Justia New Mexico Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Kathrin Kinzer-Ellington was appointed guardian ad litem pursuant to Rule 1-053.3 NMRA to help determine the best interests of minor children whose parents were involved in a custody dispute. As the case grew more and more contentious, Father David Kimbrell sued both Mother Lorraine Kimbrell and the guardian ad litem in tort as next friend of his oldest daughter, Lily Kimbrell, alleging that their conduct had injured the child. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a parent has standing to sue a Rule 1-053.3 guardian ad litem during a pending custody proceeding. The Court held that a Rule 1-053.3 guardian ad litem is protected by absolute quasi-judicial immunity from suit arising from the performance of his or her duties unless the guardian ad litem’s alleged tortious conduct is clearly and completely outside the scope of his or her appointment. A parent does not have standing to sue a guardian ad litem appointed in a custody proceeding on behalf of the child because: (1) the parent has been found to be unable to act in the best interests of the child, and (2) such a lawsuit would create a conflict of interest in the custody case. View "Kimbrell v. Kimbrell" on Justia Law

In 1997, Martin Ramirez was arrested and charged with possession of up to one ounce of marijuana and two other misdemeanors. He appeared in metropolitan court for a custody arraignment two days later and pleaded guilty to all three charges on the advice of his public defender. In 2009, Ramirez learned that his guilty pleas in 1997 rendered him "inadmissable to the United States." Ramirez filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis in the district court, seeking to vacate his metropolitan court guilty pleas on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. In "New Mexico v. Paredez," (101 P.3d 799), the New Mexico Supreme Court held that a criminal defense attorney who represents a noncitizen client "must advise that client of the specific immigration consequences of pleading guilty" to pending charges. An attorney’s failure to do so will be ineffective assistance of counsel if the client is prejudiced. The question in this case was whether the holding in Paredez applied retroactively and, if it did, whether Ramirez has a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel that could justify withdrawal of his pleas. The Court held that Paredez applied retroactively to 1990, the year that the Court began to prohibit courts from accepting a guilty plea from a defendant without: (1) ascertaining that the defendant understood that a conviction may have an effect on the defendant’s immigration status; (2) obtaining an affidavit from the defendant that the judge personally advised the defendant of the possible effect of a conviction on the defendant’s immigration status; and (3) obtaining a certification from the defendant’s attorney that the attorney had conferred with the defendant and explained in detail the contents of the affidavit signed by the defendant. These requirements were not new in 1997 at the time Ramirez pleaded guilty, and they were "designed to ensure a guilty plea is made knowingly and voluntarily." View "Ramirez v. New Mexico" on Justia Law

In 2004, Defendant Anthony Samora pled guilty to the charge of criminal sexual penetration (CSP) in the second degree for raping a fourteen year-old boy. He served a sentence of three years' incarceration. Nearly ten years later, a jury convicted Defendant of CSP in the second degree (in the commission of another felony) for raping a fifteen year-old boy. Because this was Defendant's second such conviction, the State sought to impose a mandatory life sentence. However, the district court concluded that the mandatory life sentence enhancement under Section 31-18-25 did not apply to this case, finding a "legislative infirmity," in the statutes. Before sentencing and before the district court released the jury from service, the State effectively appealed the district court's refusal to impose a mandatory life sentence. The Supreme Court granted the State's emergency petition for writ of superintending control. Subsection D of Section 30-9-11 previously defined CSP in the second degree; a 2007 legislative reorganization of the statute moved the definition of CSP in the second degree to Subsection E. Subsection D has since defined CSP in the first degree, which was not applicable to Defendant's convictions. Solely by its reference to Subsection D of Section 30-9-11, which as of 2007 defined CSP in the first degree, the definition of a violent sexual offense in Section 31-18-25(F)(2) no longer included repeated convictions of CSP in the second degree. On that basis, Defendant argued and the district court concluded that a mandatory life sentence was not authorized. The Supreme Court was "skeptical of reading too much into a passive and incidental legislative act." The 2009 amendment of Section 30-9-11 did not effectively repeal Section 31-18-25(F)(2), and therefore it did not repeal a district court's authority to impose the mandatory life sentence for a second conviction of a violent sexual offense under Section 31-18-25(A). The current Section 31-18-25(F) continues to define a violent sexual offense as either first- or second-degree CSP, despite referencing two subsections in Section 30-9-11 that define first-degree CSP and aggravated CSP pursuant to the 2007 renumbering of the Section 30-9-11 subsections. The Court invited the New Mexico Legislature to address this statutory anomaly to clarify what was essentially a clerical error. View "State of New Mexico ex rel. Brandenburg v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Thomas P. Whelan, Jr.'s decedent father, Thomas P. Whelan, Sr., was in Plaintiff's parked truck when it was hit by a moving vehicle. The collision allegedly resulted in severe injuries and medical costs in excess of $100,000 and ultimately in the decedent's death a few years later. At the time of the accident, occupants of Plaintiff's truck were insureds under the terms of a $50,000 liability policy issued by State Farm, facially providing no UM/UIM coverage. In the Supreme Court's decision in "Jordan v. Allstate Ins. Co.," the effective rejection of an insured's statutory rights to UM/UIM coverage equal to liability limits had to be made in writing and as part of the insurance policy delivered to the insured. Because the result in "Jordan" was foreshadowed by other precedents, the Supreme Court declined to make Jordan applicable only to cases arising in the future, and held that policies that failed to comply with Jordan's rejection requirements would be judicially reformed to provide full statutory coverage. In 2011, following the 2010 issuance of Jordan, Plaintiff made a demand on his insurer State Farm for reformation of his policy that was in effect at the time of the accident. Relying on a clause in the policy that purported to bar UM/UIM claims made more than six years after the date of the underlying accident, State Farm rejected the claim. Plaintiff then instituted a declaratory judgment action against State Farm for reformation of the policy. Upon review of this matter, the Supreme Court held that a limitations clause based solely on the date of the accident without consideration of the actual accrual of the right to make a UM/UIM claim was unreasonable and unenforceable as a matter of law. But addressing the merits of Plaintiff's action, the Court also held that judicial reformation under Jordan did not extend to historical insurance contracts formed before another precedential opinion was issued in 2004. Because the policy in this case was issued before that date, it was not subject to retroactive reformation of its facial lack of UM/UIM coverage. View "Whelan v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After her indictment for second-degree murder, but prior to trial, Petitioner Amy Herrera sought a writ of mandamus from this Court directing the district court to dismiss the indictment. Petitioner contended that the prosecutor prevented the grand jury from inquiring into the facts demonstrating probable cause and failed to act in a fair and impartial manner when instructing the grand jury. The Supreme Court agreed that the manner in which the prosecutor conducted the grand jury proceedings warranted dismissal of the indictment. The Court therefore issued a writ of mandamus directing the district court to dismiss the indictment without prejudice to the State’s right to bring new criminal charges against Petitioner. View "Herrera v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

The district court concluded that "Grace H.'s" father's parental rights should be terminated pursuant to a finding of abandonment without establishing that the conditions of neglect, by abandonment, could be not be cured. The father appealed that ruling, arguing that an ambiguity in Section 32A-4-28 led to an incorrect ruling. He averred that the Children Youth and Families Department (the Department) "used its unfettered discretion to pursue a theory of abandonment under Section 32A-4-28(B)(1) without establishing that it made reasonable efforts to cure the causes of neglect, as required by Section 32A-4-28(B)(2)." While the Supreme Court did not agree with the father’s framing of the issue on appeal, it did agree that Section 32A-4-28 was ambiguous with respect to when abandonment may be used as a basis for termination of parental rights. Furthermore, the Court also agreed that this ambiguity led to the improper termination of his parental rights in this case. For that reason, the Court reversed the district court’s ruling. View "In the Matter of Grace H." on Justia Law

Defendant Nieves Ortega was convicted of one count of wilful and deliberate murder. He was also convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, attempted first-degree kidnapping, armed robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, and conspiracy to commit first-degree kidnapping. He was ultimately sentenced to a life sentence. On direct appeal to the Supreme Court, defendant argued: he received ineffective assistance of counsel; that the district court erred in denying an important defense witness use immunity; testimony of the State’s medical expert violated Defendant’s confrontation rights; Defendant’s multiple conspiracy convictions violated double jeopardy; the jury was improperly instructed; the State violated its duty to disclose; and cumulative error. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions for first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, attempted first-degree kidnapping, and attempted armed robbery. The Court vacated Defendant’s convictions for conspiracy to commit robbery and conspiracy to commit first-degree kidnapping on double jeopardy grounds. View "New Mexico v. Ortega" on Justia Law

Police officers were dispatched in response to reports of an armed subject pointing a rifle at several people from the window of a light beige or tan vehicle. After Defendant Leticia T. (Child) and children passengers were removed and detained, the officers conducted a warrantless search of the interior and trunk of the vehicle. The district court held that the warrantless search was justified by exigent circumstances. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court, ruling that the possibility of a person hiding in the trunk of a vehicle did not constitute exigency. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court centered on the Court of Appeals' reversal. The Supreme Court conclude after a review of the district court record was that when police officers have probable cause and exigent circumstances to believe that an armed subject pointed a rifle at other individuals from a vehicle, officers may search the cab and the trunk of that same vehicle for the rifle. View "New Mexico v. Leticia T." on Justia Law

Defendant Gregg Crocco appealed his conviction for aggravated driving while under the influence of alcohol (aggravated DWI), claiming that his previous attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to file a motion to suppress evidence resulting from a warrantless police entry into the house of an absent third party, which Defendant had entered shortly before his arrest. Upon review of the particular facts of this case, the Supreme Court denied Defendant’s claim because the record failed to establish a prima facie showing that the police entry into another person’s house violated Defendant’s own reasonable expectation of privacy. View "New Mexico v. Crocco" on Justia Law

While working for Vista Care (Employer), appellant Sherrie Fowler suffered a back injury. Appellant began receiving TTD and subsequently underwent back surgery. Several years later, a physician determined that appellant reached maximum medical improvement (MMI). This case began when appellant filed a complaint with the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) in 2010, for reinstatement of her TTD benefits and for an increase in her PPD rating. The Court of Appeals held that the Act limited appellant's eligibility for TTD benefits to 700 weeks of benefits and reversed a contrary decision of the Workers’ Compensation Administration judge. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the Act imposed no such limitation; TTD benefits are payable during any period of total disability for the remainder of a worker’s life. View "Fowler v. Vista Care" on Justia Law