Justia New Mexico Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1997, Martin Ramirez was arrested and charged with possession of up to one ounce of marijuana and two other misdemeanors. He appeared in metropolitan court for a custody arraignment two days later and pleaded guilty to all three charges on the advice of his public defender. In 2009, Ramirez learned that his guilty pleas in 1997 rendered him "inadmissable to the United States." Ramirez filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis in the district court, seeking to vacate his metropolitan court guilty pleas on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. In "New Mexico v. Paredez," (101 P.3d 799), the New Mexico Supreme Court held that a criminal defense attorney who represents a noncitizen client "must advise that client of the specific immigration consequences of pleading guilty" to pending charges. An attorney’s failure to do so will be ineffective assistance of counsel if the client is prejudiced. The question in this case was whether the holding in Paredez applied retroactively and, if it did, whether Ramirez has a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel that could justify withdrawal of his pleas. The Court held that Paredez applied retroactively to 1990, the year that the Court began to prohibit courts from accepting a guilty plea from a defendant without: (1) ascertaining that the defendant understood that a conviction may have an effect on the defendant’s immigration status; (2) obtaining an affidavit from the defendant that the judge personally advised the defendant of the possible effect of a conviction on the defendant’s immigration status; and (3) obtaining a certification from the defendant’s attorney that the attorney had conferred with the defendant and explained in detail the contents of the affidavit signed by the defendant. These requirements were not new in 1997 at the time Ramirez pleaded guilty, and they were "designed to ensure a guilty plea is made knowingly and voluntarily." View "Ramirez v. New Mexico" on Justia Law

In 2004, Defendant Anthony Samora pled guilty to the charge of criminal sexual penetration (CSP) in the second degree for raping a fourteen year-old boy. He served a sentence of three years' incarceration. Nearly ten years later, a jury convicted Defendant of CSP in the second degree (in the commission of another felony) for raping a fifteen year-old boy. Because this was Defendant's second such conviction, the State sought to impose a mandatory life sentence. However, the district court concluded that the mandatory life sentence enhancement under Section 31-18-25 did not apply to this case, finding a "legislative infirmity," in the statutes. Before sentencing and before the district court released the jury from service, the State effectively appealed the district court's refusal to impose a mandatory life sentence. The Supreme Court granted the State's emergency petition for writ of superintending control. Subsection D of Section 30-9-11 previously defined CSP in the second degree; a 2007 legislative reorganization of the statute moved the definition of CSP in the second degree to Subsection E. Subsection D has since defined CSP in the first degree, which was not applicable to Defendant's convictions. Solely by its reference to Subsection D of Section 30-9-11, which as of 2007 defined CSP in the first degree, the definition of a violent sexual offense in Section 31-18-25(F)(2) no longer included repeated convictions of CSP in the second degree. On that basis, Defendant argued and the district court concluded that a mandatory life sentence was not authorized. The Supreme Court was "skeptical of reading too much into a passive and incidental legislative act." The 2009 amendment of Section 30-9-11 did not effectively repeal Section 31-18-25(F)(2), and therefore it did not repeal a district court's authority to impose the mandatory life sentence for a second conviction of a violent sexual offense under Section 31-18-25(A). The current Section 31-18-25(F) continues to define a violent sexual offense as either first- or second-degree CSP, despite referencing two subsections in Section 30-9-11 that define first-degree CSP and aggravated CSP pursuant to the 2007 renumbering of the Section 30-9-11 subsections. The Court invited the New Mexico Legislature to address this statutory anomaly to clarify what was essentially a clerical error. View "State of New Mexico ex rel. Brandenburg v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

After her indictment for second-degree murder, but prior to trial, Petitioner Amy Herrera sought a writ of mandamus from this Court directing the district court to dismiss the indictment. Petitioner contended that the prosecutor prevented the grand jury from inquiring into the facts demonstrating probable cause and failed to act in a fair and impartial manner when instructing the grand jury. The Supreme Court agreed that the manner in which the prosecutor conducted the grand jury proceedings warranted dismissal of the indictment. The Court therefore issued a writ of mandamus directing the district court to dismiss the indictment without prejudice to the State’s right to bring new criminal charges against Petitioner. View "Herrera v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

Defendant Nieves Ortega was convicted of one count of wilful and deliberate murder. He was also convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, attempted first-degree kidnapping, armed robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, and conspiracy to commit first-degree kidnapping. He was ultimately sentenced to a life sentence. On direct appeal to the Supreme Court, defendant argued: he received ineffective assistance of counsel; that the district court erred in denying an important defense witness use immunity; testimony of the State’s medical expert violated Defendant’s confrontation rights; Defendant’s multiple conspiracy convictions violated double jeopardy; the jury was improperly instructed; the State violated its duty to disclose; and cumulative error. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions for first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, attempted first-degree kidnapping, and attempted armed robbery. The Court vacated Defendant’s convictions for conspiracy to commit robbery and conspiracy to commit first-degree kidnapping on double jeopardy grounds. View "New Mexico v. Ortega" on Justia Law

Police officers were dispatched in response to reports of an armed subject pointing a rifle at several people from the window of a light beige or tan vehicle. After Defendant Leticia T. (Child) and children passengers were removed and detained, the officers conducted a warrantless search of the interior and trunk of the vehicle. The district court held that the warrantless search was justified by exigent circumstances. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court, ruling that the possibility of a person hiding in the trunk of a vehicle did not constitute exigency. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court centered on the Court of Appeals' reversal. The Supreme Court conclude after a review of the district court record was that when police officers have probable cause and exigent circumstances to believe that an armed subject pointed a rifle at other individuals from a vehicle, officers may search the cab and the trunk of that same vehicle for the rifle. View "New Mexico v. Leticia T." on Justia Law

Defendant Gregg Crocco appealed his conviction for aggravated driving while under the influence of alcohol (aggravated DWI), claiming that his previous attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to file a motion to suppress evidence resulting from a warrantless police entry into the house of an absent third party, which Defendant had entered shortly before his arrest. Upon review of the particular facts of this case, the Supreme Court denied Defendant’s claim because the record failed to establish a prima facie showing that the police entry into another person’s house violated Defendant’s own reasonable expectation of privacy. View "New Mexico v. Crocco" on Justia Law

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit certified a question of New Mexico Law to the New Mexico Supreme Court: "[i]f an otherwise-qualified person has completed a deferred sentence for a felony offense, is that person barred from holding public office without a pardon or certificate from the governor [. . .] or is that person’s right to hold office automatically restored [by the New Mexico Constitution]?" The New Mexico Court, in answering the question, held that after satisfactory completion of all conditions for a deferred sentence and the resulting dismissal of all charges, New Mexico restores a person’s civil rights, including the right to hold public office, by operation of law. James Reese entered a no contest plea to one felony of tampering with evidence, which was connected to aggravated assault charges. Reese was charged with tampering for hiding a knife. As a result of the plea, the State dismissed the aggravated assault charges, leaving only the evidence tampering charge. "The New Mexico Legislature established the deferred sentence as a means of judicial clemency. As such, dismissal of the criminal charges upon satisfaction of the conditions of deferment automatically restores a convicted felon’s civil rights by operation of law." View "United States of America v. Reese" on Justia Law

James Olsson was charged with sixty counts of possession of child pornography based on photographs of minors found in three binders seized from Olsson and images found on his computer. Olsson filed a motion for merger of counts asking the trial court to determine the proper unit of prosecution for those charged with possession under Section 30-6A-3(A). Olsson argued that he should only be charged with one unitary act of possession. Similarly, William Ballard was charged with twenty-five counts of possession based on an external computer hard drive containing still images and videos of minors. The trial court denied Olsson's motion, ruling that if Olsson’s reading of the statute were to be accepted, the language would become meaningless and an offender would be free to acquire unlimited child pornography without additional counts being charged. The State then amended the criminal information, adding additional counts of possession of child pornography for a total of 152 counts based on more images found on Olsson’s computer. By this opinion the Supreme Court decided the correct unit of prosecution for possession of child pornography under NMSA 1978, Section 30-6A-3(A) (2007), part of the Sexual Exploitation of Children Act, NMSA 1978, sections 30-6A-1 to -4 (1984, as amended through 2007), when various media are used to store one or countless images. Upon review, the Court held that the Legislature did not clearly define the unit of prosecution for possession of child pornography because the language was ambiguous and the history and purpose do not offer any further clarity. Furthermore, the Court held that the "Herron" indicia of distinctness test was not applicable in cases of possession. Therefore, the Court resorted to the rule of lenity and held that Olsson and Ballard could each only be charged with one count of possession of child pornography. View "New Mexico v. Olsson" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on defendant Lisa Stevens' convictions for second-degree criminal sexual penetration during the commission of a felony, child abuse, and contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The convictions were based on two separate incidents in which defendant directed her thirteen-year-old daughter to perform oral sex on defendant’s twenty-four-year-old boyfriend after the three injected methamphetamine together. The Court used the opportunity of this case to clarify that simply causing another person to engage in otherwise lawful sexual intercourse at the same time a felony was being committed did not constitute the crime of criminal sexual penetration during the commission of a felony. While the Court also held that the jury should be instructed that the crime of criminal sexual penetration during the commission of a felony requires the commission of unlawful sexual activity with the victim of the felony, the Court concluded that the unobjected-to deficiency in the instructions did not constitute fundamental error in this case case when Defendant’s guilt was clear. Finding no other reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's convictions. View "New Mexico v. Stevens" on Justia Law

The question before the Supreme Court in these appeals was: what happens when the prosecutor files an interlocutory appeal yet neglects to make a timely certification to the district court or fails to attach a copy of the certification to its notice of appeal? What should happen is the imposition of sanctions upon any attorney who fails to read the law and follow the rules of Court, something that did not occur in the two cases consolidated in this opinion. "What should not happen is outright dismissal of the interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction, something that did occur in these cases." Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed those dismissals and remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "New Mexico v. Vasquez" on Justia Law