Justia New Mexico Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue presented in this appeal was whether a police officer could temporarily remove a visible firearm from a vehicle to prevent immediate access to it by an occupant during the short duration of a lawful traffic stop. In November 2008, officers from the Hobbs Police Department stopped a GMC Jimmy with expired temporary tags. On his approach towards the vehicle, an officer saw a black nine millimeter handgun lying on the back seat floorboard. The officer asked Defendant Gregory Ketelson to step out of the vehicle, and his partner retrieved the firearm from the back seat floorboard. Neither Defendant nor his passenger was in the vehicle when the officers retrieved the firearm. After the firearm was removed, Defendant signed a card consenting to the search and admitted that the firearm belonged to him. Officers ran a background check and found that Defendant had a prior felony conviction. Officers then arrested Defendant as a felon in possession of a firearm. Prior to trial, Defendant moved to suppress the firearm and statements made to the police regarding its ownership. The State responded that the entry into the vehicle and removing the firearm were lawful as a "minimal intrusion" necessary for officer safety while the officers determined that Defendant was a felon. The district court found that the State did not make a showing sufficient to support exigent circumstances. Rather, the court found that both Defendant and the driver of the car were "at all times cooperative, and they created no apparent threat or imminent danger to life or serious damage to property." Accordingly, the district court granted the motion to suppress, noting that non-felons may legally carry loaded handguns in private automobiles, and thus, the State must make some showing beyond the mere presence of a firearm in the car before officers effect a warrantless "seizure." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that with respect to the Fourth Amendment, the officers had a reasonable articulable suspicion permitting them to remove the weapon. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the officers' removal of the firearm was a minimal intrusion, which was reasonable given the grave need for officer safety during traffic stops. The Court reversed the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "New Mexico v. Ketelson" on Justia Law

Defendant Timothy Sandoval was convicted of the second-degree murder of Jeff McCormick. The central issue at trial was whether McCormick was a mere bystander or an actual participant with the two other men involved in an altercation that ended with his death. The Court of Appeals determined that the "self-defense" and "defense of another" jury instructions issued at Defendant's trial constituted fundamental error because the instructions failed "to adequately and accurately describe Defendant's theory of defense" and misstated the applicable law. Upon review of the trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the instructions were not a correct statement of the law, but because the jury could have found that Defendant acted in self-defense and defense of another without considering McCormick as an assailant, the trial court's use of the instructions did not constitute fundamental error. The Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings with the appellate court. View "New Mexico v. Sandoval" on Justia Law

The issue presented in this appeal was whether Defendant's requested involuntary manslaughter jury instruction was properly denied by the district court. Defendant Clinton Skippings was convicted in a jury trial of voluntary manslaughter. Defendant's conviction arose from a series of interactions with Christy Rogers (Victim) that ultimately culminated in her death. At Defendant's trial, the jury was instructed regarding second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. The district court denied Defendant's requested involuntary manslaughter instruction. The jury returned a conviction on the voluntary manslaughter charge. Upon review of the trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that where there is sufficient evidence of both criminal negligence and accident, it is proper to grant an involuntary manslaughter instruction. The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, which found that the district court improperly denied the instruction. The Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "New Mexico v. Skippings" on Justia Law

Carol Sloan, a New Mexico Public Regulation Commission (PRC) Commissioner, was convicted and subsequently sentenced for aggravated battery and burglary. That same day, the Attorney General filed a petition for a writ of quo warranto asking the Supreme Court remove Ms. Sloan from office because of her felony convictions. Although Ms. Sloan did not dispute that she was convicted and sentenced for two felony offenses, she nonetheless maintained that those convictions did not disqualify her from continuing to hold public office until the expiration of the term for which she was elected. Ultimately the Court found that because Ms. Sloan was a convicted felon, forfeiture of her office was automatic. View "State ex rel. King v. Sloan" on Justia Law

Petitioners are organized labor representatives actively involved in representing public employees. They sought a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court to prohibit the Governor from removing two members of the Public Employee Labor Relations Board. Those members had responsibility to adjudicate the merits of disputes that involved the Governor. The Governor appointed those members and now she sought to remove them. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that none of the PELRB members served at the pleasure of the Governor, though the Public Employee Bargaining Act obligates the Governor to appoint them. The Court found that constitutional due process required a "neutral tribunal with members who were free to deliberate without fear of removal by a frequent litigant" such as the Governor. The Governor was enjoined from removing the PELRB members.