Justia New Mexico Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

by
After Plaintiff’s home sustained water damage in a hailstorm, he asked his insurer Allstate to cover the loss; consequently, Steamatic was hired to perform water abatement and mold remediation services. Plaintiff claimed that the mold was not remediated properly and that he developed a severe and permanent lung condition as a result. New Mexico does not permit a civil plaintiff to recover duplicate compensatory damages for the same injuries. The collateral source rule presents an exception to the prohibition of double recovery, permitting a plaintiff to recover the same damages from both a defendant and a collateral source. The New Mexico Supreme Court has held that the payor of the prejudgment settlement of a claim qualifies as a collateral source and that the payment does not reduce the same damages the plaintiff may recover from an adjudicated wrongdoer. The issue this case presented for review centered on whether a payment in postjudgment settlement of a claim by an adjudicated wrongdoer qualified as a collateral source. The Court clarified that the collateral source rule had no application to a postjudgment payment made by an adjudicated wrongdoer. Here, the Court held that the payment, which Plaintiff received in a postjudgment settlement with Allstate satisfied a portion of Plaintiff’s damages and extinguished Plaintiff’s right to recover the same damages from Steamatic. The Court explained that the share of damages fully satisfied by Allstate must offset the damages Plaintiff may recover from Steamatic. View "Gonzagowski v. Steamatic of Albuquerque" on Justia Law

by
Defendant Michael Romero alleged that his Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury was violated because one of his jurors revealed during voir dire that he knew the investigator in the case. Defendant did not inquire into the juror’s potential bias during jury selection, did not challenge the juror for cause, did not use an available peremptory challenge on the juror, and did not otherwise object to the juror during jury selection. The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that the juror’s statements did not violate Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, and that Defendant both failed to preserve and waived any objection to the juror’s alleged bias. View "New Mexico v. Romero" on Justia Law

by
The Court of Appeals held that an heirship judgment that conveyed mineral rights to a good faith buyer’s predecessor in interest was void for lack of jurisdiction. The issue presented for the New Mexico Supreme Court was whether the buyer was entitled to rely on the void judgment in its claim of bona fide purchaser status. In accordance with its Court’s decision in Archuleta v. Landers, 356 P.2d 443, the Court concluded that a party who purchases property sold under a judgment that is not void on its face is entitled to bona fide purchaser status. The Court further clarified that extrinsic evidence of lack of jurisdiction was not permitted to overcome the rights of a purchaser who properly relied upon the order of the court as “an authority emanating from a competent source.” Here, the Court held that Respondent Premier Oil & Gas, Inc. (Premier) was a bona fide purchaser, and affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Premier Oil & Gas v. Welch" on Justia Law

by
Defendants Caprock Solar (Caprock) and Swinerton Builders (collectively, Defendants) and Intervenor Quay County (the County) contended that the New Mexico Court of Appeals erred by reversing the district court and creating an additional requirement to establish a public prescriptive easement claim—namely, that a claimant had to prove frequency of use by the public and a minimum number of public users. The New Mexico Supreme Court agreed the Court of Appeals’ stricter proof requirement was improper and took this opportunity to clarify what was required to prove a public prescriptive easement claim. In doing so, the Court adopted the holding in Trigg v. Allemand, 619 P.2d 573, that “[f]requency of use or number of users is unimportant, it being enough if use of the road in question was free and common to all who had occasion to use it as a public highway” The Court also adopted the principle articulated in Luevano v. Maestas, 874 P.2d 788, that the public character of the road was key to establishing a public prescriptive easement claim. In this case, there was substantial evidence to support the district court’s finding of a public prescriptive easement over the disputed road. Therefore, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the district court. View "McFarland Land & Cattle v. Caprock Solar" on Justia Law

by
Defendant Christopher Rodriguez pleaded guilty to felony offenses committed when he was sixteen years old under a plea and disposition agreement, and following an amenability hearing, the district court imposed an adult sentence. Defendant appealed the amenability determination, and on its own motion, the Court of Appeals held that under the plea and disposition agreement, Defendant waived his right to appeal. The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a juvenile waives the right to appeal an amenability determination by entering into a plea and disposition agreement. To this, the Court held that the right was not waived, reversed the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to decide Defendant’s appeal on the merits. View "New Mexico v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

by
The New Mexico Supreme Court addressed whether the tolling provision contained in Rule 7-506.1(D) NMRA of the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the Metropolitan Courts applied to cases dismissed without prejudice by the court in addition to cases voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution. In 2018, Defendant Tito Lope was arraigned in the metropolitan court on charges including aggravated driving while intoxicated (DWI) and reckless driving. Rule 7-506(B) required Defendant’s trial to commence within 182 days of arraignment (July 20, 2018), assuming that no extensions of time were granted under Rule 7-506(C) and that no tolling was warranted under Rule 7-506.1(D). The case was initially set for trial on April 30, 2018, but continued to June 4, 2018. The arresting officer did not appear on June 4, and the State could not explain his absence. The State requested a continuance; Defendant moved to dismiss. The metropolitan court dismissed the case without prejudice because the State was not prepared for trial. On June 14, 2018, the State filed a notice of refiling of the dismissed complaint. Several days later, the metropolitan court sent a notice setting trial for July 18, 2018, but on the following day issued sua sponte a new notice to the parties resetting trial for July 24, 2018. One day before the scheduled trial date, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice for failure to prosecute under Rule 7-506(B), arguing that the State’s deadline to try Defendant was July 20. At the July 24 trial setting, Defendant arguing the tolling provision of Rule 7-506.1(D) applied only to voluntary dismissals, and that to apply the tolling provision in circumstances where the court dismisses a case as a sanction against the State would allow the State to benefit from its own mistake. The metropolitan court agreed with the State and concluded that the 182-day rule was tolled for ten days under Rule 7-506.1(D), extending deadline to bring Defendant to trial to July 30, 2018. After review, the Supreme Court held the tolling provision applied with equal force to cases dismissed by the court and to cases voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution and conclude that, with the benefit of the tolling provision here, the time for the State to bring Defendant to trial did not expire before Defendant entered into his conditional plea agreement. The Court therefore affirmed Defendant’s conviction. View "New Mexico v. Lopez" on Justia Law

by
Defendant Albert Fernandez appealed his conviction for battery upon a peace officer. The New Mexico Supreme Court granted Defendant’s petition for certiorari review to determine whether: (1) the district court incorrectly admitted Defendant’s prior conviction for battery upon a peace officer; (2) cumulative error deprived Defendant of a fair trial; and (3) the Court of Appeals improperly decided Defendant’s appeal without considering his reconstructed testimony. After such review, the Supreme Court found that the district court abused its discretion in admitting Defendant’s prior conviction for battery upon a peace officer. The Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for a new trial. In light of its reversal, the Supreme Court concluded it was unnecessary to address the merits of Defendant’s claim of cumulative error. Finally, the Court concluded Defendant’s request to supplement the record with his reconstructed testimony was resolved by the Court of Appeals and was therefore moot. View "New Mexico v. Fernandez" on Justia Law

by
In 2007, two bills addressing the monitoring and parole of convicted sex offenders passed within days of each other and were signed into law on the same day. Defendant Anthony Sena, who pleaded no contest to the offense of child solicitation by electronic communication device, asked the New Mexico Supreme Court to hold these laws irreconcilable. Consequently, he sought application of the preexisting standard parole term to his sentence and not the extended parole term enacted in the 2007 legislation. To this, the Court disagreed that the bills were irreconcilable and concluded that the extended parole term applied to those convicted of this crime. In this opinion, the Court reaffirmed that its role was to read statutes harmoniously if possible and that the proper test for a court to apply when reconciling legislation and discerning legislative intent in these circumstances was that of New Mexico v. Smith, 98 P.3d 1022. The Court of Appeals opinion was reversed and the Court affirmed the district court’s imposition of the extended parole term on Defendant’s crime. View "New Mexico v. Sena" on Justia Law

by
Defendant-Appellee Derrick Romero pleaded guilty to second-degree criminal sexual penetration (CSP). In the first judgment and sentence, the district court erred in ordering that Appellee serve two years of parole, resulting in an unlawfully short period of mandatory parole. Thirteen days later, the district court ostensibly corrected the sentencing error by entering a second amended judgment, which replaced Appellee’s parole period of two years with five-to-twenty years. Both of these parole periods were illegal sentences, as NMSA 1978, Section 31-21-10.1(A)(2) (2007), required a sex offender convicted of CSP in the second degree to serve an “indeterminate period of supervised parole for . . . not less than five years and up to the natural life of the sex offender.” Appellee challenged the revised parole period of five-to-twenty years in an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The district court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to correct the illegal parole sentence in the first judgment and accordingly granted Appellee’s habeas petition, vacating the second amended judgment and reinstating the original two-year parole period. The State appealed the grant of habeas relief. The Supreme Court held that historical changes leading to Rule 5-801 (2009) (former Rule 5- 801) did not remove a district court’s common law jurisdictional authority to correct an illegal sentence. Thus, the Court overruled New Mexiso v. Torres, 272 P.3d 689 in that regard. Under this holding, the Court reversed the district court’s grant of the writ of habeas corpus and remanded to the district court to impose the statutorily required parole sentence. The Court further directed the Rules of Criminal Procedure for State Courts Committee to clarify the length of time in which a district court retains the relevant jurisdiction to correct an illegal sentence in accordance with the Court's opinion here. Finally, under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), and Rule 5-303 NMRA, the Court held that Appellee was entitled to an opportunity for plea withdrawal. View "New Mexico v. Romero" on Justia Law

by
A constitutional amendment proposed by the Legislature and approved by the electorate in the 2020 general election made a number of changes governing the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission (Commission or PRC). Those changes included alterations to the selection, qualifications, and terms of Commission members, and revision to the PRC’s constitutionally assigned responsibilities. Petitioners were three nonprofit organizations who represented the rights of Native Americans. Petitioners asked the New Mexico Supreme Court to declare the ratification of the constitutional amendment a nullity and to issue a writ of mandamus directing Respondent Advisory Committee of the New Mexico Compilation Commission (Advisory Committee) to remove the amendment from the Constitution. The Advisory Committee responded that Petitioners’ challenge was untimely and improperly raised against the committee through a petition for writ of mandamus, but took no position on the merits. Governor Michelle Lujan Grisham, who was granted leave to intervene in these proceedings, joined the Advisory Committee’s timeliness arguments and additionally argued that the amendment was constitutional. After hearing oral arguments, the Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of mandamus, holding that the petition was timely, but that the amendment did not violate Article XIX, Section 1 of the New Mexico Constitution. View "Indigenous Lifeways v. N.M. Compilation Comm'n Advisory Comm." on Justia Law