Justia New Mexico Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The New Mexico Supreme Court previously issued an opinion after defendant Adriana Cabezuela's first trial in which a jury convicted her of intentional child abuse resulting in the death of her eight-month-old daughter Mariana Barraza. After the Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, Defendant was again tried and convicted of the same offense and sentenced to life. On direct appeal, Defendant argued: (1) the district court erred by not holding a presentencing hearing to consider mitigation evidence before imposing a life sentence; (2) the evidence was not sufficient to support her conviction; (3) a forensic pathologist's trial testimony violated Defendant's constitutional right to confrontation; (4) the district court improperly instructed the jury by giving UJI 14-610 NMRA's (1993, withdrawn 2015) definition of intent; and (5) Defendant's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. After review, the Supreme Court decided in the State's favor with respect to issues (2) through (4). With respect to issue (1), the Court concluded that the district court should have heard evidence in mitigation before imposing sentence. The case was remanded for resentencing. Regarding (5), the Court concluded Defendant's argument was more appropriate for a habeas corpus proceeding. View "New Mexico v. Cabezuela" on Justia Law

Defendant Abraham Baca was arrested by Sergeant Martin Trujillo for aggravated DWI and driving left of center of a roadway. The State filed a criminal complaint against Defendant in Magistrate Court. While the magistrate court proceedings were not recorded, what did appear in the record was that on the day of trial, the magistrate judge entered a written order dismissing the case with prejudice upon motion of the defense. The Trial Order was entered on a standardized court form that contained, among other options, fields for recording the magistrate's determination of guilty or not guilty, but these fields were left completely blank and instead the order recited that the cause was "dismissed with prejudice." The State appealed to the district court. While that appeal was pending, the magistrate court sua sponte entered a new, amended signed order in its own files, stating: "A motion was made by defense attorney Ben Ortega to suppress the testimony of Sergeant Martin Trujillo for violation of NMRA 6-506-A(C)(D). Sergeant Martin Trujillo was the arresting Officer. A second motion was made by defense attorney Ben Ortega for a directed verdict of not guilty due to insufficient evidence to proceed. Motion to suppress and directed verdict of not guilty were granted. The Defendant is therefore acquitted." Once the amended magistrate court order was filed, defense counsel moved to dismiss the State's appeal at the district court. The district court found that the magistrate judge's premature termination of the case had been a dismissal to sanction the State's filing of a nonconforming criminal complaint, rather than an acquittal on the merits. Concluding that the State's appeal did not result in double jeopardy, the district court accordingly denied Defendant's motion to dismiss the appeal. Defendant appealed the district court's order denying his motion to dismiss to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court, concluding that because "the magistrate court's dismissal constituted an acquittal and, therefore, the State was barred from appealing," it was inappropriate to address "whether . . .Judge Naranjo's ruling suppressing Sergeant Trujillo's testimony was erroneous." After review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the district court did not err in ruling the state was not constitutionally barred from further prosecution. The magistrate court's termination of defendant's trial before the State had completed presenting its evidence in its case in chief was a procedural dismissal rather than an acquittal on the merits. View "New Mexico v. Baca" on Justia Law

Petitioner Rodrigo Dominguez was convicted for voluntary manslaughter and shooting at or from a motor vehicle resulting in the death of one person, and the aggravated battery and shooting at or from a motor vehicle resulting in great bodily injury in a second person. Petitioner argued that "New Mexico v. Montoya," (306 P.3d 426 (2013)) precluded him from being cumulatively punished for voluntary manslaughter, aggravated battery and the shooting charges on double jeopardy grounds because these charges all stemmed from the same shooting of the same victim. A majority of the New Mexico Supreme Court ultimately rejected petitioner's double jeopardy arguments, concluding that another case controlled. In response, petitioner filed for habeas relief, seeking to retroactively apply "Montoya" to his case to support the same double jeopardy claims he raised earlier in certiorari review. The Supreme Court again declined to accept petitioner's claims because "Montoya" announced a new procedural rule that could not be applied retroactively. View "Dominguez v. New Mexico" on Justia Law

Baby Breandra Pena (seventeen months old) died while in the care of defendant Nathan Montoya. Defendant was convicted of intentional child abuse resulting in the death of a child under twelve and sentenced to life imprisonment. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review addressed "the ongoing confusion created by [New Mexico's] child abuse jury instructions. In review of defendant’s conviction on direct appeal, the Court held: (1) the jury instructions used in defendant’s trial accurately instructed the jury of the law that, when considered as a whole, were distinguishable from those used in previous cases which the Court reversed based on erroneous child abuse jury instructions; (2) reckless child abuse may, in some cases, be a lesser included offense of intentional child abuse resulting in the death of a child under twelve (by this opinion, the Court disavowed New Mexico cases suggesting otherwise); (3) when a jury is correctly instructed on both reckless and intentional child abuse resulting in the death of a child under twelve, a step-down instruction is appropriate; (4) the admission of a forensic pathologist’s expert testimony was not in error and that sufficient evidence was presented to convict defendant; and (5) it was abuse of discretion for the district court judge to refuse to consider mitigating the basic sentence of life imprisonment, based on the court’s mistaken understanding that the life sentence was mandatory and could not be altered. Defendant’s conviction for intentional child abuse was affirmed and the case remanded to the district court for resentencing with consideration of potential mitigating circumstances. View "New Mexico v. Montoya" on Justia Law

Defendant Jason Strauch allegedly revealed to his wife that he had been sexually abusing their minor daughter. Defendant moved out of the family home for a time and began attending counseling with a private-practice social worker licensed by the State. The couple reconciled, and defendant moved back into the home. Defendant continued to see the social worker. The daughter revealed to her mother that the abuse never stopped. Defendant and the wife then separated, and she reported the abuse. Defendant was charged with four counts of criminal sexual contact of a minor in the second degree. The State filed notice that it intended to call the social worker as a prosecution witness. Defendant moved for a protective order, arguing that the communications were protected from disclosure. The district court held that the private social worker was not a "mandatory reporter" under state law because his work was as a "private therapist" rather than in an "official capacity." On interlocutory appeal by the State, a majority of the Court of Appeals panel affirmed the district court's protective order. The Supreme Court, after its review of the district and appellate courts concluded that both privately and publicly employed social workers were mandatory child abuse reporters, and statements made to a social worker by an alleged child abuser in private counseling sessions were not protected from disclosure in court proceedings. View "New Mexico v. Strauch" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Astorga was convicted by jury of first degree murder, tampering with evidence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The State sought the death penalty; a sentencing jury could not unanimously agree on the death penalty, and consequently, the district court sentenced defendant to life for the murder charge, followed by thirteen and a half years for the remaining charges. Defendant appealed, raising purported errors that occurred during the guilt phase of trial as grounds for reversal of his conviction. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Mexico v. Astorga" on Justia Law

Defendant Donnie Silvas was convicted by jury of trafficking a controlled substance by possession with intent to distribute, and conspiracy to commit trafficking of the controlled substance. Both charges stemmed from one point in time, and a single sale of drugs. The Court of Appeals overturned the conspiracy conviction based on an expanded use of judicial presumption, also known as "Wharton's Rule." After review of the appellate court's decision, the Supreme Court agreed with the decision to reverse the conspiracy charge, it did so on a different ground: double jeopardy. By this opinion, the Court expressly discouraged "any future expansion of Wharton's Rule beyond its original contours." View "New Mexico v. Silvas" on Justia Law

Defendant Cesar Favela filed a motion requesting permission to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel after his attorney failed to advise him that his guilty plea would result in deportation. The district court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that where a defendant’s attorney fails to advise that defendant of the specific immigration consequences of entering a guilty plea, a warning of such consequences by a judge during a plea colloquy does not, by itself, cure the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the attorney’s deficient performance and should only be given minimal weight in the analysis of prejudice. The State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ holding that a judge’s warning of such consequences during a plea colloquy could not alone cure the prejudice caused by the attorney’s deficient performance. View "New Mexico v. Favela" on Justia Law

Defendant Walter Brown was arrested in 2011, and indicted two weeks later on an array of charges, including first-degree felony murder and, alternatively, second-degree murder. The district court imposed a $250,000 cash or surety bond at Defendant’s arraignment. After spending more than two years in pretrial custody awaiting trial because he lacked the financial resources to post such a bond, Defendant moved the district court to review his conditions of release and to release him under the supervision of the Second Judicial District Court’s pretrial services program with appropriate nonmonetary conditions of release. After hearing from Defendant and the State, the district court orally denied Defendant’s motion for release on nonmonetary conditions on the ground that Defendant’s charge of first-degree felony murder carried a possible life sentence that would require at least thirty years of imprisonment. The district court subsequently filed a written order setting forth detailed factual findings. Based on the evidence presented at the motion hearing, the district court found that the pretrial services program could fashion appropriate conditions of release for Defendant and that Defendant could live with his father and return to his former job if released. After several more months of pretrial confinement, Defendant filed a second motion, again seeking release under the supervision of the pretrial services program with appropriate nonmonetary release conditions. At a hearing on the second motion, defense counsel reiterated the information presented at the first hearing five months earlier and argued that Defendant’s unique personal history made him likely to comply with conditions of release and unlikely to commit additional crimes while released. After the district court denied Defendant’s second motion to amend the conditions of release, Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals by filing a motion under Rule 12-204 NMRA. After its review, the Supreme Court found that defendant presented the district court with uncontroverted evidence demonstrating that nonmonetary conditions of pretrial release were sufficient to reasonably assure that Defendant was not likely to pose a flight or safety risk. Despite this evidence, the district court ordered that Defendant be held in jail unless he posted a $250,000 cash or surety bond, based solely on the nature and seriousness of the charged offense. The Court concluded that the district court erred by requiring a $250,000 bond when the evidence demonstrated that less restrictive conditions of pretrial release would be sufficient. The Court therefore reversed the district court’s pretrial release order and instructed the district court to release Defendant on appropriate nonmonetary conditions. View "New Mexico v. Brown" on Justia Law

Antonio T., a seventeen-year-old high school student, was taken to the principal's office because he was suspected of being under the influence of alcohol. The assistant principal questioned Antonio about his possession of alcohol in the presence of a deputy sheriff. Antonio admitted that he had brought alcohol to school, where he drank it. At the principal's request, the deputy administered a breath alcohol test to Antonio, which was positive for alcohol. After administering the test, the deputy advised Antonio of his right to remain silent, and Antonio declined to answer the questions. Antonio was charged with the delinquent act of possession of alcohol by a minor. He filed a motion to suppress the statements he made to the assistant principal because his statements were elicited without a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to remain silent. The district court denied his motion, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court reversed both the district court and the Court of Appeals: although a school official may insist that a child answer questions for purposes of school disciplinary proceedings, any statements elicited by the official may not be used against the child in a delinquency proceeding unless the child made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his or her right to remain silent. Because the State failed to prove that Antonio effectively waived this right, his statements were inadmissible in the delinquency proceeding. View "New Mexico v. Antonio T." on Justia Law