Justia New Mexico Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

DeAngelo M. (Child) was thirteen years and eight days old when, during a custodial interrogation by three law enforcement officers, he made inculpatory statements regarding a burglary, which connected him to a murder. Had Child made his statements nine days earlier, his statements would not have been admissible against him in any delinquency proceedings. Had Child been fifteen years old at the time of his statement, his statement would have been admissible if the prosecution proved by a preponderance that Child’s statement was elicited after waiver of his constitutional and statutory rights. However, because Child was thirteen years old and his statement was given to a person in a position of authority, there was a rebuttable presumption that his statement was inadmissable. The Court of Appeals held that to rebut the presumption, the prosecution had to prove by clear and convincing evidence, through expert testimony, that “Child had the maturity and intelligence of an average fifteen-year-old child to understand his situation and the rights he possessed.” The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress because the prosecution did not meet this burden and remanded for a new trial. The State appealed. After review, the Supreme Court held that Section 32A-2-14(F) required the State to prove by clear and convincing evidence that at the time a thirteen- or fourteen-year-old child makes a statement, confession, or admission to a person in a position of authority, the child: (1) was warned of his constitutional and statutory rights; and (2) knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived each right. To prove the second element, the recording of the custodial interrogation which resulted in the statement, confession, or admission must prove clearly and convincingly that the child’s answer to open-ended questions demonstrated that the thirteen- or fourteen-year-old child had the maturity to understand each of his or her constitutional and statutory rights and the force of will to insist on exercising those rights. Expert testimony may assist the fact-finder in understanding the evidence or determining the facts, but it is not essential. The Supreme Court concluded that the evidence in this case did not prove that Child knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived each right. Therefore, his statement should have been suppressed. View "New Mexico v. DeAngelo M." on Justia Law

In this case, police officers made their arrest for shoplifting at the scene of the crime, without any prior opportunity to secure a warrant. Surveillance cameras at Sportsman’s Warehouse in Albuquerque caught defendant Ernest Paananen placing two flashlights under his jacket and then leaving the store without paying. Moments later, the store’s loss prevention team apprehended defendant and returned him to the store. The loss prevention team placed defendant in a back room, frisked him, and called the police. During the frisk, a loss prevention employee placed defendant’s possessions on the table, along with the stolen flashlights. The employee did not go through Defendant’s backpack. Albuquerque Police Department Officers Cole Knight and Andrew Hsu arrived at the store. Defendant was immediately handcuffed, and officers searched Defendant’s backpack and found hypodermic needles. When questioned about the needles, defendant admitted that he had tried to use drugs the day before but said he did not possess any drugs. While waiting for a copy of the surveillance video, Officer Knight searched through defendant’s possessions on the table and found a cigarette pack, and in looking inside the pack, discovered a substance believed to be heroin. Along with shoplifting, the State charged defendant with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant sought to suppress all evidence seized at the store, arguing that the officers conducted an unreasonable, warrantless search. The Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression. The Supreme Court, after review, reversed the Court of Appeals, finding that though without a warrant, defendant's arrest was reasonable under the New Mexico Constitution. "The subsequent warrantless search of Defendant fits a judicially recognized exception to the warrant requirement and was therefore also constitutionally reasonable." View "New Mexico v. Paananen" on Justia Law

Defendant Donovan King and Justin Mark arrived at Kevin Lossiah’s apartment the morning of May 29, 2011. Initially, Lossiah’s neighbors saw Defendant and Mark outside the apartment. The neighbor later heard banging coming from Lossiah’s apartment and someone yelling. The neighbor called the police, and once police arrived, they discovered Lossiah severely beaten but still breathing. Officers called for paramedics and Lossiah was rushed to the hospital. Defendant was ultimately charged with and convicted of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, armed robbery, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and tampering with evidence. The district court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment plus 18 years. Recently the New Mexico Supreme Court upheld Mark’s conviction for first-degree murder for his participation in Lossiah’s murder. Relying on "Santobello v. New York," (404 U.S. 257 (1971)), the New Mexico Supreme Court has previously held that a plea-bargained sentence must be fulfilled by the prosecution, and if not, will be enforced by the courts. In defendant's murder appeal, the Court applied that principle to the prosecution's promise to dismiss a tampering-with-evidence charge if defendant would locate and produce the murder weapon. Here, defendant produced the weapon, but the prosecutor did not drop the charge as promised and defendant was convicted of tampering with evidence. Accordingly, the Court reversed the tampering conviction. Affirming all remaining convictions, including first-degree murder, this case was remanded for resentencing. View "New Mexico v. King" on Justia Law

In a consolidated appeal, Respondents Steven B. and Ernie Begaye were both enrolled members of the Navajo Nation who were accused of offenses committed on Parcel Three of Fort Wingate (Parcel Three). The question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether Parcel Three was a "dependent Indian community" and therefore Indian country under 18 U.S.C. 1151(b) (2012) and "Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government," (522 U.S. 520 (1998)). If so, then the district court properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Respondents; if not, then the New Mexico Supreme Court had to reverse the district court and permit the State to proceed against Respondents. In review of the controlling case law, the history and the present circumstances of Parcel Three, the Supreme Court concluded that Parcel Teal was not a dependent Indian community, and the district court, therefore, had jurisdiction over Respondents. The district court and the Court of Appeals having concluded otherwise, the Supreme Court reversed. View "New Mexico v. Steven B." on Justia Law

Defendant-respondent Aide Sanchez was at the Santa Teresa port of entry attempting to enter the United States from Mexico, when Border Patrol agents seized marijuana from her van. In "New Mexico v. Cardenas-Alvarez," (25 P.3d 225), the New Mexico Supreme Court held that “the New Mexico Constitution and laws apply to evidence seized by federal 8 agents at a border patrol checkpoint [located] sixty miles within the State of New Mexico [(an interior fixed checkpoint)] when that evidence is proffered in state court.” The Court also held that Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution “demands that after a Border Patrol agent has asked about a motorist’s citizenship and immigration status, and has reviewed the motorist’s documents, any further detention requires reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” Sanchez successfully moved to suppress the evidence seized from her van, arguing that: (1) Cardenas-Alvarez applied at the international border; and (2) seizure of the marijuana violated the New Mexico Constitution because the Border Patrol agents did not have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to continue to detain her once they had established her citizenship and immigration status. After review, the Supreme Court held that Article II, Section 10 did not afford greater protections at an international border checkpoint because unlike motorists who are stopped at interior border checkpoints, all motorists stopped at international fixed checkpoints are known to be international travelers who are not entitled to the heightened privacy expectations enjoyed by domestic travelers. The Court reversed the district court’s order suppressing the evidence in this case and remanded for further proceedings. View "New Mexico v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

The New Mexico Supreme Court previously issued an opinion after defendant Adriana Cabezuela's first trial in which a jury convicted her of intentional child abuse resulting in the death of her eight-month-old daughter Mariana Barraza. After the Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, Defendant was again tried and convicted of the same offense and sentenced to life. On direct appeal, Defendant argued: (1) the district court erred by not holding a presentencing hearing to consider mitigation evidence before imposing a life sentence; (2) the evidence was not sufficient to support her conviction; (3) a forensic pathologist's trial testimony violated Defendant's constitutional right to confrontation; (4) the district court improperly instructed the jury by giving UJI 14-610 NMRA's (1993, withdrawn 2015) definition of intent; and (5) Defendant's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. After review, the Supreme Court decided in the State's favor with respect to issues (2) through (4). With respect to issue (1), the Court concluded that the district court should have heard evidence in mitigation before imposing sentence. The case was remanded for resentencing. Regarding (5), the Court concluded Defendant's argument was more appropriate for a habeas corpus proceeding. View "New Mexico v. Cabezuela" on Justia Law

Defendant Abraham Baca was arrested by Sergeant Martin Trujillo for aggravated DWI and driving left of center of a roadway. The State filed a criminal complaint against Defendant in Magistrate Court. While the magistrate court proceedings were not recorded, what did appear in the record was that on the day of trial, the magistrate judge entered a written order dismissing the case with prejudice upon motion of the defense. The Trial Order was entered on a standardized court form that contained, among other options, fields for recording the magistrate's determination of guilty or not guilty, but these fields were left completely blank and instead the order recited that the cause was "dismissed with prejudice." The State appealed to the district court. While that appeal was pending, the magistrate court sua sponte entered a new, amended signed order in its own files, stating: "A motion was made by defense attorney Ben Ortega to suppress the testimony of Sergeant Martin Trujillo for violation of NMRA 6-506-A(C)(D). Sergeant Martin Trujillo was the arresting Officer. A second motion was made by defense attorney Ben Ortega for a directed verdict of not guilty due to insufficient evidence to proceed. Motion to suppress and directed verdict of not guilty were granted. The Defendant is therefore acquitted." Once the amended magistrate court order was filed, defense counsel moved to dismiss the State's appeal at the district court. The district court found that the magistrate judge's premature termination of the case had been a dismissal to sanction the State's filing of a nonconforming criminal complaint, rather than an acquittal on the merits. Concluding that the State's appeal did not result in double jeopardy, the district court accordingly denied Defendant's motion to dismiss the appeal. Defendant appealed the district court's order denying his motion to dismiss to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court, concluding that because "the magistrate court's dismissal constituted an acquittal and, therefore, the State was barred from appealing," it was inappropriate to address "whether . . .Judge Naranjo's ruling suppressing Sergeant Trujillo's testimony was erroneous." After review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the district court did not err in ruling the state was not constitutionally barred from further prosecution. The magistrate court's termination of defendant's trial before the State had completed presenting its evidence in its case in chief was a procedural dismissal rather than an acquittal on the merits. View "New Mexico v. Baca" on Justia Law

Petitioner Rodrigo Dominguez was convicted for voluntary manslaughter and shooting at or from a motor vehicle resulting in the death of one person, and the aggravated battery and shooting at or from a motor vehicle resulting in great bodily injury in a second person. Petitioner argued that "New Mexico v. Montoya," (306 P.3d 426 (2013)) precluded him from being cumulatively punished for voluntary manslaughter, aggravated battery and the shooting charges on double jeopardy grounds because these charges all stemmed from the same shooting of the same victim. A majority of the New Mexico Supreme Court ultimately rejected petitioner's double jeopardy arguments, concluding that another case controlled. In response, petitioner filed for habeas relief, seeking to retroactively apply "Montoya" to his case to support the same double jeopardy claims he raised earlier in certiorari review. The Supreme Court again declined to accept petitioner's claims because "Montoya" announced a new procedural rule that could not be applied retroactively. View "Dominguez v. New Mexico" on Justia Law

Baby Breandra Pena (seventeen months old) died while in the care of defendant Nathan Montoya. Defendant was convicted of intentional child abuse resulting in the death of a child under twelve and sentenced to life imprisonment. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review addressed "the ongoing confusion created by [New Mexico's] child abuse jury instructions. In review of defendant’s conviction on direct appeal, the Court held: (1) the jury instructions used in defendant’s trial accurately instructed the jury of the law that, when considered as a whole, were distinguishable from those used in previous cases which the Court reversed based on erroneous child abuse jury instructions; (2) reckless child abuse may, in some cases, be a lesser included offense of intentional child abuse resulting in the death of a child under twelve (by this opinion, the Court disavowed New Mexico cases suggesting otherwise); (3) when a jury is correctly instructed on both reckless and intentional child abuse resulting in the death of a child under twelve, a step-down instruction is appropriate; (4) the admission of a forensic pathologist’s expert testimony was not in error and that sufficient evidence was presented to convict defendant; and (5) it was abuse of discretion for the district court judge to refuse to consider mitigating the basic sentence of life imprisonment, based on the court’s mistaken understanding that the life sentence was mandatory and could not be altered. Defendant’s conviction for intentional child abuse was affirmed and the case remanded to the district court for resentencing with consideration of potential mitigating circumstances. View "New Mexico v. Montoya" on Justia Law

Defendant Jason Strauch allegedly revealed to his wife that he had been sexually abusing their minor daughter. Defendant moved out of the family home for a time and began attending counseling with a private-practice social worker licensed by the State. The couple reconciled, and defendant moved back into the home. Defendant continued to see the social worker. The daughter revealed to her mother that the abuse never stopped. Defendant and the wife then separated, and she reported the abuse. Defendant was charged with four counts of criminal sexual contact of a minor in the second degree. The State filed notice that it intended to call the social worker as a prosecution witness. Defendant moved for a protective order, arguing that the communications were protected from disclosure. The district court held that the private social worker was not a "mandatory reporter" under state law because his work was as a "private therapist" rather than in an "official capacity." On interlocutory appeal by the State, a majority of the Court of Appeals panel affirmed the district court's protective order. The Supreme Court, after its review of the district and appellate courts concluded that both privately and publicly employed social workers were mandatory child abuse reporters, and statements made to a social worker by an alleged child abuser in private counseling sessions were not protected from disclosure in court proceedings. View "New Mexico v. Strauch" on Justia Law