Justia New Mexico Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The New Mexico Supreme Court examined whether the constitutional right to confrontation was forfeited as a result of a defendant’s own wrongdoing. Specifically, the Court questioned whether the wrongdoing required an overt threat of harm to procure a witness’s silence or absence. When the State’s witness, Juliana Barela, Defendant Joshua Maestas’s girlfriend, refused to testify at trial, the district court declared her unavailable. The State then requested that the district court find that Defendant had obtained Barela’s unavailability by wrongdoing, and to therefore admit at trial testimony Barela gave to the grand jury, a statement she made to police, and a call she made to 911 operators. In support of its claim that Defendant had procured and intended to procure Barela’s unavailability by way of misconduct, the State offered recorded jailhouse phone conversations between Defendant and Barela. The district court determined that Defendant had neither caused nor intended to cause by any wrongdoing Barela’s decision not to testify, concluded Barela’s prior statements were thus inadmissible, and dismissed Defendant’s indictment. The State appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling. The Supreme Court held that wrongdoing, for purposes of the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception, need not take the form of overt threat of harm; various forms of coercion, persuasion, and control may satisfy the requirement. Accordingly, the Court reversed the decisions of the district court and Court of Appeals and remanded to the district court to apply the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception. View "New Mexico v. Maestas" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Defendant John “Jack” McDowell was convicted of first- degree murder and tampering with evidence. During trial, the prosecutor elicited testimony from the arresting detective, without objection, that Defendant had invoked his right to counsel, and that by doing so the detective was precluded from questioning Defendant. Defendant argued on appeal that he was deprived of due process when the prosecutor elicited this testimony. The New Mexico Supreme Court agreed that the prosecutor erred. The Court reviewed the prosecutor’s error in this case for fundamental error because the error was not preserved, and concluded that the error was fundamental due to the prejudicial impact of such testimony and the lack of overwhelming evidence against Defendant. Accordingly, the convictions were vacated and the matter remanded back to the district court for a new trial. View "New Mexico v. McDowell" on Justia Law

Police Sergeant George Rascon pulled over Defendant Jennifer Martinez for failing to stop at a stop sign and, as a result, the police obtained evidence that led to Defendant’s arrest and conviction for driving while intoxicated. In a motion to suppress, Defendant argued that the video from the officer’s on board camera, or “dash-cam,” demonstrated that Defendant made a legal stop at the intersection and that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to pull her over. At an evidentiary hearing, the officer testified that Defendant went past the stop sign before coming to a complete stop, blocking the intersection. The district court viewed the dash-cam video and concluded that the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop, even though the video demonstrated that the alleged traffic violation was not as blatant as described by the officer. The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that the officer was not credible and that the video evidence was too ambiguous to support a finding of reasonable suspicion. After its review, the New Mexico Supreme Court held the Court of Appeals misapplied the standard of review, which required the appellate court to defer to the district court’s findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence and to view the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. View "New Mexico v. Martinez" on Justia Law

This case involved three people who agreed to co-parent one minor Child: Tue Thi Tran (Mother); Clinton Demmon (Demmon), Child’s biological father and Mother’s current partner; and Robert Bennett (Bennett), who was married to Mother at the time of Child’s birth. In 2007, the parties entered into a memorandum of agreement that settled the issue of legal paternity in Demmon’s favor yet provided that all three adults were Child’s “co-parents.” The district court adopted the memorandum of agreement as a stipulated order of the court. Disputes arose between the parties, and in 2012 the district court issued a parenting order that expressly awarded joint legal custody of Child to Mother, Demmon, and Bennett. The district court also held Mother and Demmon in contempt of court for violating the vacation and visitation provisions in the memorandum of agreement. On appeal, Mother and Demmon challenged the 2012 parenting order, arguing that Bennett was not Child’s father and that the district court erred by awarding custody to a non-parent. Mother and Demmon also contended that the district court abused its discretion by holding them in contempt of court. After review, the New Mexico Supreme Court concluded the parties effectively settled the issue of paternity under the Uniform Parentage Act when they entered into the memorandum of agreement and that the district court adjudicated the issue of paternity when it issued the stipulated order adopting the agreement. Therefore, the Court held Demmon was Child’s legal father. Furthermore, the parties’ memorandum of agreement did not confer parental rights on Bennett, in addition to Child’s two legal parents. Finally, the Court vacated the contempt order. View "Tran v. Bennett" on Justia Law

The State filed a Motion for Pretrial Detention in this case involving a charge of first-degree murder, which was denied by the district court judge after an evidentiary hearing. The State appealed to the New Mexico Supreme Court, contending that the district court judge, relying on New Mexico v. Brown, 338 P.3d 1276, “apparently determined that the charges themselves—no matter how serious the crime and how dangerous a manner in which it is committed—are never sufficient to detain.” The State also contended the district court judge abused his discretion and asked the Supreme Court to clarify that a district court judge “should neither disregard the nature or circumstances of the crime nor consider the charges to the exclusion of all other factors.” The prosecuting authority did not offer any reasons why the conditions of release were inadequate to reasonably provide for the safety of a person or the community. But because of the ambiguity in the trial court’s written Order, the Supreme Court remanded to the district court judge to clarify the Order. View "New Mexico v. Ferry" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant Alejandro Ramirez guilty of shooting and killing Johnny Vialpando. Ramirez was convicted of several offenses, including first-degree murder, and the district court sentenced Ramirez to life imprisonment plus an additional sixty-five and one-half years. Ramirez appeals directly to the New Mexico Supreme Court, arguing: (1) there was insufficient evidence presented to support his convictions; (2) his right to due process was violated when the district court permitted several eyewitnesses to identify him in court as the shooter; and (3) his convictions violated the double-jeopardy guarantee against multiple punishments. With respect to the murder conviction, the Supreme Court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, the district court did not violate Ramirez’s right to due process by allowing the in-court identifications, and double jeopardy precluded the district court from convicting Ramirez of first-degree murder and shooting at a motor vehicle. The Court vacated Ramirez's shooting-at-a-motor-vehicle conviction and remanded for resentencing. View "New Mexico v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

Petitioner Sarah Cahn invoked the due process exception to the New Mexico Medical Malpractice Act (MMA), but did not file her late-accruing medical malpractice claim against Respondent John Berryman, M.D. within twelve months. Twenty-one months elapsed between the accrual date of Cahn’s claim against Dr. Berryman and the date she filed suit against him. Thus, her claim was barred by Section 41-5-13 of the Act. By this opinion, the New Mexico Supreme Court clarified the contours of the due process exception, and held that plaintiffs with late-accruing medical malpractice claims, i.e., claims accruing in the last twelve months of the three-year repose period, shall have twelve months from the time of accrual to commence suit. View "Cahn v. Berryman" on Justia Law

This case concerned the inventory search exception to the warrant requirement. Wesley Davis was arrested for operating a motorcycle without a license. Davis was carrying a backpack; during the stop, an Eddy County sheriff deputy searched the backpack and found marijuana. Davis was charged with one count of distribution of marijuana. He moved to suppress the marijuana, arguing the search was unlawful because Davis did not possess the backpack "on his person or in his physical possession." The New Mexico Supreme Court disagreed that possession in the inventory search context should have been so narrowly construed, and concluded Davis possessed the backpack at the time of his arrest. Therefore the inventory search was valid. The Court of Appeals judgment holding to the contrary was reversed. View "New Mexico v. Davis" on Justia Law

Defendant John Ochoa appealed his convictions relating to criminal sexual contact of a minor, and the Court of Appeals reversed on speedy trial grounds. Defendant was arrested in 2008. Prior to a mistrial in 2010, trial was delayed for a number of reasons including a furlough affecting the New Mexico Public Defender Department. Defendant was incarcerated for the entire pretrial period. The Court of Appeals determined defendant was prejudiced by his two-year pretrial incarceration. The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that neither the length of delay, the reason for delay, nor the assertion of the right to a speedy trial weighed heavily in defendant’s favor: “We presume that Defendant suffered some prejudice as a result of his continuous pretrial incarceration, but our presumption does not outweigh the other three factors. Thus, despite the obvious prejudice to Defendant, his right to a speedy trial was not violated.” View "New Mexico v. Ochoa" on Justia Law

In the early morning April 23, 2011, the Bernalillo County Sheriff Department was conducting a DWI checkpoint in Albuquerque. Defendant Laressa Vargas was pulled over as part of the checkpoint. The Deputy at the checkpoint immediately noticed the odor of alcohol emanating from both Vargas’s person and her vehicle. The Deputy asked Vargas if she had been drinking, to which she answered that she had not. The Deputy requested that Vargas submit to field sobriety tests (FSTs), and Vargas agreed. Vargas performed poorly on the FSTs. At that point, the Deputy believed that Vargas was intoxicated and could not safely operate a vehicle, so he placed her under arrest. Defendant Vargas consented to and submitted to two breath tests, but refused to consent to a blood test. The arresting deputy did not obtain a warrant for a blood test, nor could he do so under New Mexico law, because he did not have probable cause to believe that Vargas had committed a felony or caused death or great bodily injury to another person while driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance. Vargas was convicted of violating NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-102(D)(3) (2010, amended 2016) because she refused to submit to a blood test; she received a sentence of ninety days in jail, with credit for seventy-five days for time served. In Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 9 2160 (2016), the United States Supreme Court held that a person who is arrested for DWI may be punished for refusing to submit to a breath test under an implied consent law, but may not be punished for refusing to consent to or submit to a blood test under an implied consent law unless the officer either (a) obtains a warrant, or (b) proves probable cause to require the blood test in addition to exigent circumstances. The Birchfield opinion had not been decided when the Bernalillo County Metropolitan Court entered its judgment convicting Vargas; however, Birchfield was published while Vargas’s appeal was pending before the New Mexico Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals applied Birchfield and reversed Vargas’s conviction for aggravated DWI. The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals correctly applied Birchfield to the pending appeal. View "New Mexico v. Vargas" on Justia Law