Justia New Mexico Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Donnie Silvas was convicted by jury of trafficking a controlled substance by possession with intent to distribute, and conspiracy to commit trafficking of the controlled substance. Both charges stemmed from one point in time, and a single sale of drugs. The Court of Appeals overturned the conspiracy conviction based on an expanded use of judicial presumption, also known as "Wharton's Rule." After review of the appellate court's decision, the Supreme Court agreed with the decision to reverse the conspiracy charge, it did so on a different ground: double jeopardy. By this opinion, the Court expressly discouraged "any future expansion of Wharton's Rule beyond its original contours." View "New Mexico v. Silvas" on Justia Law

Defendant Cesar Favela filed a motion requesting permission to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel after his attorney failed to advise him that his guilty plea would result in deportation. The district court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that where a defendant’s attorney fails to advise that defendant of the specific immigration consequences of entering a guilty plea, a warning of such consequences by a judge during a plea colloquy does not, by itself, cure the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the attorney’s deficient performance and should only be given minimal weight in the analysis of prejudice. The State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ holding that a judge’s warning of such consequences during a plea colloquy could not alone cure the prejudice caused by the attorney’s deficient performance. View "New Mexico v. Favela" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was one of res judicata, and whether the preclusive effect of a fee proceeding in bankruptcy court on a later lawsuit for legal malpractice allegedly committed in the course of the bankruptcy. After review, the Court held that the elements of res judicata were met and that Petitioner was sufficiently aware of his malpractice claim, which he could and should have brought in the bankruptcy proceeding. The Court affirmed dismissal of Petitioner’s subsequent malpractice suit but emphasized that barring a claim on res judicata grounds requires a determination that the claimant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim in the earlier proceeding. View "Potter v. Pierce" on Justia Law

Respondent-guardian Djamila B. was appointed by a family court as kinship guardian to children Mahdjid and Aliah. Children, Youth & Families Department (CYFD) brought abuse and neglect proceedings against the guardian and the children's biological parents. Prior to seeking adoption for the children, CYFD filed a motion to dismiss the guardian from the abuse and neglect proceedings, arguing the guardian was not an appropriate party to a termination of parental rights proceeding because the guardian was not a parent. The children's court granted CYFD's motion without revoking the kinship guardianship. The Court of Appeals reversed the children's court ruling, holding that the guardian was a necessary and indispensable party to the abuse proceedings. After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' outcome, but on different grounds. The Court held that while kinship guardians were not necessary and indispensable parties to abuse and neglect proceedings, kinship guardians, nonetheless, have a statutory right to a revocation hearing in accordance with the revocation procedures of the Kinship Guardian Act prior to being dismissed from abuse and neglect proceedings. "There is no need for separate filings and hearings in the original family court that appointed the kinship guardian because the children’s court presiding over the abuse and neglect proceeding has jurisdiction over the kinship guardian and the subject matter of the case to make decisions that are ultimately in the best interests of the children. In addition to matters involving the guardian, the children's biological father intervened in this appeal arguing his due process rights were violated because he was not given a fair opportunity to voice concerns in the dismissal of Guardian from the abuse and neglect proceedings. The Supreme Court found it was unnecessary to address the Father's claim in view of its holding on the primary issue. View "In re Mahdjid B. and Aliah B." on Justia Law

In the 2014 legislative session, the New Mexico Legislature passed the General Appropriations Act of 2014, which included a pair of salary increases for judges and justices of the state judiciary. The first increase was a 5% raise for the judicial branch (including judges). The raise was not separately identified in the language of section 4(B) of the Act. The second increase, separately funded in Section 8(A) was the same 3% raise authorized for all eligible state employees, including judges. Calling out what she referred to as a "dramatic 8% raise," Governor Martinez used her partial veto authority to strike the 3% raise for judges, leaving intact the language set forth in section 4(B). Thereafter, a group of judges, judicial associations and legislators (collectively, petitioners), petitioned the New Mexico Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to declare the Governor's veto of the 3% raise as unconstitutional. Petitioners sought to have the vetoed language reinstated, thereby asking for the full 8% raise. After a full briefing and hearing the arguments of the parties, the Supreme Court denied the petition in part, holding that the Governor's veto was effective with respect to the section 8(A) 3% raise. The Court also granted in part, holding that the 5% raise separately funded in section 4(B) was never vetoed and therefore was still intact. The Court then issued the writ to order the Secretary of the Department of Finance and Administration to implement the 5% raise. View "New Mexico ex rel. Cisneros v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Defendant Walter Brown was arrested in 2011, and indicted two weeks later on an array of charges, including first-degree felony murder and, alternatively, second-degree murder. The district court imposed a $250,000 cash or surety bond at Defendant’s arraignment. After spending more than two years in pretrial custody awaiting trial because he lacked the financial resources to post such a bond, Defendant moved the district court to review his conditions of release and to release him under the supervision of the Second Judicial District Court’s pretrial services program with appropriate nonmonetary conditions of release. After hearing from Defendant and the State, the district court orally denied Defendant’s motion for release on nonmonetary conditions on the ground that Defendant’s charge of first-degree felony murder carried a possible life sentence that would require at least thirty years of imprisonment. The district court subsequently filed a written order setting forth detailed factual findings. Based on the evidence presented at the motion hearing, the district court found that the pretrial services program could fashion appropriate conditions of release for Defendant and that Defendant could live with his father and return to his former job if released. After several more months of pretrial confinement, Defendant filed a second motion, again seeking release under the supervision of the pretrial services program with appropriate nonmonetary release conditions. At a hearing on the second motion, defense counsel reiterated the information presented at the first hearing five months earlier and argued that Defendant’s unique personal history made him likely to comply with conditions of release and unlikely to commit additional crimes while released. After the district court denied Defendant’s second motion to amend the conditions of release, Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals by filing a motion under Rule 12-204 NMRA. After its review, the Supreme Court found that defendant presented the district court with uncontroverted evidence demonstrating that nonmonetary conditions of pretrial release were sufficient to reasonably assure that Defendant was not likely to pose a flight or safety risk. Despite this evidence, the district court ordered that Defendant be held in jail unless he posted a $250,000 cash or surety bond, based solely on the nature and seriousness of the charged offense. The Court concluded that the district court erred by requiring a $250,000 bond when the evidence demonstrated that less restrictive conditions of pretrial release would be sufficient. The Court therefore reversed the district court’s pretrial release order and instructed the district court to release Defendant on appropriate nonmonetary conditions. View "New Mexico v. Brown" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review stemmed from a worker's compensation claim. Specifically, the issue the Court had to determine was whether a “wet floor” sign was a safety device and whether a nurse who slips on a recently mopped floor at work is entitled to a 10% increase in benefits when a “wet floor” sign was not posted near a mopped floor. The Court held that a “wet floor” sign is a safety device and that the nurse’s injury resulted from the negligence of the employer in failing to supply reasonable safety devices in general use. View "Benavides v. Eastern N.M. Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Antonio T., a seventeen-year-old high school student, was taken to the principal's office because he was suspected of being under the influence of alcohol. The assistant principal questioned Antonio about his possession of alcohol in the presence of a deputy sheriff. Antonio admitted that he had brought alcohol to school, where he drank it. At the principal's request, the deputy administered a breath alcohol test to Antonio, which was positive for alcohol. After administering the test, the deputy advised Antonio of his right to remain silent, and Antonio declined to answer the questions. Antonio was charged with the delinquent act of possession of alcohol by a minor. He filed a motion to suppress the statements he made to the assistant principal because his statements were elicited without a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to remain silent. The district court denied his motion, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court reversed both the district court and the Court of Appeals: although a school official may insist that a child answer questions for purposes of school disciplinary proceedings, any statements elicited by the official may not be used against the child in a delinquency proceeding unless the child made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his or her right to remain silent. Because the State failed to prove that Antonio effectively waived this right, his statements were inadmissible in the delinquency proceeding. View "New Mexico v. Antonio T." on Justia Law

In August 2002, plaintiff William Vaughan went to the emergency room at St. Vincent Hospital complaining of symptoms that included abdominal pain. In this medical negligence case, Vaughan alleged that, as the result of a communication failure between a surgeon and a contract radiologist, St. Vincent failed to tell Vaughan about a cancer diagnosis. The district court granted summary judgment for St. Vincent because Vaughan did not specifically plead vicarious liability relating to the radiologist, St. Vincent's apparent agent, and failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact through expert testimony. After review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Vaughan's complaint adequately notified St. Vincent that one or more of its employees or agents was negligent and that genuine issues of material fact required resolution at a trial on the merits. View "Vaughan v. St. Vincent Hospital" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether payees who are entitled to interest on suspended oil and gas royalty payments could contract away their statutorily mandated interest payments. The district court awarded interest payments from Defendant Yates Petroleum Company to Petitioners on the basis that NMSA 1978, Section 70-10-4 (1991) mandated that payees be paid interest on funds to which they are entitled. The district court found that this provision of Yates’ form division order was unenforceable because it contravened Section 70-10-4, and therefore Yates owed the interest to Petitioners. Yates appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the parties could contract around the provisions of the statute. According to Yates, its form division order allowed it to withhold payment of oil and gas royalties pending the resolution of title issues, and when it eventually disburses royalties, to pay the proceeds without interest. After review of the record, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the district court’s ruling. View "First Baptist Church of Roswell v. Yates Petroleum Corp." on Justia Law