Justia New Mexico Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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Four years and three months after Defendant Mark Serros was arrested and charged with sexually abusing his nephew, the district court dismissed his case, concluding that his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution had been violated. Among other things, the district court found that Defendant had suffered extreme prejudice as a result of the length and circumstances of his detention. A divided Court of Appeals reversed. The majority reasoned that the delay in bringing Defendant to trial could not be attributed to the State, faulting Defendant because he had agreed to numerous requests to extend the time for commencing trial and had twice requested new counsel. The dissent concluded that the delays resulted primarily from the “negligence and disregard” of Defendant’s attorneys and that, whether or not the State was at fault, Defendant’s right to a speedy trial had been violated. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed: the Court agreed with the district court’s conclusion that the length and circumstances of Defendant’s pre-trial incarceration resulted in extreme prejudice. The Court therefore hold that dismissal was appropriate because Defendant did not cause or acquiesce in the numerous delays in his case and because the State failed in its obligation to bring Defendant’s case to trial. View "New Mexico v. Serros" on Justia Law

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Defendant was charged with and convicted of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, armed robbery, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and tampering with evidence. The district court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment plus 18 years. Relying on “Santobello v. New York,” (404 U.S. 257 (1971)), the New Mexico Supreme Court held previously that a plea-bargained sentence must be fulfilled by the prosecution, and if not, will be enforced by the courts. In this first-degree murder appeal, the Court applied that principle to a prosecutorial promise to dismiss defendant’s tampering-with-evidence charge if the defendant would locate and produce the murder weapon. Defendant indeed produced the weapon, but the prosecutor did not drop the charge as promised and defendant was convicted of tampering with evidence. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the tampering conviction. Defendant’s remaining convictions were affirmed, and the case was remanded for resentencing. View "New Mexico v. King" on Justia Law

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The County Assessor for Eddy County sought to use money in a county property valuation fund (as established by the Legislature in 1986) to contract with a private company for technical assistance in locating and valuing oil and gas property. The County Commission for Eddy County refused to approve the proposed plan because it believed that a contract to pay private, independent contractors to assist the County Assessor in the performance of the Assessor’s statutory duties exceeded the Commission’s lawful authority. The Supreme Court was persuaded that the County Commission did have such authority under law, and that the contract under consideration here would not have exceed that authority or be otherwise ultra vires. The district court having previously issued a declaratory judgment to that same effect, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Robinson v. Bd. of Comm'rs of the Cty. of Eddy" on Justia Law

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Defendant Norman Davis was convicted of possession of marijuana after New Mexico State Police consensually searched his greenhouse and seized 14 marijuana plants. That search was the result of “Operation Yerba Buena 2006,” conducted by a coordinated law enforcement effort that allegedly discovered marijuana plants growing on Davis’ property. The issue this case presented for the New Mexico Supreme Court’s review was whether that aerial surveillance, and the manner in which it was conducted, amounted to a warrantless search of Davis’ property. Concluding that his federal constitutional rights were violated in this instance, the Court reversed the opinion of the Court of Appeals which held to the contrary, and reversed Davis’ conviction. View "New Mexico v. Davis" on Justia Law

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DeAngelo M. (Child) was thirteen years and eight days old when, during a custodial interrogation by three law enforcement officers, he made inculpatory statements regarding a burglary, which connected him to a murder. Had Child made his statements nine days earlier, his statements would not have been admissible against him in any delinquency proceedings. Had Child been fifteen years old at the time of his statement, his statement would have been admissible if the prosecution proved by a preponderance that Child’s statement was elicited after waiver of his constitutional and statutory rights. However, because Child was thirteen years old and his statement was given to a person in a position of authority, there was a rebuttable presumption that his statement was inadmissable. The Court of Appeals held that to rebut the presumption, the prosecution had to prove by clear and convincing evidence, through expert testimony, that “Child had the maturity and intelligence of an average fifteen-year-old child to understand his situation and the rights he possessed.” The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress because the prosecution did not meet this burden and remanded for a new trial. The State appealed. After review, the Supreme Court held that Section 32A-2-14(F) required the State to prove by clear and convincing evidence that at the time a thirteen- or fourteen-year-old child makes a statement, confession, or admission to a person in a position of authority, the child: (1) was warned of his constitutional and statutory rights; and (2) knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived each right. To prove the second element, the recording of the custodial interrogation which resulted in the statement, confession, or admission must prove clearly and convincingly that the child’s answer to open-ended questions demonstrated that the thirteen- or fourteen-year-old child had the maturity to understand each of his or her constitutional and statutory rights and the force of will to insist on exercising those rights. Expert testimony may assist the fact-finder in understanding the evidence or determining the facts, but it is not essential. The Supreme Court concluded that the evidence in this case did not prove that Child knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived each right. Therefore, his statement should have been suppressed. View "New Mexico v. DeAngelo M." on Justia Law

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The Public Regulation Commission (PRC) granted Southwestern Public Service Company’s (SPS) application to: (1) include a prepaid pension asset in its rate base in order for SPS to earn a return on this asset; and (2) obtain a renewable energy cost rider to recover approximately $22 million of renewable energy procurement costs from those customers who did not have a legislatively imposed limit on their renewable energy costs (non-capped customers). The Attorney General appealed the PRC’s final order granting SPS’s application, arguing that the approved rates were unjust and unreasonable because the inclusion of the entire prepaid asset in the rate base was not supported by substantial evidence, and the PRC acted contrary to law in allowing SPS to recover the aforementioned renewable energy costs from non-capped customers. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the PRC because: (1) SPS was entitled to earn a reasonable rate of return on the investor-funded prepaid pension asset; and (2) SPS could recover its renewable energy costs in excess of the large customer cap from non-capped customers because such a recovery mechanism was the only viable method of cost recovery that was consistent with the purposes of the Renewable Energy Act. View "N.M. Att'y. Gen. v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm'n" on Justia Law

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In this case, police officers made their arrest for shoplifting at the scene of the crime, without any prior opportunity to secure a warrant. Surveillance cameras at Sportsman’s Warehouse in Albuquerque caught defendant Ernest Paananen placing two flashlights under his jacket and then leaving the store without paying. Moments later, the store’s loss prevention team apprehended defendant and returned him to the store. The loss prevention team placed defendant in a back room, frisked him, and called the police. During the frisk, a loss prevention employee placed defendant’s possessions on the table, along with the stolen flashlights. The employee did not go through Defendant’s backpack. Albuquerque Police Department Officers Cole Knight and Andrew Hsu arrived at the store. Defendant was immediately handcuffed, and officers searched Defendant’s backpack and found hypodermic needles. When questioned about the needles, defendant admitted that he had tried to use drugs the day before but said he did not possess any drugs. While waiting for a copy of the surveillance video, Officer Knight searched through defendant’s possessions on the table and found a cigarette pack, and in looking inside the pack, discovered a substance believed to be heroin. Along with shoplifting, the State charged defendant with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant sought to suppress all evidence seized at the store, arguing that the officers conducted an unreasonable, warrantless search. The Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression. The Supreme Court, after review, reversed the Court of Appeals, finding that though without a warrant, defendant's arrest was reasonable under the New Mexico Constitution. "The subsequent warrantless search of Defendant fits a judicially recognized exception to the warrant requirement and was therefore also constitutionally reasonable." View "New Mexico v. Paananen" on Justia Law

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Defendant Donovan King and Justin Mark arrived at Kevin Lossiah’s apartment the morning of May 29, 2011. Initially, Lossiah’s neighbors saw Defendant and Mark outside the apartment. The neighbor later heard banging coming from Lossiah’s apartment and someone yelling. The neighbor called the police, and once police arrived, they discovered Lossiah severely beaten but still breathing. Officers called for paramedics and Lossiah was rushed to the hospital. Defendant was ultimately charged with and convicted of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, armed robbery, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and tampering with evidence. The district court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment plus 18 years. Recently the New Mexico Supreme Court upheld Mark’s conviction for first-degree murder for his participation in Lossiah’s murder. Relying on "Santobello v. New York," (404 U.S. 257 (1971)), the New Mexico Supreme Court has previously held that a plea-bargained sentence must be fulfilled by the prosecution, and if not, will be enforced by the courts. In defendant's murder appeal, the Court applied that principle to the prosecution's promise to dismiss a tampering-with-evidence charge if defendant would locate and produce the murder weapon. Here, defendant produced the weapon, but the prosecutor did not drop the charge as promised and defendant was convicted of tampering with evidence. Accordingly, the Court reversed the tampering conviction. Affirming all remaining convictions, including first-degree murder, this case was remanded for resentencing. View "New Mexico v. King" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Kenneth Badilla bought a pair of work boots at Wal-Mart. He claimed the soles of the boots came unglued, causing him to trip and injure his back. More than three years later, he sued Wal-Mart and its store manager (Defendants) for breach of express and implied warranties. In his complaint plaintiff sought damages for personal injuries he claims were caused by the boots’ alleged failure to conform to their warranties. Defendants moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted on two grounds: (1) that Plaintiff’s complaint was time-barred by the application of the three-year statute of limitation for causes of action for torts; and (2) that there were no genuine issues of material fact to rebut plaintiff’s inability to establish the elements for breach of express and implied warranty. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the statute of limitations issue, and because its determination on that issue was dispositive, it abstained from addressing the second basis upon which the district court granted summary judgment. Plaintiff sought review of the Court of Appeals’ decision by petition for writ of certiorari, asking this Court to determine whether his claims for personal injury damages resulting from breach of warranties were subject to the four-year limitation period set out in Section 55-2-725 or the three-year limitation period for tort actions found in Section 37-1-8. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the UCC’s four-year statute of limitation governed breach of warranty claims, including those seeking damages for personal injuries resulting from the breach. View "Badilla v. Wal-Mart Stores East Inc." on Justia Law

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In 2009, the Governor appointed District Judge Sheri Raphaelson to fill a vacancy in Division V of the First Judicial District Court created when then-District Judge Tim Garcia was appointed to the New Mexico Court of Appeals, leaving an unexpired term of office. A year later, as required by Article VI, Section 35 of the New Mexico Constitution, Judge Raphaelson successfully ran in a partisan election to remain in office as Judge Garciaís successor. On March 11, 2014, Judge Raphaelson filed a declaration of candidacy to place her name on the ballot for retention in the 2014 general election in accordance with Article VI, Section 34 of the New Mexico Constitution and NMSA 1978, Section 1-8-26 (2013). In the general election, Judge Raphaelsonís fell short of the 57 percent votes necessary to retain the office as stipulated by Article VI, Section 33(A) of the New Mexico Constitution. Days after the 2014 general election, despite her unsuccessful retention election, Judge Raphaelson publically declared her intent to remain on the bench until January 1, 2017, not January 1, 2015. Judge Raphaelson contended for the first time that her six-year term of office had begun on January 1, 2011, after her successful partisan election, and that she had mistakenly stood for retention prematurely. Upon review of this matter, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that a judge elected in a partisan election is subject to retention in the sixth year of the predecessor judge's term, and that by failing to win enough votes for retention, Judge Raphaelson lost her seat. "Any effort to remain in office beyond December 31, 2014 contravened the Constitution, justifying our writ of quo warranto." View "King v. Raphaelson" on Justia Law