Justia New Mexico Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellee Emily Kane ran for elective office while she was employed at the Albuquerque Fire Department (the AFD) as a captain. Article X, Section 3 of the Charter of the City of Albuquerque (1989), and the City of Albuquerque Personnel Rules and Regulations Section 311.3 (2001), prohibit city employees from holding elective office. Kane sought injunctive relief to allow her to hold elective office while retaining her employment with the AFD. She argued that the employment regulations of the City of Albuquerque (the City) violated: (1) the First and Fourth Amendments of the United States Constitution; (2) Article VII, Section 2 of the New Mexico Constitution; and (3) Section 10-7F-9 of the Hazardous Duty Officers' Employer-Employee Relations Act (the HDOA). The district court granted Kane the relief she sought, but the Supreme Court reversed. The Court found the City's employment regulations did not violate the First Amendment because they regulated conflicts of interest, and they were therefore rationally related to the legitimate government purpose of promoting administrative efficiency. In addition, the Court held these regulations did not violate Article VII, Section 2 because they constituted conditions of employment that did not add additional qualifications to elective public office. Finally, the City's employment regulations were not preempted by Section 10-7F-9 because personnel rules touched issues of local rather than general concern, and they were within the City's authority to promulgate. View "Kane v. City of Albuquerque" on Justia Law

Ken Snow worked as an operator for the Navajo Refinery. During a procedure called a "turn-around" at the refinery, a hose assembly came loose and struck Snow, causing "serious, life-changing injuries." Snow and his wife filed suit against the Refinery, complaining of personal injury, loss of consortium, and asked for punitive damages. Snow named as defendants Midwest Hose & Specialty, Inc., Gandy Corporation, Repcon, Inc., and Holly Corporation as defendants. After a period of discovery, Snow sought to amend his complaint to add Warren Power & Machinery, Inc. d/b/a Warren CAT and Brininstool Equipment Sales. What this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the "unusual" issue dealing with the procedure for seeking leave to amend a complaint to add parties as additional defendants. When the motion for leave is filed before the statute of limitations has run, but the order granting leave is filed after the statute has run, is the amended complaint time barred? Adopting a new rule for this situation, the Court held that the subsequently filed amended complaint, post-statute of limitations, was deemed filed as of the date of the original motion for leave to file and accordingly, the statute of limitations was not a bar. The Court of Appeals held to the contrary, and the Supreme Court reversed. View "Snow v. Warren Power & Mach., Inc." on Justia Law

In March 2007, Plaintiff Dara Hem brought suit in a Texas federal court after he was seriously injured in an accident. Hem was traveling through northern New Mexico when his Toyota truck separated from the U-Haul trailer it was towing, causing the truck to roll over several times. After treating Hem for his injuries, the University of New Mexico Hospital (UNMH) recorded a hospital lien for Hem's outstanding medical bills. The lien would attach to any future judgment or settlement he might procure from a lawsuit, pursuant to the Hospital Lien Act. Although Hem did not dispute the amount owed, UNMH agreed to compromise on the lien amount and accept a lesser amount as payment in full. In exchange, one of Hem's attorneys, Miller, agreed to give up his statutory priority over settlement funds already obtained from U-Haul and some anticipated settlement funds from Toyota, so UNMH would be paid first. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the agreement UNMH made to reduce the amount of a lien for medical services rendered violated Article IV, Section 32 of the New Mexico Constitution. UNMH argued it had priority over settlement funds pursuant to the agreement between itself and Hem's initial attorney, Clay Miller. Hem's second attorney, Turner & Associates, P.A. (claimant in interpleader) argued that this agreement was unconstitutional. Therefore, Turner argued that it has a priority right to collect fees and costs out of the interpleaded settlement funds prior to the satisfaction of the hospital lien, pursuant to the Act. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that: (1) the first clause of Section 32 was correctly interpreted in State Investment and is strictly a limitation on the Legislature; and (2) Article IV, Section 32 of the New Mexico Constitution does not prohibit UNMH from agreeing to compromise the amount owed by a patient-debtor. View "Hem v. Toyota Motor Corp." on Justia Law

In a consolidated appeal, Respondents Steven B. and Ernie Begaye were both enrolled members of the Navajo Nation who were accused of offenses committed on Parcel Three of Fort Wingate (Parcel Three). The question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether Parcel Three was a "dependent Indian community" and therefore Indian country under 18 U.S.C. 1151(b) (2012) and "Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government," (522 U.S. 520 (1998)). If so, then the district court properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Respondents; if not, then the New Mexico Supreme Court had to reverse the district court and permit the State to proceed against Respondents. In review of the controlling case law, the history and the present circumstances of Parcel Three, the Supreme Court concluded that Parcel Teal was not a dependent Indian community, and the district court, therefore, had jurisdiction over Respondents. The district court and the Court of Appeals having concluded otherwise, the Supreme Court reversed. View "New Mexico v. Steven B." on Justia Law

This appeal centered on the second of two qui tam actions filed by former New Mexico Education Retirement Board ("ERB") Chief Investment Officer Frank Foy and his wife Suzanne ("Foys"), attacking the management of the investment portfolios of the ERB and of the New Mexico State Investment Council ("SIC"). The Foys "allege that Defendants, who include Wall Street firms and investment advisors, as well as high-ranking state officials, executed fraudulent schemes that led to the loss of hundreds of millions of dollars at the expense of the [SIC] and the [ERB]. Specifically, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the retroactive application of the Fraud Against Taxpayers Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 44-9-1 to -14 (2007) ("FATA") violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and New Mexico Constitutions. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that FATA was constitutional. The treble damages under FATA were predominantly compensatory and could be applied retroactively to conduct that occurred prior to its effective date. The Court declined to resolve the issue of whether the civil penalties awarded under FATA were punitive and violated ex post facto principles until there was a definitive amount awarded. View "New Mexico ex rel. Foy v. Austin Capital Mgmt., Ltd." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the Director of the Labor Relations Division of the New Mexico Department of Workforce Solutions (DWS) was in violation of the Public Works Minimum Wage Act for failing to set prevailing wage rates and prevailing fringe benefit rates for public works projects in accordance with collective bargaining agreements (CBAs). Petitioner New Mexico Building and Construction Trades Council represented the interests of thousands of New Mexico employees working on public works projects throughout the State. Petitioners International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 611 and Sheet Metal Workers Local 49 were affiliated members of the Council. The Unions sought a writ of mandamus to direct the Director to set prevailing wage and prevailing benefit rates for public works projects in accordance with rates specified in CBAs in or near a project’s locality, as required by Section 13-4-11(B) of the Act. This case was the second time the New Mexico Building and Construction Trades Council has petitioned the Supreme Court for mandamus in the matter of DWS compliance with Section 13-4-11(B): in June 2011 the Court denied a petition for writ of mandamus in order to give the Secretary “four or five months” to set prevailing wage and prevailing benefit rates under the Act as amended in 2009. In this case, the issue was again whether the Director failed to set prevailing wage rates and prevailing fringe benefit rates for public works projects in accordance with the applicable CBAs. After review, the Supreme Court held that under the Act, the Director had a mandatory, nondiscretionary duty to set the same prevailing wage and prevailing benefit rates as those negotiated in applicable CBAs and that the Director’s failure to do so violated the Act. The Court therefore issued a writ of mandamus ordering the Director to comply with the Act and set rates in accordance with CBAs as required. View "N.M. Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council v. Dean" on Justia Law

In 2007, the remainder beneficiaries of two testamentary trusts sued defendant Bank of America for its actions as trustee from 1991 through 2003. The beneficiaries alleged that the Bank had invested trust assets in an unproductive commercial building in direct violation of express trust provisions and had thereby caused the loss of trust value in breach of its duty of care. The beneficiaries also alleged that, as part of this investment, the Bank arranged loans to the trust from its own affiliates that were secured by mortgages on the building and collected loan fees and mortgage interest from the trust in breach of its duty of loyalty. The New Mexico Uniform Trust Code provided that when a trustee breaches its duty of care and causes a loss to the trust, that lost value must be returned to the trust as restoration damages. It also provided that when a trustee breaches its duty of loyalty by self-dealing, any profit from such self-dealing must be disgorged so that the trustee cannot profit from its wrongdoing. "Restoration and disgorgement are not mutually exclusive, and recovery need not be limited to the amount of a beneficiary’s loss if more is required to ensure that both remedial goals are met." Because it was unclear whether the principles of disgorgement and restoration have both been satisfied in this case, the Supreme Court remanded to the district court to determine whether the profit wrongfully earned by the trustee was included in the restoration award to the beneficiary. View "Miller v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

Defendant-respondent Aide Sanchez was at the Santa Teresa port of entry attempting to enter the United States from Mexico, when Border Patrol agents seized marijuana from her van. In "New Mexico v. Cardenas-Alvarez," (25 P.3d 225), the New Mexico Supreme Court held that “the New Mexico Constitution and laws apply to evidence seized by federal 8 agents at a border patrol checkpoint [located] sixty miles within the State of New Mexico [(an interior fixed checkpoint)] when that evidence is proffered in state court.” The Court also held that Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution “demands that after a Border Patrol agent has asked about a motorist’s citizenship and immigration status, and has reviewed the motorist’s documents, any further detention requires reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” Sanchez successfully moved to suppress the evidence seized from her van, arguing that: (1) Cardenas-Alvarez applied at the international border; and (2) seizure of the marijuana violated the New Mexico Constitution because the Border Patrol agents did not have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to continue to detain her once they had established her citizenship and immigration status. After review, the Supreme Court held that Article II, Section 10 did not afford greater protections at an international border checkpoint because unlike motorists who are stopped at interior border checkpoints, all motorists stopped at international fixed checkpoints are known to be international travelers who are not entitled to the heightened privacy expectations enjoyed by domestic travelers. The Court reversed the district court’s order suppressing the evidence in this case and remanded for further proceedings. View "New Mexico v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

Officer Glen Gutierrez, on duty as a full-time salaried police officer of the Pueblo of Pojoaque and also commissioned as a Santa Fe County deputy sheriff, was patrolling a portion of U.S. Highway 84/285 located within the exterior boundary of the Pojoaque Pueblo. Officer Gutierrez observed Jose Loya making a dangerous lane change and pulled Loya over. Once stopped, Officer Gutierrez asked Loya to step out of his vehicle and informed Loya that he was under arrest for reckless driving in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-113 (1987), a state law. Officer Gutierrez placed Loya in the back of his patrol vehicle and transported Loya to the Pojoaque Tribal Police Department for processing. Loya, a non-Indian, was not subject to prosecution for violation of tribal law, so he was transported from the Pueblo to the Santa Fe County Adult Detention Center where he was incarcerated. Ultimately, Officer Gutierrez prosecuted Loya for reckless driving in Santa Fe County Magistrate Court. The issue this case presented for the New Mexico Supreme Court's review centered on a a county’s legal obligation when a non-Indian, arrested by a tribal officer and prosecuted in state court for state traffic offenses, sues the arresting tribal officer for federal civil rights violations. Specifically, the issue the Court identified in this case was when the county has an obligation under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, to provide that tribal police officer with a legal defense in the federal civil rights action. The district court as well as the Court of Appeals found no such legal duty, in part because it concluded that the tribal officer was not a state public employee as defined in the NMTCA. The Supreme Court held the opposite, finding clear evidence in the text and purpose of the NMTCA requiring the county to defend the tribal officer, duly commissioned to act as a deputy county sheriff, under these circumstances. View "Loya v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

The New Mexico Supreme Court previously issued an opinion after defendant Adriana Cabezuela's first trial in which a jury convicted her of intentional child abuse resulting in the death of her eight-month-old daughter Mariana Barraza. After the Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, Defendant was again tried and convicted of the same offense and sentenced to life. On direct appeal, Defendant argued: (1) the district court erred by not holding a presentencing hearing to consider mitigation evidence before imposing a life sentence; (2) the evidence was not sufficient to support her conviction; (3) a forensic pathologist's trial testimony violated Defendant's constitutional right to confrontation; (4) the district court improperly instructed the jury by giving UJI 14-610 NMRA's (1993, withdrawn 2015) definition of intent; and (5) Defendant's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. After review, the Supreme Court decided in the State's favor with respect to issues (2) through (4). With respect to issue (1), the Court concluded that the district court should have heard evidence in mitigation before imposing sentence. The case was remanded for resentencing. Regarding (5), the Court concluded Defendant's argument was more appropriate for a habeas corpus proceeding. View "New Mexico v. Cabezuela" on Justia Law