Justia New Mexico Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On the morning of January 21, 2006, Defendant-Petitioner Michael Swick, along with his cousin, Benito Lopez, and the victim, Alex Ogle, began a day of cruising and drinking alcohol in a borrowed Jeep. Late in the afternoon, Defendant and his cousin also consumed cocaine. After getting a jacket from the Jeep, Lopez walked back toward the place where he had left Defendant and Ogle. When he arrived, he found Defendant standing, holding a large 15-pound rock, with Ogle lying on the ground beneath him. Defendant had stabbed Ogle and bludgeoned him on the head with the rock. Defendant and his cousin walked from the crime scene and had agreed to steal a car as they approached the home of Carlos and Rita Atencio. Mrs. Atencio answered the door, and they told her that their Jeep was stuck. She let them in so that they could use the telephone. When they entered the house, Defendant stabbed Mrs. Atencio, and both men continued to beat, stab, and slash her and her husband. Defendant and his cousin left with $14.00 and a van owned by the Atencios. Defendant was indicted with first-degree murder for Ogle’s killing. The indictment also charged him with 25 additional counts for the offenses at the Atencio home. The jury found Defendant guilty of second-degree murder of Ogle and guilty of all of the remaining charges against him related to the Atencios. Defendant appealed to the New Mexico Court of Appeals, raising issues regarding double jeopardy, jury instructions, and challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion for a mistrial. The Court of Appeals upheld all of his convictions. Upon its review of the case, the Supreme Court :(1) vacated both of Defendant's convictions for aggravated battery with a deadly weapon and his two convictions for aggravated burglary based on battery because these convictions violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy; (2) remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial on the second-degree murder conviction because the instruction regarding second-degree murder was erroneous; (3) affirmed the trial court’s rejection of the self-defense jury instruction; and (4) affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion for a mistrial. View "New Mexico v. Swick" on Justia Law

Several months after being granted sole legal and physical custody of Patrick D. (Child), Brian D. and Peggy D. (Grandparents) filed a petition for guardianship and custody pursuant to the Kinship Guardianship Act. Julie Ann D. (Mother), Grandparents’ daughter, consented to the guardianship, but Freedom C. (Father) opposed it. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found both Mother and Father unfit to raise Child. The district court granted guardianship to Grandparents, granted time-sharing privileges to both Mother and Father, and held that it would review the guardianship arrangement in twenty-four months. Father appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the district court. The Court of Appeals held that the consent provision in Section 40-10B–8(B)(1) was not satisfied because both parents did not consent to the guardianship. The Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari filed by Grandparents to consider: (1) whether application of the Act is appropriate under the circumstances of this case; and (2) whether any of the prerequisites for its application were met. Because the Court concluded that Section 40-10B-8(B)(3) was met under the facts, circumstances, and procedure of this case, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remand to the district court to schedule a hearing to review the guardianship arrangement as previously anticipated by its order. View "Freedom C. v. Brian D." on Justia Law

Defendant-Petitioner Laybe Torres was convicted by a jury of Driving While Intoxicated (seventh or subsequent offense). While Defendant was initially pulled over for not wearing a seatbelt during a routine seatbelt enforcement operation, the arresting officer subsequently initiated a DWI investigation after smelling alcohol, observing Defendant’s bloodshot eyes, and noting Defendant’s slurred speech. In his rebuttal closing, the prosecutor told the jury that defense counsel had lied when commenting on the absence of a seatbelt citation during his closing argument, implying that a citation did in fact exist. The prosecutor also waved around what appeared to be a copy of the seatbelt violation, which had not been introduced into evidence, in front of the jury while accusing defense counsel of lying. Defense counsel promptly moved for mistrial, and the trial court, after excusing the jury from the courtroom and discussing the issue with counsel, instructed the jury to "disregard the statement of the prosecution as to opposing counsel lying." Defendant appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that because the prosecutor's improper actions were limited in scope and duration, and because the seatbelt violation issue was peripheral to the evidence presented and the elements of the crime for which Defendant was on trial, the trial court's prompt offering of a curative instruction was a sufficient response. The trial court properly denied Defendant’s motion for mistrial and therefore the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "New Mexico v. Torres" on Justia Law

This case required the New Mexico Supreme Court to apply the context-specific inquirt established by the federal Supreme Court in "Michigan v. Bryant" (131 S.Ct. 1143 (2011)) to evaluate whether an out-of-court statement was testimonial. Defendant Harrison Largo's main issues concerned the admission into evidence out-of-court statements by victim Freida Smith: portions of the 911 tape in which she communicated to the operator that Defendant shot her, and a sheriff's deputy's testimony that the victim identified Defendant as the one who shot her. Upon review, the New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that Defendant's confrontation rights were not violated by the admission of the victim's out-of-court statements that identified him as her shooter. The Court concluded those statements in this instance were not testimonial. Additionally, the Court concluded that the victim's statements were properly admitted as a dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule. Accordingly, the Court found sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction on first-degree murder charges, and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "New Mexico v. Largo" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant Graciela Guerra guilty of first-degree murder for the stabbing death of her daughter-in-law, Brenda Guerra, in an Alamogordo motel room. The district court sentenced Defendant to a mandatory term of life imprisonment, giving the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction to hear her direct appeal. The Court addressed Defendant’s arguments that the district court: (1) erred by denying Defendant’s self-defense instruction; (2) abused its discretion when it excluded, for lack of notice under Rule 5-602(F) NMRA, expert testimony about Defendant’s incapacity to form specific intent; (3) abused its discretion when it excluded expert testimony related to whether the victim’s wounds would have been fatal if treated; (4) abused its discretion when it excluded letters Defendant wrote while in prison; (5) and abused its discretion when it denied Defendant’s motion for a new trial. Defendant also made a claim of cumulative error. Finding no error in the district court's ruling, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "New Mexico v. Guerra" on Justia Law

Defendant Angel Arrendondo testified during his trial that he shot and killed Alfego "Ace" Aragon in self-defense. Defendant claimed that Aragon shot at him numerous times, wounding him once in the shoulder. Witnesses testified that Aragon did not own a gun and was not armed. The jury found Defendant guilty of first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit a violent felony, negligent child abuse, tampering with evidence, and shooting at a dwelling. Defendant raised several issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Defendant a fifth continuance requested one week before trial to allow defense counsel an opportunity to examine an unidentified hard fragment found in the lining of the jacket Defendant wore on the day of the shooting; (2) whether there was sufficient evidence to prove Defendant's convictions for assault with intent to commit a violent felony against Nicole Rael, Aragon’s daughter, negligent child abuse, tampering with evidence, and shooting at a dwelling; (3) whether defense counsel ineffective because she failed to timely investigate the unidentified hard fragment in the jacket, and because she did not pursue a defense that Defendant was so intoxicated by heroin use that he could not form the specific intent to commit first-degree murder; (4) whether Defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a claim he raised for the first time on appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction for negligent child abuse and his conviction for tampering with evidence, the Court reversed those convictions. Furthermore, the Court reversed his conviction for assault with intent to commit a felony and remanded the case for a new trial on that issue. The Court affirmed Defendant's remaining convictions. View "New Mexico v. Arrendondo" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellee the Village of Angel Fire (the Village) held an election to determine whether a public improvement district (PID) should be formed within its boundaries, after supporters of the PID petitioned the Village to do so. The requisite majority of eligible voters approved formation of the PID. Plaintiffs-Appellants Ron Glaser and his wife, Theresa Cull, Cheryl Host and several others, owners of real property located in Angel Fire, filed suit in district court, seeking a declaration that the PID formation election was procedurally defective and therefore void, that the PID lacked legal existence, and that a special levy approved and assessed by the PID was invalid. The district court dismissed Appellants' complaint as untimely, and Appellants sought review by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals determined that Appellants’ complaint presented an election contest, which was subject to a thirty-day statute of limitations under the Election Code. The Court further determined that because Appellants waited more than one year to file suit, their complaint was time-barred. After thoroughly analyzing these issues, however, the Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that it lacked jurisdiction and transferred the appeal to the Supreme Court, pursuant to the Election Code’s directive that appeals in election contest proceedings should be made directly to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court adopted the appellate court's reasoning for dismissing Appellants' case. View "Glaser v. LeBus" on Justia Law

Before the 2010 primary election, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether Appellant Dennis Montoya, a candidate for a Court of Appeals judgeship, was properly disqualified by the Secretary of State (the Secretary) from receiving public campaign funding under the New Mexico Voter Action Act (the Act). This case gave the Court its first opportunity to construe the Act, explain its previous oral ruling affirming the Secretary, and to address Appellant’s constitutional challenges to the Act as well as the civil penalty the Secretary imposed upon him. The dispute in this case centered on the provision in Section 1-19A-5(A), that "[a]n applicant candidate may contribute an amount of seed money from the applicant candidate's own funds up to" the $5000 limit. Appellant argues that his "general" contributions were intended to cover other kinds of expenses such as the costs of seeking his party's support at local preprimary convention gatherings leading up to the state preprimary convention. As such, these contributions were not intended to pay for the kinds of expenses that seed money is intended to cover and to limit. The Supreme Court concluded that when Appellant contributed more than $8000 of his own money to the campaign, while simultaneously applying for public funds, he violated the Act. Under the law, the Secretary had no choice but to disqualify him from public financing, and she did so. Furthermore, the Court concluded Appellant "misplaced" his reliance on "a number of federal cases to suggest that a civil penalty cannot be imposed on him for voluntarily exercising his First Amendment right to free speech." The Court affirmed the district court's judgment in this case. View "Montoya v. Herrera" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court addressed the question of what level of participation in an administrative rule-making proceeding gives a participant the right to defend that new rule in an appellate court during a subsequent appeal. Each of the four petitions for writs of superintending control stemmed from an appeal of a decision made by one of two administrative agencies, the New Mexico Environmental Improvement Board (EIB) or the New Mexico Water Quality Control Commission (WQCC). Those petitions arose from appeals of administrative rule makings: one appeal challenging rules adopted by EIB and the other challenging rules adopted by WQCC. The Court of Appeals denied appellee status to all four Petitioners, and the Petitioners requested that the Supreme Court issue writs of superintending control to overturn those rulings. The Court consolidated the four petitions and, after hearing oral arguments, issued the writs requested by three of the Petitioners while rejecting the fourth: "[b]eyond the party initiating the proceeding, [the Court] need only decide in this case whether participants who have presented technical testimony are 'parties' to an appeal as contemplated under [New Mexico] rules. [The Court concluded] that they are." [Petitioners] were not just participants who happened to be recognized as parties by EIB and WQCC. Rather, each participated in the rule-making proceedings in a legally significant manner. Each was required to file advance notice of participation, naming their witnesses and the witnesses' qualifications, and each was required to satisfy other prerequisites to their testimony. In addition, Petitioners contributed the kind of evidence that directly informed the inquiries made by EIB and WQCC in making their final decisions. Thus, the Court concluded that the requirements imposed upon Petitioners afforded them a right to defend their positions as parties on appeal. View "New Energy Economy Inc. v. Vanzi" on Justia Law

Defendant Steve Tollardo was convicted by a jury of being an accessory to first-degree murder, being an accessory to kidnapping, conspiracy to commit murder, and conspiracy to commit kidnapping. He was acquitted of being an accessory to aggravated arson and conspiracy to commit aggravated arson. The Supreme Court addressed only one of the issues Defendant raised on appeal: whether the district court erred in advising the jury that two other individuals were convicted of conspiracy to commit second-degree murder in connection with the same homicide underlying the charges against Defendant. The Court concluded that the district court did err in mentioning the coconspirators' convictions, and that the error was not harmless. Accordingly, the Court reversed Defendant's convictions and remanded the case to the district court for a new trial. In reaching this holding, the Court reexamined its harmless error analysis and clarified that a review of the particular circumstances in each case, rather than mechanical application of a multi-factor test, must guide the inquiry into whether a given trial error requires reversal. View "New Mexico v. Tollardo" on Justia Law