Justia New Mexico Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Abraham Baca was arrested by Sergeant Martin Trujillo for aggravated DWI and driving left of center of a roadway. The State filed a criminal complaint against Defendant in Magistrate Court. While the magistrate court proceedings were not recorded, what did appear in the record was that on the day of trial, the magistrate judge entered a written order dismissing the case with prejudice upon motion of the defense. The Trial Order was entered on a standardized court form that contained, among other options, fields for recording the magistrate's determination of guilty or not guilty, but these fields were left completely blank and instead the order recited that the cause was "dismissed with prejudice." The State appealed to the district court. While that appeal was pending, the magistrate court sua sponte entered a new, amended signed order in its own files, stating: "A motion was made by defense attorney Ben Ortega to suppress the testimony of Sergeant Martin Trujillo for violation of NMRA 6-506-A(C)(D). Sergeant Martin Trujillo was the arresting Officer. A second motion was made by defense attorney Ben Ortega for a directed verdict of not guilty due to insufficient evidence to proceed. Motion to suppress and directed verdict of not guilty were granted. The Defendant is therefore acquitted." Once the amended magistrate court order was filed, defense counsel moved to dismiss the State's appeal at the district court. The district court found that the magistrate judge's premature termination of the case had been a dismissal to sanction the State's filing of a nonconforming criminal complaint, rather than an acquittal on the merits. Concluding that the State's appeal did not result in double jeopardy, the district court accordingly denied Defendant's motion to dismiss the appeal. Defendant appealed the district court's order denying his motion to dismiss to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court, concluding that because "the magistrate court's dismissal constituted an acquittal and, therefore, the State was barred from appealing," it was inappropriate to address "whether . . .Judge Naranjo's ruling suppressing Sergeant Trujillo's testimony was erroneous." After review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the district court did not err in ruling the state was not constitutionally barred from further prosecution. The magistrate court's termination of defendant's trial before the State had completed presenting its evidence in its case in chief was a procedural dismissal rather than an acquittal on the merits. View "New Mexico v. Baca" on Justia Law

Petitioner Rodrigo Dominguez was convicted for voluntary manslaughter and shooting at or from a motor vehicle resulting in the death of one person, and the aggravated battery and shooting at or from a motor vehicle resulting in great bodily injury in a second person. Petitioner argued that "New Mexico v. Montoya," (306 P.3d 426 (2013)) precluded him from being cumulatively punished for voluntary manslaughter, aggravated battery and the shooting charges on double jeopardy grounds because these charges all stemmed from the same shooting of the same victim. A majority of the New Mexico Supreme Court ultimately rejected petitioner's double jeopardy arguments, concluding that another case controlled. In response, petitioner filed for habeas relief, seeking to retroactively apply "Montoya" to his case to support the same double jeopardy claims he raised earlier in certiorari review. The Supreme Court again declined to accept petitioner's claims because "Montoya" announced a new procedural rule that could not be applied retroactively. View "Dominguez v. New Mexico" on Justia Law

In a matter of first impression for the New Mexico Supreme Court, the issues this case presented related to the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission's authority and procedures in regulating utility rates of a generation and transmission cooperative, which statutorily differed from the Commission's powers over rates charged by public utilities. After review of the cooperatives' arguments on appeal of the Commission's decision, the Supreme Court ultimately vacated the Commission's order related to its suspension of the cooperative's proposed rates and provided guidance for similar situations that might arise in the future. View "Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass'n v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm'n" on Justia Law

A trucking company purchased a liability insurance policy covering its tractors and trailers. The policy stipulated that liability coverage would be limited to "$1,000,000 each ‘accident.’" A tractor-trailer rig insured under the policy was involved in a single accident. The question this case presented for the New Mexico Supreme Court's review centered on whether $1,000,000 was the limit per accident for both vehicles (the tractor and the trailer) or whether each vehicle has liability coverage in the amount of $1,000,000. The district court interpreted the policy to limit its coverage to $1,000,000; the Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed. Because this dispute affects not only the parties to this lawsuit but arguably New Mexico’s place among the many jurisdictions that have grappled with similar policy language, the New Mexico Court granted certiorari. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals and reversed. The Supreme Court found that the Declarations page of the policy at issue provided that the dollar limit was $1,000,000 each accident. Section II(C) of the policy then said the same thing in terms of a "per accident" outside limit on what the insurer would pay: "Regardless of the number of covered ‘autos’ . . . or vehicles involved in the ‘accident’," the most Northland will pay "for the total of all damages . . .resulting from any one ‘accident’ is the Limit of Insurance for Liability Coverage shown in the Declarations [$1,000,000 each accident]." Therefore, the argument advanced by plaintiffs, the Luceros, that the policy provided $1,000,000 in coverage for "'each covered auto in each accident' simply does not find support in the language of the policy. The policy limits Northland’s exposure to $1,000,000 per accident regardless of the number of covered autos involved in any one accident." View "Lucero v. Northland Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Attorney Daniel Faber filed a federal lawsuit on behalf of three assistant attorneys who alleged alleging gender discrimination in connection with their salaries. The Attorney General filed a motion to stay litigation pending resolution of his motion to dismiss the complaint based on an immunity defense. The federal district court entered a memorandum opinion and order granting the Attorney General’s motion to stay all proceedings, including discovery; the stay was lifted a few months later. Prior to lifting of the stay, Faber filed an Inspection of Public Records Act (IPRA) request in his own name seeking employment data for every attorney who had been employed by the Attorney General’s Office since January 1987. The records custodian of the Attorney General’s Office denied the IPRA request, stating that “[t]his request is being denied as these records involve a current lawsuit and appear to circumvent the discovery process and the current Order Staying Discovery (attached).” Faber filed a complaint for damages and a petition for writ of mandamus in the state district court against the Attorney General alleging that his IPRA request had been wrongfully denied. The state district court found that the stay of discovery entered by the federal court did not preempt the statutory rights granted to New Mexico citizens by IPRA, and that the Attorney General violated IPRA by denying Faber’s request. The court also issued a writ of mandamus ordering the Attorney General to comply and ruled that damages would be considered at a later date. Faber subsequently moved for an award of damages. The state district court awarded damages of $10 per day from the date of the wrongful denial to the date the stay was lifted and thereafter “damages of $100 per day until the records are provided,” and $257.19 in costs to Faber. The Attorney General appealed the state district court’s award of damages. The determination of the IPRA violation was not at issue on appeal. The issue in this case focused on what type of damages were authorized by the Legislature in Section 14-2-13 12(D). The Supreme Court held that Section 14-2-12(D) permitted compensatory or actual damages because the plain language, purpose, and history of IPRA indicated that neither punitive nor statutory damages were intended by the Legislature. The Court also held that Faber was not eligible for nominal damages. View "Farber v. King" on Justia Law

Baby Breandra Pena (seventeen months old) died while in the care of defendant Nathan Montoya. Defendant was convicted of intentional child abuse resulting in the death of a child under twelve and sentenced to life imprisonment. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review addressed "the ongoing confusion created by [New Mexico's] child abuse jury instructions. In review of defendant’s conviction on direct appeal, the Court held: (1) the jury instructions used in defendant’s trial accurately instructed the jury of the law that, when considered as a whole, were distinguishable from those used in previous cases which the Court reversed based on erroneous child abuse jury instructions; (2) reckless child abuse may, in some cases, be a lesser included offense of intentional child abuse resulting in the death of a child under twelve (by this opinion, the Court disavowed New Mexico cases suggesting otherwise); (3) when a jury is correctly instructed on both reckless and intentional child abuse resulting in the death of a child under twelve, a step-down instruction is appropriate; (4) the admission of a forensic pathologist’s expert testimony was not in error and that sufficient evidence was presented to convict defendant; and (5) it was abuse of discretion for the district court judge to refuse to consider mitigating the basic sentence of life imprisonment, based on the court’s mistaken understanding that the life sentence was mandatory and could not be altered. Defendant’s conviction for intentional child abuse was affirmed and the case remanded to the district court for resentencing with consideration of potential mitigating circumstances. View "New Mexico v. Montoya" on Justia Law

Three former New Mexico State employees were denied unemployment compensation benefits by the Department of Workforce Solutions because they were in positions designated as "a major nontenured policy-making or advisory position." The Supreme Court reversed the Department's decision, because after review, it concluded that the three positions in questions in these cases were not indeed designated as major nontentured policy-making or advisory positions. View "Perez v. N.M. Dep't of Workforce Solutions" on Justia Law

Defendant Jason Strauch allegedly revealed to his wife that he had been sexually abusing their minor daughter. Defendant moved out of the family home for a time and began attending counseling with a private-practice social worker licensed by the State. The couple reconciled, and defendant moved back into the home. Defendant continued to see the social worker. The daughter revealed to her mother that the abuse never stopped. Defendant and the wife then separated, and she reported the abuse. Defendant was charged with four counts of criminal sexual contact of a minor in the second degree. The State filed notice that it intended to call the social worker as a prosecution witness. Defendant moved for a protective order, arguing that the communications were protected from disclosure. The district court held that the private social worker was not a "mandatory reporter" under state law because his work was as a "private therapist" rather than in an "official capacity." On interlocutory appeal by the State, a majority of the Court of Appeals panel affirmed the district court's protective order. The Supreme Court, after its review of the district and appellate courts concluded that both privately and publicly employed social workers were mandatory child abuse reporters, and statements made to a social worker by an alleged child abuser in private counseling sessions were not protected from disclosure in court proceedings. View "New Mexico v. Strauch" on Justia Law

Respondent Dr. Emre Yedidag was an employee-physician for Roswell Clinic Corp. and Roswell Hospital Corp. (Eastern New Mexico Medical Center). During a peer review of another Eastern employee-physician, Dr. Akbar Ali, Dr. Yedidag questioned Dr. Ali because Dr. Ali was not forthcoming concerning his role in a patient's death. Members of Eastern's executive team reported the exchange to the hospital administration, which led to the subsequent termination of Dr. Yedidag's employment for unprofessional conduct. Dr. Yedidag then filed a complaint against Eastern for utilizing confidential peer review information to justify his termination. A jury determined that Eastern violated the New Mexico Review Organization Immunity Act (ROIA), and concluded that this violation proximately caused Dr. Yedidag's damages. The jury also concluded that Eastern breached its employment contract with Dr. Yedidag by terminating him for his participation in a peer review. The jury awarded both compensatory and punitive damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict. Eastern appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing: (1) ROIA did not create a private cause of action; (2) ROIA did not create an implied promise that Dr. Yedidag would not suffer adverse consequences incident to his participation in the peer review process; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to substantiate the jury's award of punitive damages. Finding no reversible error in the Court of Appeals' judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Yedidag v. Roswell Clinic Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Astorga was convicted by jury of first degree murder, tampering with evidence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The State sought the death penalty; a sentencing jury could not unanimously agree on the death penalty, and consequently, the district court sentenced defendant to life for the murder charge, followed by thirteen and a half years for the remaining charges. Defendant appealed, raising purported errors that occurred during the guilt phase of trial as grounds for reversal of his conviction. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Mexico v. Astorga" on Justia Law