Justia New Mexico Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mary Herrera, when acting as the Secretary of State, terminated the employment of two employees of the Secretary of State’s office, James Flores and Manny Vildasol. In separate actions, Flores and Vildasol each asserted a Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) claim against Herrera in her individual capacity. Herrera left office; nevertheless, Flores and Vildasol sought to proceed with their individual-capacity WPA claims against her. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the WPA would allow for a state employee to assert a claim against a state officer in that officer's individual capacity. The Court of Appeals concluded that the WPA allowed the employees to continue their suit, but the Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the Court of Appeals. On remand, the Supreme Court instructed the courts to dismiss Flores’s individual-capacity claim against Herrera and, with respect to Flores’s official-capacity claim against Herrera, to enter a substitution order. InVildasol’s case, the Court instructed the trial court to dismiss Vildasol’s individual-capacity claim against Herrera and to proceed with Vildasol’s claim against the Secretary of State’s office. View "Flores v. Herrera" on Justia Law

Defendant Anthony Samora was accused of luring a sixteen-year-old male into his truck by deception, driving him to a secluded location in Albuquerque, and then forcibly having sex. A jury convicted Defendant of second-degree criminal sexual penetration in the commission of a felony (CSP-felony), and first-degree kidnapping. Due to sentencing enhancements, Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after thirty years for his CSP-felony conviction plus a consecutive eighteen-year sentence for his kidnapping conviction. In a direct appeal, Defendant raised a variety of challenges to both convictions, including a challenge to the district court for omitting that the sexual act had to be non-consensual when instructing the jury on CSP-felony. The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that it was fundamental error to omit the phrase “without consent” from the jury instructions relevant to CSP-felony, and accordingly reversed and remanded on Defendant’s CSP conviction. The same fundamental error also infected the jury’s findings with respect to Defendant’s intent to inflict a sexual offense against the alleged victim, and that too was reversed. This case was remanded back to the district court, where Defendant could be retried on both charges. View "New Mexico v. Samora" on Justia Law

In 2004, defendant Lucas Trammell pled guilty in part, to false imprisonment of a minor victim. At the time, a conviction of false imprisonment of a minor victim required that defendant register as a sex offender under the New Mexico Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). Defendant’s attorney failed to realize that defendant’s plea included a sex offense requiring SORNA registration. Defendant moved to withdraw his plea six years later, after he was arrested and found to have violated the terms of his probation. After review, the New Mexico Supreme Court, concluded that although counsel’s failure to advise Defendant of the SORNA registration requirement in his plea agreement was per se deficient performance under the first prong of the "Strickland" test for ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant failed to show that under the second prong of Strickland, he had been prejudiced by that deficient performance. The Court of Appeals was reversed for holding otherwise, and remanded this case back to the district court for entry of an order denying defendant's motion to withdraw his plea agreement. View "New Mexico v. Trammell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court addressed whether shooting at or from a motor vehicle could serve as a predicate for felony murder. A jury found Defendant Eric Marquez guilty of first-degree felony murder, and shooting from a motor vehicle causing great bodily harm. The underlying felony supporting Defendant’s felony murder conviction was the felony of shooting from a motor vehicle. To avoid double jeopardy concerns, the district court vacated Defendant’s conviction of shooting from a motor vehicle, then sentenced Defendant to a term of life imprisonment followed by a minimum period of five years of parole supervision. In his direct appeal, Defendant claimed that: (1) shooting at a motor vehicle cannot serve as a predicate felony in the context of a felony murder conviction; (2) the court erred in precluding evidence of drive-by shootings at Defendant’s home before 2010; (3) the jury instructions on felony murder and self-defense failed to instruct on the essential elements that Defendant did not act in self-defense or with sufficient provocation; and (4) admission of the Medical Investigator’s testimony violated Defendant’s confrontation rights. After review, the Supreme Court held that the crime of shooting at or from a motor vehicle may not serve as the predicate felony in support of a felony murder charge and vacated Defendant’s felony murder conviction. The Court rejected Defendant’s second, third, and fourth claims, and remanded this case back to the district court for entry of an amended judgment reinstating his conviction for shooting from a motor vehicle. View "New Mexico v. Marquez" on Justia Law

While on routine patrol in San Juan County, New Mexico State Police Officer James Rempe entered the license plate number of the vehicle Defendant Joann Yazzie was driving into his patrol car’s mobile data terminal (MDT). The query returned a result indicating that the compliance status of the vehicle was “unknown.” Upon receiving the report of “unknown” compliance status (compliance with the New Mexico Mandatory Financial Responsibility Act), Officer Rempe activated his emergency lights and pulled over Defendant’s vehicle to investigate further. The “unknown” query return was the only basis for the traffic stop. Based on further information the officer acquired as a result of the stop, Defendant was arrested and charged in magistrate court with driving while under the influence of alcohol and failure to maintain insurance. Defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained during the course of the stop, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop and thereby violated her right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. The ultimate question this case posed for the Supreme Court's review was whether the "unknown" status could serve as the basis for the traffic stop. The Supreme Court held that an officer learning of a vehicle's "unknown" compliance status in MVD records has constitutionally reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle and investigate further. The Court reversed the appellate court's holding to the contrary. View "New Mexico v. Yazzie" on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals presented an issue to the New Mexico Supreme Court on whether farm and ranch laborers' exclusion from coverage under the state Workers' Compensation Act violated the rights of those workers under the Equal Protection Clause of Article II, Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution in light of the fact that other agricultural workers are not singled out for exclusion. After review of these cases, the Supreme Court concluded that there was nothing to distinguish farm and ranch laborers from other agricultural employees and that purported government interests such as cost savings, administrative convenience, and other justifications related to unique features of agribusiness bore no rational relationship to the Act’s distinction between these groups. "This is nothing more than arbitrary discrimination and, as such, it is forbidden by our Constitution." Accordingly, the Court held that the farm and ranch laborer exclusion contained in Section 52-1-6(A) of the Act was unconstitutional, and these cases were remanded for further proceedings. View "Rodriguez v. Brand West Dairy" on Justia Law

The question this case presented for the New Mexico Supreme Court's review centered on whether a mentally-competent-but-terminally-ill patient had a constitutional right to have a willing physician, consistent with accepted medical practices, prescribe a safe medication that the patient may self-administer for the purpose of peacefully ending the patient’s life. The implications of a "yes" from the Supreme Court would have been that a willing physician could assist the patient and avoid criminal liability because Section 30-2-4 would be unconstitutional as applied to the physician. If the Court answered "no," the alternatives for the patient would be to: (1) endure the prolonged physical and psychological consequences of a terminal medical condition that the patient finds intolerable; or (2) take his or her own life, possibly by violent or dangerous means. "Although the State does not have a legitimate interest in preserving a painful and debilitating life that will imminently come to an end, the State does have a legitimate interest in providing positive protections to ensure that a terminally ill patient’s end-of-life decision is informed, independent, and procedurally safe." The Court declined to hold that there was an absolute and fundamental constitutional right to a physician’s aid in dying and conclude that Section 30-2-4 was not unconstitutional on its face or as applied to Petitioners in this case. View "Morris v. Brandenburg" on Justia Law

In 2010, Guadalupe Ashford’s body was found partially hidden behind a trash can at the edge of a small parking lot. Drag marks and blood spatter indicated that Ashford had initially been assaulted in the lot and then dragged a short distance to its edge where her body was found. An Albuquerque Police Department (APD) forensic scientist analyst performed DNA measurements of samples collected from Ashford’s body and from a six-inch by six-inch bloodied brick described as “paver stone” and believed to be the murder weapon, generating DNA profiles of Ashford and of the presumed perpetrator. Unidentified DNA was also discovered on the paver stone, though in smaller amounts than the DNA evidence matching either of the full profiles. The forensic analyst entered the presumed perpetrator’s profile into the CODIS database, which resulted in a match to Defendant Truett Thomas. Defendant was arrested and charged on the basis of this DNA evidence, but he denied ever having met Ashford. Defendant was held in pretrial custody for twenty-two months before he moved to dismiss the charges for violation of his right to a speedy trial. The district court denied the motion and set the trial to begin approximately twenty-six months after Defendant’s arrest. By the time the case came to trial, the State’s forensic analyst had moved out of New Mexico. At a hearing two weeks before trial, the prosecutor expressed concerns about securing the presence of that forensic analyst at trial and suggested that she be allowed to testify over the live, two-way audio-video communications application Skype as an alternative. At another pretrial hearing in the following week, the court asked if there were “any other matters” that needed to be addressed before trial. In response, defense counsel expressed hesitation at the use of Skype testimony. The prosecutor replied that the State had not sought an enforceable subpoena for the witness in reliance on defense counsel’s statement a week earlier that Skype would “work.” The district court judge took the position that Defendant had waived any objection to the use of two-way video by defense counsel’s initial informal acquiescence. Defendant appealed after he was convicted for first-degree deliberate murder and first-degree kidnapping on multiple grounds, including an asserted violation of the Confrontation Clause through the admission of Skype testimony of the DNA analyst. After review, the Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s convictions on this basis but remanded for a new trial on the murder charge only, having concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support the kidnapping conviction. View "New Mexico v.Thomas" on Justia Law

The Pueblo of San Felipe (Pueblo) appealed a Court of Appeals decision declining to extend the Pueblo immunity from suit. Hamaatsa, Inc. (Hamaatsa) owned land in Sandoval County. Adjacent to Hamaatsa’s property was land owned in fee by the Pueblo. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) conveyed to the Pueblo, in fee simple, the land at issue on December 13, 2001. The property, adjacent and contiguous with reservation land, was not then held in trust by the federal government as part of the Pueblo’s reservation. In its 2001 conveyance to the Pueblo, the BLM reserved an easement and right-of-way over, across the parcel at issue here ( “932 Roads” or “R.S. 2477 Roads,”). The BLM purported to quitclaim its interest in one particular R.S. 2477 to the Pueblo. Hamaatsa used Northern R.S. 2477 on the Pueblo’s property to access its land. In August 2009, Hamaatsa received a letter from the then Governor of the Pueblo stating that Hamaatsa had no legal right of access across the Pueblo’s property and that Hamaatsa’s use of Northern R.S. 2477 was a trespass. Hamaatsa continued to use the road and filed suit requesting that the district court declare that the Pueblo cannot restrict use of the road. The Pueblo moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing its immunity deprived the district court of jurisdiction to hear Hamaatsa's case. The Supreme Court agreed the district court lacked jurisdiction and remanded the case for dismissal. View "Hamaatsa, Inc. v. Pueblo of San Felipe" on Justia Law

Defendant Edward Armijo was convicted for driving while intoxicated (DWI). The district court affirmed his conviction, but the Court of Appeal reversed. The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the State’s arguments that the Court of Appeals lacked appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s decision in an on-record appeal from metropolitan court, and that a defendant had no right to that secondary record review. Addressing only these two issues and declining to conduct a third appellate review of the underlying merits of this case, the Supreme Court held that the Legislature vested the Court of Appeals with appellate jurisdiction over a district court’s on-record appellate review of a metropolitan court proceeding and has provided an aggrieved party the right to such an appeal. View "New Mexico v. Armijo" on Justia Law