Justia New Mexico Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

While aimlessly driving around Roswell in 2008, Defendant Julian Tafoya shot and killed Andrea Larez, and shot and injured Crystal Brady. Larez and Brady were sitting in the front of the car and Defendant and his girlfriend, Kaprice Conde, were sitting in back. Defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder with the predicate felony of "shooting at or from a motor vehicle," attempted first degree murder, and tampering with evidence. The trial court also found Defendant guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm after the jury issued a special verdict finding that Defendant committed the above crimes with a firearm. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment plus seventeen and one-half years. Defendant appealed his convictions to the Supreme Court. Principal among Defendant's contentions on appeal, he argued: (1) that his felony murder conviction should have been reversed because shooting entirely within a motor vehicle is neither shooting "at" nor "from" a motor vehicle and therefore cannot serve as the predicate felony for his felony murder conviction; (2) that shooting at or from a motor vehicle cannot serve as the requisite collateral felony for a felony murder conviction; (3) that there was insufficient evidence of deliberation to support his conviction for attempted first degree murder. Upon review, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court to vacate the felony murder conviction and enter judgment for second degree murder. The Court did not reach Defendant's second argument on appeal. Furthermore, the Court found sufficient evidence to support his conviction for attempted murder.View "New Mexico v. Tafoya" on Justia Law

Two cases were consolidated for the purposes of this opinion. In the first, Defendant Abdul Muqqddin was charged with five separate counts when a police officer discovered him lying under a car in an attempt to drain the gas tank: auto burglary; criminal damage to property; possession of burglary tools; larceny; and concealing identity. A jury trial was held. At the close of the State’s case, Defendant moved for a directed verdict on all charges. The district court granted the motion in regard to the possession of burglary tools charge, but denied the motion in regard to the other charges. The jury returned a guilty verdict on all the remaining charges, including auto burglary. Before his trial, Defendant Edgar Dominguez-Meraz filed a motion to dismiss the burglary charge filed against him. He was charged with burglary for allegedly removing the two rear wheels of a vehicle and the lug nuts of the front wheels. The motion acknowledged that Defendant Dominguez-Meraz was one of two individuals apprehended near a vehicle missing two rear tires and lug nuts from the front wheels. He argued, however, even if those facts were true, as a matter of law he could not be convicted of burglary for those actions because there was no entry as required by the statute. The district court agreed with Defendant Dominguez-Meraz and ordered the burglary charge dismissed. The issue presented before the Supreme Court by these cases concerned the "outer limits" of New Mexico’s burglary statute. In more than 40 years, the Court issued only one burglary opinion. Over that same time, the Court of Appeals has issued numerous opinions that significantly expanded the reach of the statute without any parallel change in the statute itself. The Court took the opportunity to review "the unprecedented scope of that expansion." Ultimately, the Court concluded that New Mexico case law had "gone astray." The Court reversed the two cases upon which these appeals relied as authority, vacated Muqqddin's conviction and affirmed the dismissal of the burglary charge against Domminquez-Meraz.View "New Mexico v. Muqqddin" on Justia Law

Defendant Luciano Guerra was convicted of first-degree murder and tampering with evidence in the fatal stabbing of Andrew Gama during a fight in March 2010. In his direct appeal to the Supreme Court, he argued that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for tampering with evidence; (2) the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a new trial when two defense exhibits left on counsel table after closing arguments were not included with other exhibits provided to the jury during deliberation; (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to ensure the return of the two exhibits for delivery to the jury room; (4) there was insufficient evidence to support the first-degree murder conviction; and (5) through various other claimed errors the district court denied him due process of law. The Supreme Court used this opinion to clarify the standard for sufficiency of evidence to support tampering-with-evidence convictions and reversed Defendant's tampering conviction. The Court rejected the remainder of Defendant’s claims and upheld his first-degree murder conviction.View "New Mexico v. Guerra" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether "Crawford v. Washington" (541 U.S. 36 (2004)) and subsequent related case law precluded a forensic pathologist from relating subjective observations recorded in an autopsy report as a basis for the pathologist's trial opinions, when the pathologist neither participated in nor observed the autopsy performed on the decedent. The Court answered this question affirmatively and concluded that there was a Confrontation Clause violation because: (1) the autopsy report contained statements that were made with the primary intention of establishing facts that the declarant understood might be used in a criminal prosecution; (2) the statements in the report were related to the jury as the basis for the pathologist's opinions and were therefore offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted; and (3) the pathologist who recorded her subjective observations in the report did not testify at trial and Defendant Arnoldo Navarette did not have a prior opportunity to cross-examine her. The Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. The Court did not address remaining issues raised by defendant as without merit. View "New Mexico v. Navarette" on Justia Law

Defendant Bruce Hall was convicted of a sex crime in California pursuant to a plea agreement. He then moved to New Mexico and was charged with the fourth-degree felony of failing to register as a sex offender. The New Mexico Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) requires a person convicted of any of twelve enumerated sex offenses, or who is convicted of an sheriff for the New Mexico county in which that person resides. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was what constituted an equivalent offense and how a court makes that determination. Upon review, the Court held that an offense is "equivalent" to a New Mexico offense for purposes of SORNA, is if the defendant's actual conduct that gave rise to the out-of-state conviction would have constituted one of the twelve enumerated offenses requiring registration. View "New Mexico v. Hall" on Justia Law

Petitioner Joseph C. Perry, Petitioner, was a prison inmate at the Penitentiary of New Mexico serving sentence at the Lea County Correctional Facility for battery against a household member as well as for a parole violation for fraud over $2,500. In 2006, Petitioner was transported to the Otero County Detention Center for an arraignment relating to the fraud charge. While at the Otero Center, Petitioner raped inmate Joshua Sommer. Upon discovering Petitioner’s pending criminal charge for rape in Otero County District Court, the New Mexico Corrections Department (NMCD) pursued disciplinary action against him for the same rape incident. A disciplinary hearing was scheduled at the Lea County Facility. A hearing officer conducted the hearing, documenting the proceedings and the evidence in a form entitled "Disciplinary Summary of Evidence and Proceeding," the tape of which was lost. The hearing officer ultimately concluded that Petitioner committed rape and threats to other inmates. NMCD forfeited Petitioner’s earned good time (69 days) and placed him in Level VI Disciplinary Segregation at a maximum security facility for a period of 455 days. In 2007, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus at the Santa Fe District Court, asserting five grounds for habeas relief. Just over three weeks later, Petitioner was convicted in Otero County on second-degree felony of criminal sexual penetration and the third-degree felony of bribery or intimidation of a witness, based on the same rape incident. Approximately a year later, the State filed an amended response to an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus and attached the judgment and sentence from Otero County. The central issue at the evidentiary hearing was whether NMCD had violated Petitioner’s due process rights by denying him an opportunity to call witnesses or otherwise elicit written testimony at his prison disciplinary hearing. At the conclusion of the habeas hearing, the district court agreed with Petitioner’s contentions and issued an order granting remedies with respect to its earlier findings of due process violations. Notwithstanding Petitioner’s intervening criminal convictions for rape and witness intimidation, the district court ordered NMCD to (1) restore Petitioner’s good-time credits, (2) remove the disciplinary hearing findings from Petitioner’s record, (3) never use findings of the disciplinary hearing against Petitioner in any way, including in present and future decisions relating to classification and placement within the prison system, and (4) never pursue the same factual allegations that were the subject of the disciplinary hearing in later proceedings against Petitioner. The NMCD appealed; the Supreme Court reversed: "In focusing on Petitioner’s procedural due process rights, the district court appears to have lost sight of the reason for such a hearing. The court failed to appreciate the significance of the intervening criminal convictions - not to whether due process was violated - but, pivotally, to what remedy was appropriate under the circumstances." View "Perry v. Moya" on Justia Law

By the time Defendant Wayne Bent was indicted, the grand jury allegedly had exceeded its statutory term of service. Having been convicted subsequently of most of the charges in the indictment, Defendant appealed on the basis of that untimely indictment. He claimed that the untimely indictment deprived the grand jury of jurisdiction and that the Supreme Court should overturn the subsequent jury verdict against him. Persuaded by this argument, the Court of Appeals reversed Defendant's convictions. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that statutory challenges to the indictment like those presented by this case must be adjudicated before trial and before a verdict issues on those same charges. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to that court for consideration of all other issues raised but not yet decided in Defendant's appeal. View "New Mexico v. Bent" on Justia Law

In this first-degree murder case, the State improperly admitted into evidence a diary of the decedent which was inadmissible hearsay. Because the diary was important to the State's case, and the State repeatedly relied upon its contents throughout the trial, the Supreme Court concluded that the error was not harmless and the convictions should have been reversed. View "New Mexico v. Leyba" on Justia Law

Defendant Julian Tafoya shot and killed Andrea Larez, and shot and injured Crystal Brady. Larez and Brady were sitting in the front of a car and Defendant and his girlfriend, Kaprice Conde, were sitting in back. Defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder with the predicate felony of "shooting at or from a motor vehicle," attempted first degree murder, and tampering with evidence. The trial court also found Defendant guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm after the jury issued a special verdict finding that Defendant committed his crimes with a firearm. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment plus seventeen and one-half years. Defendant appealed his convictions to the Supreme Court. Defendant argued: (1) his felony murder conviction should be reversed because shooting entirely within a motor vehicle is neither shooting "at" nor "from" a motor vehicle pursuant to statute, and therefore cannot serve as the predicate felony for his felony murder conviction; (2) there was insufficient evidence of deliberation to support his conviction for attempted first degree murder. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with Defendant on both arguments raised, and reversed his first degree murder conviction for entry of second degree murder. View "New Mexico v. Tafoya" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a Court of Appeals opinion that overturned the district court's denial of a motion to suppress drug evidence discovered during a traffic stop of Defendant Gunnar Olson. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the valid traffic stop to an investigation of prostitution solicitation and that Defendant's subsequent consent to a protective search of his fanny pack was not a fruit of a prior unlawful search or seizure. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress. View "New Mexico v. Olson" on Justia Law