Justia New Mexico Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In an issue of first impression, the New Mexico Supreme Court addressed an issue of whether evidence of non-violent crimes committed in the presence of a police officer after an unconstitutional traffic stop had to be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment of the federal Constitution and Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. Defendant Edward Tapia, Sr. entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of forgery, for signing his brother’s name to a traffic citation charging failure to wear a seat belt in a motor vehicle, and reserved his right to appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed his conviction, finding that the initial stop was illegal, and the subsequent evidence of concealing identity and forgery was not sufficiently removed from the taint of the illegal stop to justify admitting that evidence. The Supreme Court held the new crime exception to the exclusionary rule may apply to both violent and non-violent crimes committed in response to unlawful police action. Defendant’s attempts to conceal his identity after the unlawful traffic stop sufficiently purged the taint of the initial illegality so as to render the exclusionary rule inapplicable under both the Fourth Amendment and Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. The evidence of the seat belt violation obtained as a direct result of the unlawful stop was correctly suppressed. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals was reversed Defendant’s conviction reinstated. View "New Mexico v. Tapia" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the New Mexico Supreme Court's review centered on: (1) whether the arresting officer denied Defendant Stefan Chakerian the right to an independent chemical test in addition to one administered by police when arrested for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DWI) when the officer provided Defendant with a telephone and telephone directory, but took no additional steps to help Defendant arrange for the test; and (2) what role law enforcement officers have after an arrestee expresses a desire for an additional test under Section 66-8-109(B). The Court of Appeals held that Section 66-8-109(B) required law enforcement to “meaningfully cooperate” with an arrestee who desired to obtain an additional chemical test, and reversed Defendant’s DWI conviction. The Supreme Court held Section 66-8-109(B) required law enforcement to advise an arrestee of the arrestee’s right to be given an opportunity to arrange for a qualified person of the arrestee’s own choosing to perform a chemical test in addition to any test performed at the direction of the arresting officer. This section does not, however, confer any additional obligation on law enforcement to facilitate the arrestee in actually arranging for the test. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the metropolitan court convictions of DWI and speeding. View "New Mexico v. Chakerian" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the New Mexico Supreme Court's review centered on: (1) whether the arresting officer denied Defendant Stefan Chakerian the right to an independent chemical test in addition to one administered by police when arrested for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DWI) when the officer provided Defendant with a telephone and telephone directory, but took no additional steps to help Defendant arrange for the test; and (2) what role law enforcement officers have after an arrestee expresses a desire for an additional test under Section 66-8-109(B). The Court of Appeals held that Section 66-8-109(B) required law enforcement to “meaningfully cooperate” with an arrestee who desired to obtain an additional chemical test, and reversed Defendant’s DWI conviction. The Supreme Court held Section 66-8-109(B) required law enforcement to advise an arrestee of the arrestee’s right to be given an opportunity to arrange for a qualified person of the arrestee’s own choosing to perform a chemical test in addition to any test performed at the direction of the arresting officer. This section does not, however, confer any additional obligation on law enforcement to facilitate the arrestee in actually arranging for the test. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the metropolitan court convictions of DWI and speeding. View "New Mexico v. Chakerian" on Justia Law

Defendant Corey Franklin pled guilty to one count of first-degree, willful and deliberate murder, the only offense currently designated as a “capital felony,” in exchange for life in prison with a possibility of parole. Due to his first-degree murder conviction, Defendant was subject to sentencing pursuant to Section 31-18-14. See § 30-2-1(A). Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of a five-year period of parole after serving thirty years in prison. Prior to sentencing, Defendant filed a motion seeking the opportunity to present mitigating evidence which could eventually shorten his sentence. While Defendant acknowledged that Section 31-18-14 did not expressly provide an opportunity to present mitigating evidence at the time of sentencing to those convicted of first-degree murder, he argued that this violated his due process rights under Article II, Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution and his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under Article II, Section 13 of the New Mexico Constitution. In his motion, Defendant noted that persons convicted of a lesser offense are provided with an opportunity to present mitigating circumstances at sentencing, which places them in a stronger position for parole than first-degree murderers. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to declare Section 31-18-14 7 unconstitutional and concluded that it was within the Legislature’s authority to decline to provide the opportunity to present evidence of mitigating circumstances to the most serious offenders. The district court entered final judgment and sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment with the possibility of a five-year 11 period of parole after he served thirty years in prison. On appeal, Defendant abandoned his constitutional arguments, and instead challenged the sentencing distinction on equal protection grounds. The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that defendants convicted of first-degree murder and those convicted of lesser offenses are not similarly situated, and consequently, Section 31-18-14 did not violated Defendant’s constitutional right to equal protection. View "New Mexico v. Franklin" on Justia Law

Defendant Noe Torres appealed his convictions on multiple offenses arising from the shooting into a home that missed the intended victim but resulted in the killing of a young boy. Among other questions he raised were several issues regarding the scope of constitutional double jeopardy protections against multiple punishments for the same offense. With regard to those double jeopardy issues, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that: Conviction and punishment for both attempted murder of an intended victim and a resulting murder of a different but unintended victim when the two crimes causing harm to separate victims arise from the same act do not violate double jeopardy clause; (2) The double jeopardy clause does protect against multiple punishments for causing death or great bodily harm to a victim by shooting at a dwelling and for first-degree murder of the same victim when the same shooting caused the great bodily harm and the resulting death; and (3) The double jeopardy clause also protects against multiple conspiracy convictions for entering into a single criminal conspiracy with objectives to commit more than one criminal offense. The Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction in all other respects. View "New Mexico v. Torres" on Justia Law

The State of New Mexico appealed the suppression of two statements made by sixteen-year-old Filemon V. Filemon made the first statement to his probation officers. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that, absent a valid waiver, Section 32A-2-14(C) of the Delinquency Act of the Children’s Code precluded the admission of Filemon’s statement to his probation officers while in investigatory detention. The Court affirmed the district court’s order suppressing the use of the statement in a subsequent prosecution. The second contested statement was elicited by police officers at the Silver City Police Department. Filemon was at this point in custody, and entitled to be warned of his Miranda rights. At issue was whether the midstream Miranda warnings were sufficient to inform Filemon of his rights. The Supreme Court concluded the warnings were insufficient under Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). Because the statement was elicited in clear violation of the Fifth Amendment and Section 32A-2- 19 14, the district court’s suppression of the statement was affirmed. View "New Mexico v. Filemon V." on Justia Law

Defendant Elexus Groves was indicted on two counts of first-degree murder and other serious felony offenses. In this interlocutory appeal, she challenged a district court order of pretrial detention that was based on two independent and alternative detention grounds contained in Article II, Section 13 of the New Mexico Constitution. The New Mexico Supreme Court held after review that the district court’s detention order was lawfully based on the new constitutional authority for pretrial detention of dangerous defendants, and affirmed on that ground. As a result, there was no need to address the issues Defendant raised relating to the alternative ground for the district court’s action based on the old capital-offense exception. View "New Mexico v. Groves" on Justia Law

In this case, the New Mexico Supreme Court was asked to address the nature of evidentiary presentation required by the new detention authority approved by the New Mexico Legislature in February 2016 and passed by New Mexico voters in the November 2016 general election. The Court agreed with courts in all other federal and state bail reform jurisdictions that have considered the same issues, and held that the showing of dangerousness required by the new constitutional authority was not bound by formal rules of evidence but instead focuses on judicial assessment of all reliable information presented to the court in any format worthy of reasoned consideration. "The probative value of the information, rather than the technical form, is the proper focus of the inquiry at a pretrial detention hearing." In most cases, credible proffers and other summaries of evidence, law enforcement and court records, or other nontestimonial information should be sufficient support for an informed decision that the state either has or has not met its constitutional burden. But the Supreme Court also agreed with other jurisdictions that a court necessarily retains the judicial discretion to find proffered or documentary information insufficient to meet the constitutional clear and convincing evidence requirement in the context of particular cases. View "New Mexico ex rel. Torrez v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

The New Mexico Supreme Court examined whether the constitutional right to confrontation was forfeited as a result of a defendant’s own wrongdoing. Specifically, the Court questioned whether the wrongdoing required an overt threat of harm to procure a witness’s silence or absence. When the State’s witness, Juliana Barela, Defendant Joshua Maestas’s girlfriend, refused to testify at trial, the district court declared her unavailable. The State then requested that the district court find that Defendant had obtained Barela’s unavailability by wrongdoing, and to therefore admit at trial testimony Barela gave to the grand jury, a statement she made to police, and a call she made to 911 operators. In support of its claim that Defendant had procured and intended to procure Barela’s unavailability by way of misconduct, the State offered recorded jailhouse phone conversations between Defendant and Barela. The district court determined that Defendant had neither caused nor intended to cause by any wrongdoing Barela’s decision not to testify, concluded Barela’s prior statements were thus inadmissible, and dismissed Defendant’s indictment. The State appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling. The Supreme Court held that wrongdoing, for purposes of the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception, need not take the form of overt threat of harm; various forms of coercion, persuasion, and control may satisfy the requirement. Accordingly, the Court reversed the decisions of the district court and Court of Appeals and remanded to the district court to apply the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception. View "New Mexico v. Maestas" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Defendant John “Jack” McDowell was convicted of first- degree murder and tampering with evidence. During trial, the prosecutor elicited testimony from the arresting detective, without objection, that Defendant had invoked his right to counsel, and that by doing so the detective was precluded from questioning Defendant. Defendant argued on appeal that he was deprived of due process when the prosecutor elicited this testimony. The New Mexico Supreme Court agreed that the prosecutor erred. The Court reviewed the prosecutor’s error in this case for fundamental error because the error was not preserved, and concluded that the error was fundamental due to the prejudicial impact of such testimony and the lack of overwhelming evidence against Defendant. Accordingly, the convictions were vacated and the matter remanded back to the district court for a new trial. View "New Mexico v. McDowell" on Justia Law