. Based on the summary judgment language and Rules 1-054(B)(1)-(2) and 12-203 NMRA, the Supreme Court concluded that the summary judgment was a final order because all of Bigbyte's claims had been disposed of and the summary judgment did not contain express language stating that the summary judgment was not a final order as to Bigbyte. Therefore, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' dismissal of the appeal.View "Santa Fe Pacific Trust, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque" on Justia Law