Justia New Mexico Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In June 2005, the New Mexico Department of Corrections (DOC) adopted an Employee DWI Policy. The DOC hired Respondent Rudy Sais in April 2006 as a Correctional Officer I. Respondent reviewed the Policy and signed a DWI acknowledgment form, noting that he received a copy of the Policy and he understood its requirements. In 2006, Respondent was arrested on suspicion of aggravated DWI. Respondent received a seven-day suspension as a result of the arrest. The criminal charges against Respondent were ultimately dismissed without an adjudication of guilt or innocence. In 2008, Respondent was again arrested on suspicion of DWI. The criminal charges against Respondent were once again dismissed. After a DOC investigation, Respondent was dismissed based on a second offense under the Policy. Respondent appealed his termination to the State Personnel Board and a hearing was held before an administrative law judge (ALJ). At the hearing, Respondent claimed that he was treated differently than other employees under the Policy. After the hearing, the ALJ submitted an extensive recommended decision to the Personnel Board that supported Respondent’s termination. The Personnel Board adopted the ALJ’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in their entirety and upheld Respondent’s termination. The district court reversed the Personnel Board, finding that "[t]he termination of [Respondent] was arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law" because "he was not treated in a similar fashion to several other officers in similar circumstances." The DOC then petitioned for certiorari to the Court of Appeals, which denied the petition. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to address the important policy issues implicated "when DWI and public employment intersect, especially in light of [the] Court’s precedent on the same subject." After review, the Supreme Court reversed: "[w]hen the district court concluded that Respondent 'was not treated in a similar fashion to several other officers in similar circumstances,' the court was simply incorrect based upon the record before it." View "Sais v. NM Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

Former priest of Rio Rancho St. Francis Episcopal Church Plaintiff Walter F. Smith, III brought a defamation action against St. Francis Vestry members Defendants Will Durden and William DeVries, and members of the parish Denise Durden and Marion DeVries. Plaintiff initiated this defamation action in 2006 after the publication of a packet of documents which, among other things, alluded to alleged sexual misconduct involving Plaintiff and minor parishioners. Defendant Will Durden had originally compiled the packet for a presentation before the Standing Committee of the Diocese of the Rio Grande by certain vestry members who desired the removal of Plaintiff from his position. The packet included documentation related to financial problems at St. Francis, an alleged lack of leadership shown by Plaintiff, and personal attacks against Plaintiff. One of the documents was an anonymous letter accusing Plaintiff of several acts of pedophilia. After the presentation before the Standing Committee, and at the recommendation of the Episcopal Bishop of the Diocese of the Rio Grande, Plaintiff disclosed a summary of the allegations to the congregation during a Sunday service. The issue before the Court was whether New Mexico requires a showing of injury to one's reputation to establish liability for defamation. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that it does, "as injury to reputation is the very essence of the tort of defamation. Evidence of humiliation and mental anguish, without evidence of actual injury to reputation, is insufficient to establish a cause of action for defamation." The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' reversal of the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants. View "Smith v. Durden" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal in this case was the grandfather clause of the Public Employee Bargaining Act applied to the City of Albuquerque Labor-Management Relations Ordinance (the City Ordinance), as it pertained to the process for the appointment of interim members to the City's Labor-Management Relations Board. When the Local Board must meet during the absence of a member, Section 3-2-15(D) of the City Ordinance provided that the City Council President should appoint an interim member "with due regard to the representative character of the [Local] Board." The Court of Appeals characterized the City Council President as "managerial personnel" and held that the President's appointment of a third member defeated the neutral makeup of the Local Board’s membership. Upon review, the Supreme court disagreed and held that the City Council President does not serve in either a "management" or a "labor" capacity, and therefore the City Ordinance provision that provides a procedure by which the City Council President appoints a member to the Local Board during the absence of a member does not violate the Act's grandfather clause requirement that a local ordinance create a system of collective bargaining. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals' holding and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals for consideration of other unaddressed issues. View "City of Albuquerque v. Montoya" on Justia Law

Dean Durand crashed his Ford Bronco into a motorcycle driven by Daniel Gutierrez, ultimately resulting in Gutierrez's death. Defendant admitted that while at the business establishment operated by Defendant Meteor Monument, L.L.C., he had consumed seven twelve-ounce cans of beer and a twenty-four-ounce can of malt liquor. He also testified that he ingested heroin and crack cocaine shortly before the accident. Gutierrez's estate and family successfully sued both Durand and Meteor for Gutierrez's wrongful death. Only the verdict against Meteor was at issue in this appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the circumstantial evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a jury to find that it was reasonably apparent to Meteor that Durand was intoxicated at the time he was last served alcohol. Furthermore, the trial court did not err in holding that Meteor was on notice that the negligent supervision claim included Durand as an employee. In addition, "scope of employment" may be a factor in a negligent supervision claim; both Gutierrez and Meteor requested a scope-of-employment instruction and agreed with the trial court's answers to the jury questions regarding that instruction. As a result, that error was invited, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Meteor's motion for a new trial. The Court remanded the case for the appellate court to address an unresolved issue regarding punitive damages. View "Estate of Gutierrez v. Meteor Monument, LLC" on Justia Law

This issue before the Supreme Court in this case was the appointment of the New Mexico House of Representatives following the 2010 federal census. It was undisputed that the House was unconstitutionally apportioned. The Legislature then passed House Bill 39 to reapportion the House during a 2011 Special Session. The Governor vetoed the bill. Because lawmakers failed to create constitutionally-acceptable districts, the burden fell on the courts to draw a reapportionment map for the House. The Court appointed a retired district judge to oversee the judiciary's process. Petitioners filed petitions for a writ of superintending control to ask the Supreme Court to take jurisdiction over the case, and to reverse the district court to adopt an alternative plan or remand the case with instructions regarding the legal standard that should be applied. After reading the parties' briefs and listening to oral argument, the Court entered an order articulating the legal principles that should govern redistricting litigation in New Mexico and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Maestas v. Hall" on Justia Law

Defendant Zirachuen Rivera drove through a DWI checkpoint in Bernalillo County and an officer suspected he had been drinking alcohol. Defendant showed signs of impairment on the standard field sobriety tests and was arrested on suspicion of driving while intoxicated. Defendant’s bench trial began in Metropolitan Court where assistant district attorney Rachel Bayless entered an appearance for both herself and Chris Mills, a purported attorney, on behalf of the State. At the conclusion of trial, Defendant was found guilty of driving while intoxicated. Upon leaving the courtroom, defense counsel overheard Mills telling Bayless that he had decided not to take the New Mexico bar exam. Upon learning that Mills was not a licensed New Mexico attorney, Defendant filed a motion for a mistrial and a new trial. Defendant later attached a certificate from the Chief Clerk of the New Mexico Supreme Court to affirm that Mills was not on the official roll of New Mexico attorneys.In its opinion in this case, the Supreme Court clarified the rules and judicial precedent pertaining to the authorized practice of law in all state courts. The Court held that practice is limited to "duly licensed attorneys who are members of the State Bar or otherwise authorized by this Court’s rules in specific, limited circumstances." Because the Court of Appeals relied on statutory expressions that appeared to permit the unauthorized practice of law in magistrate courts, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals while affirming Defendant's conviction. View "New Mexico v. Rivera" on Justia Law

Petitioner Timothy Allen appealed the district court's dismissal of his petition for habeas relief. He alleged he received ineffective assistance of counsel after he was sentenced to death for the 1994 kidnapping, sexual assault and murder of a seventeen-year-old victim. The district court did not consider the merits of Petitioner's claims but instead dismissed the petition as a sanction for his refusal to answer court-ordered deposition questions, which Petitioner claimed violated his privilege against self-incrimination and attorney-client privilege. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that deposing Petitioner was improper, and that communications that were relevant to Petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were excepted from the attorney-client privilege. The Court reversed the dismissal of Petitioner's petition for habeas corpus and remanded the case back to the district court to determine the merits of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. View "Allen v. LeMaster" on Justia Law

The New Mexico Legislature passed House Bill 59 during the 2011 legislative session. The Bill sought to amend five different sections of the Unemployment Compensation Act in order to address an impending insolvency in the unemployment compensation fund. In addition to reducing benefits to the unemployed, House Bill 59 increased employer contributions to the unemployment compensation fund over contributions that would be made in 2011. Governor Susana Martinez partially vetoed the Bill by striking one of the variables necessary to calculate employer contributions beginning on January 1, 2012. The Petitioners, each of whom are legislators, sought a writ of mandamus to invalidate Governor Martinez's partial veto. Because the effect of the veto was to exempt most employers from making what would otherwise be mandatory contributions to the unemployment compensation fund for calendar year 2012, the Supreme Court held that the partial veto was invalid. The Court therefore issued a writ of mandamus to order that House Bill 59 be reinstated as passed by the Legislature. View "State of NM ex rel Stewart v. Martinez" on Justia Law

On certification from the federal district court, two questions came before the Supreme Court on whether the New Mexico Department of Labor's "Charge of Discrimination" form fairly and adequately allowed a claimant to exhaust administrative remedies and preserved the right to pursue further judicial remedies for individual liability claims under the New Mexico Human Rights Act (NMHRA). In 2008, Plaintiff Michael Lobato filed two complaints with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charging his employer, the New Mexico Environment Department, with discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Plaintiff filed his administrative complaints by using the New Mexico Department of Labor, Human Rights Division's (NMHRD) official Charge of Discrimination form. Submitting this form to either the EEOC or the NMHRD constitutes filing with both agencies, as is noted on the form directly above the signature line. According to the instructions on the NMHRD's form, Plaintiff was required to explain the "PARTICULARS" of his charge. In December 2009, Plaintiff filed a complaint in federal district court stating in part that the EEOC "complaints [had been] processed to conclusion." The individually named defendants responded by filing a motion to dismiss, arguing in part that Plaintiff did not exhaust his NMHRA administrative remedies and preserve his right to sue any individual defendant not specifically identified in Plaintiff's NMHRD forms. The district court denied Defendants' motion for those identified by their job positions within the "PARTICULARS" narrative and sua sponte certified two questions to the Supreme Court regarding defendants not otherwise identified in those administrative forms. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) the NMHRD's Charge of Discrimination form failed to provide Plaintiff a fair and adequate opportunity to exhaust administrative remedies against individual defendants; and (2) because of this inadequacy, Plaintiff was not required to have exhausted administrative remedies against the previously unnamed individual defendants before pursuing his suit in the United States District Court. View "Lobato v. N.M. Environment Dept." on Justia Law

Defendant Curtis Harper was indicted on fifteen counts of criminal sexual penetration of a child under the age of thirteen. During a docket call, the district court learned for the first time that not all witness interviews had been conducted, including those of the alleged victim and the doctor who examined her. The district court rescheduled the trial and verbally instructed the attorneys to complete the witness interviews. During a subsequent hearing, because neither the victim nor the doctor were interviewed before the court-imposed deadline, the district court prohibited the State from calling either of them as witnesses. The State agreed with Defendant that it could not make a prima facie case against him if these two witnesses were not allowed to testify. The State appealed the district court's exclusion of the two witnesses. The Court of Appeals unanimously reversed the district court regarding the victim, concluding that the State made efforts to comply with the district court's request and Defendant was not prejudiced by the State's failure to make the victim available for an interview within the time frame established by the district court. Because exclusion of witnesses requires an intentional violation of a court order, prejudice to the opposing party, and consideration of less severe sanctions, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals with respect to the victim and reversed with respect to the doctor. Therefore, the Court reversed the district court’s order precluding the victim and the doctor from testifying at trial and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "New Mexico v. Harper" on Justia Law