Justia New Mexico Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

There is no hospital in Valencia County. People in Valencia County who are faced with a medical emergency must deal with the emergency itself, and find a way to travel twenty to thirty-five miles to an Albuquerque hospital. Ambulances coming from Valencia County can take two hours or longer to transport a patient to the nearest hospital, process the patient, and return. The long turnaround times mean that ambulance companies sometimes run at full capacity, or “zero status,” and cannot respond to calls from new patients because all available ambulances are in use. Since 1987, appellant Living Cross Ambulance Service has been the only ambulance company in Valencia County operating under a permanent certificate from the Public Regulation Commission (PRC). Living Cross has been at zero status and unavailable to transport patients for less than one percent of ambulance service requests. When Living Cross is at zero status, dispatch requests mutual aid from a nearby ambulance company, and if those mutual aid ambulances are also unavailable, the municipality whose EMTs first responded to the scene must transport the patients at the municipality’s expense. This case was a direct appeal from a final order of the Public Regulation Commission (PRC) granting a permanent certificate to American Medical Response Ambulance Service, Inc. d/b/a American Medical Response, Emergicare (AMR) for both emergency and nonemergency ambulance service in Valencia County. Living Cross petitioned the New Mexico Supreme Court to vacate the final order of the PRC, claiming that the PRC acted arbitrarily and capriciously by granting AMR’s certificate because there was no evidence of need for non-emergency ambulance service in Valencia County, and because there was insufficient evidence of need for additional emergency ambulance service. Living Cross also claimed that the PRC abused its discretion by allowing Living Cross’s former attorney to represent AMR in an initial hearing before ruling on its motion to disqualify the attorney. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the PRC decision to allow the former Living Cross attorney to appear for AMR during the hearing for the temporary permit was contrary to law, and that the wholesale admission of the record from that hearing as evidence in the hearing for the permanent certificate was plain error, requiring reversal. Because the Court determined that the attorney disqualification issue is dispositive, it did not reach the other issues in this case. View "Living Cross Ambulance Serv. v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm'n" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the issue this case presented to the New Mexico Supreme Court was whether pharmacists who dispense prescription drugs to Medicaid recipients must be paid under the formula set forth in NMSA 1978, Section 27-2-16(B) (1984). Section 27-2-16(B) was enacted when New Mexico only operated under a fee-for-services model. The Legislature created a new, alternative managed care system in 1994 in an effort to rein in costs of medical public assistance. The district court and our Court of Appeals held that Section 27-2-16(B) applied in both the fee-for-services context and in managed care settings. Upon review, however, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that Section 27-2-16(B) applied only in the fee-for-services context, which requires HSD to directly reimburse providers. View "Starko, Inc. v. New Mexico Human Servs. Dep't" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant Vincent Montoya of kidnapping with the intent to inflict a sexual offense upon his girlfriend (Victim). Defendant was also convicted of two other crimes not relevant to this appeal. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on "the confusing interplay" between an accused's Sixth Amendment right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him," and New Mexico's rape shield law designed to protect a victim's privacy. Because the Court determined that the accused was denied an opportunity to fully confront his accuser and because this error could have affected the jury's verdict, it reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "New Mexico v. Montoya" on Justia Law

A jury returned a guilty verdict against defendant for intentional and negligent child abuse causing great bodily harm to an infant, which the Court of Appeals affirmed in a memorandum opinion. Upon review of the case, the Supreme Court held that under the particular circumstances of this case, the district court erred: (1) when it rejected defense counsel's request for separate jury instructions for intentional and negligent child abuse; (2) that the evidence offered to support the charge of criminally negligent child abuse resulting in great bodily harm failed, according to the State's own witnesses, to prove that Defendant's actions caused the infant's injuries; and (3) that the evidence of intentional child abuse resulting in great bodily harm, in this case, an allegation that the accused intentionally suffocated the infant, failed to prove that charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court and order the charges dismissed with prejudice for lack of sufficient evidence. View "New Mexico v. Consaul" on Justia Law

A Curry County grand jury indicted Defendant Julian Gutierrez on three counts of criminal sexual contact of a minor based on the testimony of Defendant’s daughter that he touched or pinched her breasts on several occasions when she was fifteen years old. At the time of the alleged incidents, Defendant was estranged from his daughter’s mother, who lived in Lubbock, Texas. After Defendant’s indictment, his daughter moved out of their home to stay next door with her paternal grandparents. On the first scheduled day of trial, Defendant informed his attorney that he had been provided with a statement written by his daughter that related to a recent visit by prosecution representatives to her school. When defense counsel asked for a hearing on the new revelations, the prosecutor admitted not having disclosed to the defense anything about the pretrial encounter at which the daughter attempted to recant her grand jury testimony. The next morning, when Defendant’s daughter did not appear to testify and the State could not locate her, the State asked the district court to make a finding of manifest necessity and declare a mistrial. Two weeks later, the daughter still not having been located, the district court declared a mistrial over the objection of the defense and permanently discharged the jury. The court rejected Defendant’s argument that determining manifest necessity required considering the “intertwined” matter of prosecutorial misconduct in the encounter with the daughter, saying that it would address the propriety of that encounter separately “at a later date.” Another two weeks passed, and the daughter had been arrested on the bench warrant. The court held hearings on Defendant’s motions to dismiss for prosecutorial misconduct and to preclude retrial for lack of manifest necessity justifying the mistrial. The ultimate issue this case presented to for the Supreme Court's review centered on the boundaries between proper and improper prosecutorial conduct in dealing with recalcitrant witnesses and of the circumstances in which a mistrial and retrial may take place without violating constitutional double jeopardy protections when a witness does not appear for trial. Following federal double jeopardy principles in United States Supreme Court precedent, the New Mexico Court concluded that a prosecution witness’s failure to appear for Defendant’s trial did not constitute manifest necessity for granting a mistrial after a jury had been selected and sworn to hear his case. Because empaneling a new jury and retrying Defendant would violate his double jeopardy protections under the United States Constitution, the Court remanded this case to the district court with instructions to dismiss. View "New Mexico v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

Petitioner-taxpayer CAVU Company was the owner of a twenty-six-acre school campus in Santa Fe that was developed and improved beginning in 1997 solely for operation as a school. Since opening its doors over fifteen years ago, the Property has been used for educational purposes by several schools and has never been used for any other purpose. The following time line indicates the changes in occupancy of the Property since its development for use as a school. Taxpayer purchased the Property in 2004, when the New Mexico Academy for Science and Mathematics (NMASM) was experiencing financial difficulties. Taxpayer leased the Property to NMASM for $1.00 per year for several academic years and supported the school with donations in an effort to help NMASM succeed. In August 2007, Taxpayer raised the rent to $10,000 per month, although by November 2007 it was clear that NMASM could not afford that rate. At this point, Taxpayer allowed the school to occupy the building rent free until June 2008, when it closed. Throughout the remainder of 2008 and all of 2009, Taxpayer actively sought to lease the Property to various other educational tenants, negotiating in particular with Desert Academy. Taxpayer listed the Property for sale on the residential or commercial market but refused to lease the building to anyone other than an educational tenant. In March 2010, shortly after Taxpayer began temporarily leasing the Property to a training school for dogs and their owners, the Santa Fe County Assessor discovered the Property’s sale listing. Although the Assessor was apparently aware that the Property had been vacant, it was the sale listing that motivated the Assessor to put the Property on the tax rolls and issue Taxpayer a notice of valuation for $6,689,750 for the 2010 tax year. Taxpayer filed an application for an educational use exemption for 2010, which the Assessor denied because “on January 1st of 2009 and 2010” the property “was not used directly and immediately for educational purposes.” Following a March 2011 hearing before the Santa Fe County Valuation Protests Board, the Board reinstated Taxpayer’s exemption for 2010. On Assessor’s appeal, the District Court reversed the Board’s decision and denied the exemption pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 7-38-7 (1997) because the Property was not “currently and actively used as an educational facility” specifically on January 1, 2010, the Property had been listed for sale to residential or commercial buyers, and no showing of fraud or intentional discrimination entitled the Property to an exemption under Article VIII, Section 1(A). Soon after the district court’s ruling, Taxpayer sold the Property to Desert Academy. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that the appropriate inquiry into the validity of a property’s educational exemption from taxation under the exemption provision of Article VIII, Section 3 of the New Mexico Constitution was whether use during the tax year furthered the exempt purpose. Because the taxpayer in this case had only used the property for educational purposes, had declined to use it for noneducational purposes, and was actively negotiating with schools capable of relocating to his campus property during the relevant tax year when the property was temporarily vacant, the Court reversed the conclusions of the lower courts that the property could not qualify for an educational use exemption. The case was remanded to the Santa Fe County Valuation Protests Board for further consideration. View "CAVU Co. v. Martinez" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant Gerard Parvilus guilty of the 2008 aggravated burglary of his estranged wife’s separate dwelling, murder of her boyfriend, first-degree kidnapping of his wife and her boyfriend, aggravated assault of his wife, and interference with communications. The district court granted Defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and vacated the aggravated burglary conviction because of Defendant's claimed unrestricted right under Section 40-3-3 to make an unconsented entry into his wife's separate residence. Section 40-3-3 (1907), a civil marital property statute, recognized the rights of married women to hold separate property but provided that "neither [husband nor wife could] be excluded from the other’s dwelling." The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Supreme Court held that Section 40-3-3 did not preclude a conviction for burglary of a spouse's separate dwelling, and reversed the contrary rulings of both lower courts. View "New Mexico v. Parvilus" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with trafficking controlled substances and possession of drug paraphernalia based on evidence obtained by the police, who found evidence of methamphetamine manufacturing in the dumpster of the Choice Inn in Clovis where Defendant rented a room. Prior to trial, Defendant moved for the suppression of evidence found in the dumpster, as well as evidence obtained from the room, which was acquired by a search warrant that was based in part on the evidence recovered from the dumpster. He argued that the police's warrantless search of the garbage and subsequent immediate searches violated his constitutional right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. The district court granted the motion to suppress. With this opinion the Supreme Court addressed whether, pursuant to Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution, Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage left out for collection in the motel dumpster. The Court of Appeals upheld the district court's ruling. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ ultimate holding, but on slightly different grounds. View "New Mexico v. Crane" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, homeowners Pinghua Zhao, and Gregg and Janet Fallick appealed the valuation of their residences for property tax purposes as a result of what they alleged was "tax lightning," also known as acquisition-value taxation. Under acquisition-value taxation, a real estate owner's property tax liability is determined by the value of the property when acquired, not by the traditional practice of taxing real property on its current fair market value. Consequently, there could be disparities in the tax liabilities of taxpayers owning similar properties. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Section 7-36-21.2 (2003) created an authorized class based on the nature of the property and not the taxpayer. The Court also held that the New Mexico tax system did not violate the equal and uniform clause of the New Mexico Constitution because it furthered a legitimate state interest. Furthermore, the Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of "owner-occupant." Therefore, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the Court of Appeals. View "Zhao v. Montoya" on Justia Law

In January 2006, two former payday lenders, defendants B&B Investment Group, Inc., and American Cash Loans, LLC, began to market and originate high-cost signature of $50 to $300, primarily to less-educated and financially unsophisticated individuals. The loans were for twelve months, payable biweekly, and carried annual percentage rates ranging from 1,147.14 to 1,500%. The Attorney General’s Office sued Defendants, alleging that the loan products were procedurally and substantively unconscionable under the common law and that they violated the Unfair Practices Act (UPA). The district court found that Defendants’ marketing and loan origination procedures were unconscionable and enjoined certain of its practices in the future, but declined to find the high-cost loans substantively unconscionable, concluding that it is the Legislature’s responsibility to determine limits on interest rates. Both parties appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s finding of procedural unconscionability. However, the Court reversed the district court’s refusal to find that the loans were substantively unconscionable because under the UPA, courts have the responsibility to determine whether a contract results in a gross disparity between the value received by a person and the price paid. The Supreme Court concluded that the interest rates in this case were substantively unconscionable and violated the UPA. View "New Mexico ex rel. King v. B&B Investment Group, Inc." on Justia Law