Justia New Mexico Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Public Regulation Commission (PRC) granted Southwestern Public Service Company’s (SPS) application to: (1) include a prepaid pension asset in its rate base in order for SPS to earn a return on this asset; and (2) obtain a renewable energy cost rider to recover approximately $22 million of renewable energy procurement costs from those customers who did not have a legislatively imposed limit on their renewable energy costs (non-capped customers). The Attorney General appealed the PRC’s final order granting SPS’s application, arguing that the approved rates were unjust and unreasonable because the inclusion of the entire prepaid asset in the rate base was not supported by substantial evidence, and the PRC acted contrary to law in allowing SPS to recover the aforementioned renewable energy costs from non-capped customers. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the PRC because: (1) SPS was entitled to earn a reasonable rate of return on the investor-funded prepaid pension asset; and (2) SPS could recover its renewable energy costs in excess of the large customer cap from non-capped customers because such a recovery mechanism was the only viable method of cost recovery that was consistent with the purposes of the Renewable Energy Act. View "N.M. Att'y. Gen. v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm'n" on Justia Law

Appellee Emily Kane ran for elective office while she was employed at the Albuquerque Fire Department (the AFD) as a captain. Article X, Section 3 of the Charter of the City of Albuquerque (1989), and the City of Albuquerque Personnel Rules and Regulations Section 311.3 (2001), prohibit city employees from holding elective office. Kane sought injunctive relief to allow her to hold elective office while retaining her employment with the AFD. She argued that the employment regulations of the City of Albuquerque (the City) violated: (1) the First and Fourth Amendments of the United States Constitution; (2) Article VII, Section 2 of the New Mexico Constitution; and (3) Section 10-7F-9 of the Hazardous Duty Officers' Employer-Employee Relations Act (the HDOA). The district court granted Kane the relief she sought, but the Supreme Court reversed. The Court found the City's employment regulations did not violate the First Amendment because they regulated conflicts of interest, and they were therefore rationally related to the legitimate government purpose of promoting administrative efficiency. In addition, the Court held these regulations did not violate Article VII, Section 2 because they constituted conditions of employment that did not add additional qualifications to elective public office. Finally, the City's employment regulations were not preempted by Section 10-7F-9 because personnel rules touched issues of local rather than general concern, and they were within the City's authority to promulgate. View "Kane v. City of Albuquerque" on Justia Law

This appeal centered on the second of two qui tam actions filed by former New Mexico Education Retirement Board ("ERB") Chief Investment Officer Frank Foy and his wife Suzanne ("Foys"), attacking the management of the investment portfolios of the ERB and of the New Mexico State Investment Council ("SIC"). The Foys "allege that Defendants, who include Wall Street firms and investment advisors, as well as high-ranking state officials, executed fraudulent schemes that led to the loss of hundreds of millions of dollars at the expense of the [SIC] and the [ERB]. Specifically, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the retroactive application of the Fraud Against Taxpayers Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 44-9-1 to -14 (2007) ("FATA") violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and New Mexico Constitutions. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that FATA was constitutional. The treble damages under FATA were predominantly compensatory and could be applied retroactively to conduct that occurred prior to its effective date. The Court declined to resolve the issue of whether the civil penalties awarded under FATA were punitive and violated ex post facto principles until there was a definitive amount awarded. View "New Mexico ex rel. Foy v. Austin Capital Mgmt., Ltd." on Justia Law

Officer Glen Gutierrez, on duty as a full-time salaried police officer of the Pueblo of Pojoaque and also commissioned as a Santa Fe County deputy sheriff, was patrolling a portion of U.S. Highway 84/285 located within the exterior boundary of the Pojoaque Pueblo. Officer Gutierrez observed Jose Loya making a dangerous lane change and pulled Loya over. Once stopped, Officer Gutierrez asked Loya to step out of his vehicle and informed Loya that he was under arrest for reckless driving in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-113 (1987), a state law. Officer Gutierrez placed Loya in the back of his patrol vehicle and transported Loya to the Pojoaque Tribal Police Department for processing. Loya, a non-Indian, was not subject to prosecution for violation of tribal law, so he was transported from the Pueblo to the Santa Fe County Adult Detention Center where he was incarcerated. Ultimately, Officer Gutierrez prosecuted Loya for reckless driving in Santa Fe County Magistrate Court. The issue this case presented for the New Mexico Supreme Court's review centered on a a county’s legal obligation when a non-Indian, arrested by a tribal officer and prosecuted in state court for state traffic offenses, sues the arresting tribal officer for federal civil rights violations. Specifically, the issue the Court identified in this case was when the county has an obligation under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, to provide that tribal police officer with a legal defense in the federal civil rights action. The district court as well as the Court of Appeals found no such legal duty, in part because it concluded that the tribal officer was not a state public employee as defined in the NMTCA. The Supreme Court held the opposite, finding clear evidence in the text and purpose of the NMTCA requiring the county to defend the tribal officer, duly commissioned to act as a deputy county sheriff, under these circumstances. View "Loya v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

In a matter of first impression for the New Mexico Supreme Court, the issues this case presented related to the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission's authority and procedures in regulating utility rates of a generation and transmission cooperative, which statutorily differed from the Commission's powers over rates charged by public utilities. After review of the cooperatives' arguments on appeal of the Commission's decision, the Supreme Court ultimately vacated the Commission's order related to its suspension of the cooperative's proposed rates and provided guidance for similar situations that might arise in the future. View "Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass'n v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm'n" on Justia Law

Attorney Daniel Faber filed a federal lawsuit on behalf of three assistant attorneys who alleged alleging gender discrimination in connection with their salaries. The Attorney General filed a motion to stay litigation pending resolution of his motion to dismiss the complaint based on an immunity defense. The federal district court entered a memorandum opinion and order granting the Attorney General’s motion to stay all proceedings, including discovery; the stay was lifted a few months later. Prior to lifting of the stay, Faber filed an Inspection of Public Records Act (IPRA) request in his own name seeking employment data for every attorney who had been employed by the Attorney General’s Office since January 1987. The records custodian of the Attorney General’s Office denied the IPRA request, stating that “[t]his request is being denied as these records involve a current lawsuit and appear to circumvent the discovery process and the current Order Staying Discovery (attached).” Faber filed a complaint for damages and a petition for writ of mandamus in the state district court against the Attorney General alleging that his IPRA request had been wrongfully denied. The state district court found that the stay of discovery entered by the federal court did not preempt the statutory rights granted to New Mexico citizens by IPRA, and that the Attorney General violated IPRA by denying Faber’s request. The court also issued a writ of mandamus ordering the Attorney General to comply and ruled that damages would be considered at a later date. Faber subsequently moved for an award of damages. The state district court awarded damages of $10 per day from the date of the wrongful denial to the date the stay was lifted and thereafter “damages of $100 per day until the records are provided,” and $257.19 in costs to Faber. The Attorney General appealed the state district court’s award of damages. The determination of the IPRA violation was not at issue on appeal. The issue in this case focused on what type of damages were authorized by the Legislature in Section 14-2-13 12(D). The Supreme Court held that Section 14-2-12(D) permitted compensatory or actual damages because the plain language, purpose, and history of IPRA indicated that neither punitive nor statutory damages were intended by the Legislature. The Court also held that Faber was not eligible for nominal damages. View "Farber v. King" on Justia Law

In the 2014 legislative session, the New Mexico Legislature passed the General Appropriations Act of 2014, which included a pair of salary increases for judges and justices of the state judiciary. The first increase was a 5% raise for the judicial branch (including judges). The raise was not separately identified in the language of section 4(B) of the Act. The second increase, separately funded in Section 8(A) was the same 3% raise authorized for all eligible state employees, including judges. Calling out what she referred to as a "dramatic 8% raise," Governor Martinez used her partial veto authority to strike the 3% raise for judges, leaving intact the language set forth in section 4(B). Thereafter, a group of judges, judicial associations and legislators (collectively, petitioners), petitioned the New Mexico Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to declare the Governor's veto of the 3% raise as unconstitutional. Petitioners sought to have the vetoed language reinstated, thereby asking for the full 8% raise. After a full briefing and hearing the arguments of the parties, the Supreme Court denied the petition in part, holding that the Governor's veto was effective with respect to the section 8(A) 3% raise. The Court also granted in part, holding that the 5% raise separately funded in section 4(B) was never vetoed and therefore was still intact. The Court then issued the writ to order the Secretary of the Department of Finance and Administration to implement the 5% raise. View "New Mexico ex rel. Cisneros v. Martinez" on Justia Law

There is no hospital in Valencia County. People in Valencia County who are faced with a medical emergency must deal with the emergency itself, and find a way to travel twenty to thirty-five miles to an Albuquerque hospital. Ambulances coming from Valencia County can take two hours or longer to transport a patient to the nearest hospital, process the patient, and return. The long turnaround times mean that ambulance companies sometimes run at full capacity, or “zero status,” and cannot respond to calls from new patients because all available ambulances are in use. Since 1987, appellant Living Cross Ambulance Service has been the only ambulance company in Valencia County operating under a permanent certificate from the Public Regulation Commission (PRC). Living Cross has been at zero status and unavailable to transport patients for less than one percent of ambulance service requests. When Living Cross is at zero status, dispatch requests mutual aid from a nearby ambulance company, and if those mutual aid ambulances are also unavailable, the municipality whose EMTs first responded to the scene must transport the patients at the municipality’s expense. This case was a direct appeal from a final order of the Public Regulation Commission (PRC) granting a permanent certificate to American Medical Response Ambulance Service, Inc. d/b/a American Medical Response, Emergicare (AMR) for both emergency and nonemergency ambulance service in Valencia County. Living Cross petitioned the New Mexico Supreme Court to vacate the final order of the PRC, claiming that the PRC acted arbitrarily and capriciously by granting AMR’s certificate because there was no evidence of need for non-emergency ambulance service in Valencia County, and because there was insufficient evidence of need for additional emergency ambulance service. Living Cross also claimed that the PRC abused its discretion by allowing Living Cross’s former attorney to represent AMR in an initial hearing before ruling on its motion to disqualify the attorney. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the PRC decision to allow the former Living Cross attorney to appear for AMR during the hearing for the temporary permit was contrary to law, and that the wholesale admission of the record from that hearing as evidence in the hearing for the permanent certificate was plain error, requiring reversal. Because the Court determined that the attorney disqualification issue is dispositive, it did not reach the other issues in this case. View "Living Cross Ambulance Serv. v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm'n" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the issue this case presented to the New Mexico Supreme Court was whether pharmacists who dispense prescription drugs to Medicaid recipients must be paid under the formula set forth in NMSA 1978, Section 27-2-16(B) (1984). Section 27-2-16(B) was enacted when New Mexico only operated under a fee-for-services model. The Legislature created a new, alternative managed care system in 1994 in an effort to rein in costs of medical public assistance. The district court and our Court of Appeals held that Section 27-2-16(B) applied in both the fee-for-services context and in managed care settings. Upon review, however, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that Section 27-2-16(B) applied only in the fee-for-services context, which requires HSD to directly reimburse providers. View "Starko, Inc. v. New Mexico Human Servs. Dep't" on Justia Law

Petitioner-taxpayer CAVU Company was the owner of a twenty-six-acre school campus in Santa Fe that was developed and improved beginning in 1997 solely for operation as a school. Since opening its doors over fifteen years ago, the Property has been used for educational purposes by several schools and has never been used for any other purpose. The following time line indicates the changes in occupancy of the Property since its development for use as a school. Taxpayer purchased the Property in 2004, when the New Mexico Academy for Science and Mathematics (NMASM) was experiencing financial difficulties. Taxpayer leased the Property to NMASM for $1.00 per year for several academic years and supported the school with donations in an effort to help NMASM succeed. In August 2007, Taxpayer raised the rent to $10,000 per month, although by November 2007 it was clear that NMASM could not afford that rate. At this point, Taxpayer allowed the school to occupy the building rent free until June 2008, when it closed. Throughout the remainder of 2008 and all of 2009, Taxpayer actively sought to lease the Property to various other educational tenants, negotiating in particular with Desert Academy. Taxpayer listed the Property for sale on the residential or commercial market but refused to lease the building to anyone other than an educational tenant. In March 2010, shortly after Taxpayer began temporarily leasing the Property to a training school for dogs and their owners, the Santa Fe County Assessor discovered the Property’s sale listing. Although the Assessor was apparently aware that the Property had been vacant, it was the sale listing that motivated the Assessor to put the Property on the tax rolls and issue Taxpayer a notice of valuation for $6,689,750 for the 2010 tax year. Taxpayer filed an application for an educational use exemption for 2010, which the Assessor denied because “on January 1st of 2009 and 2010” the property “was not used directly and immediately for educational purposes.” Following a March 2011 hearing before the Santa Fe County Valuation Protests Board, the Board reinstated Taxpayer’s exemption for 2010. On Assessor’s appeal, the District Court reversed the Board’s decision and denied the exemption pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 7-38-7 (1997) because the Property was not “currently and actively used as an educational facility” specifically on January 1, 2010, the Property had been listed for sale to residential or commercial buyers, and no showing of fraud or intentional discrimination entitled the Property to an exemption under Article VIII, Section 1(A). Soon after the district court’s ruling, Taxpayer sold the Property to Desert Academy. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that the appropriate inquiry into the validity of a property’s educational exemption from taxation under the exemption provision of Article VIII, Section 3 of the New Mexico Constitution was whether use during the tax year furthered the exempt purpose. Because the taxpayer in this case had only used the property for educational purposes, had declined to use it for noneducational purposes, and was actively negotiating with schools capable of relocating to his campus property during the relevant tax year when the property was temporarily vacant, the Court reversed the conclusions of the lower courts that the property could not qualify for an educational use exemption. The case was remanded to the Santa Fe County Valuation Protests Board for further consideration. View "CAVU Co. v. Martinez" on Justia Law