Justia New Mexico Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Ronald Myers was convicted on seven counts under the Sexual Exploitation of Children Act (the Act) for covertly videotaping two female minors while they used the bathroom in a government office in 2004.  Defendant was convicted under that portion of the Act which prohibits the intentional "‘manufactur[ing of] any obscene visual or print medium depicting any prohibited sexual act or simulation of such an act if one or more of the participants in that act is a child under eighteen years of age.'"  Defendant appealed the convictions claiming that the images did not depict a "prohibited sexual act" and were not "obscene." The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant's convictions. Of the five prohibited sexual acts defined in the Act, the one at issue was "a ‘lewd and sexually explicit exhibition with a focus on the genitals or pubic area of any person for the purpose of sexual stimulation.'"  The Court of Appeals concluded that the videotaped images did not depict a "prohibited sexual act" because the images were neither "lewd and sexually explicit" nor manufactured "for the purpose of sexual stimulation" within the meaning of the Act.  The State petitioned for certiorari, and the Supreme Court reversed.  The Court remanded Defendant's appeal for the Court of Appeals to consider two remaining issues raised by the parties in the initial appeal that the appellate court had not yet addressed:  (1) "whether the Act is void for vagueness as applied to Defendant's conduct," and (2) "whether the trial court properly entered a stay of execution that relieved Defendant of the obligation to register as a sex offender [under SORNA] pending the outcome of this appeal."  Upon second review of Defendant's case, the Supreme Court once again affirmed the result of the trial below, and held that trial judges have neither the power nor the discretion to stay the application of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) pending the outcome of an appeal.  In affirming Defendant's convictions, the Court reversed a second opinion of the Court of Appeals. The Court concluded that the Court of Appeals misapprehended both the Court's opinion and the law relative to retroactive application of judicial decisions.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings to enforce Defendant's convictions. View "New Mexico v. Myers " on Justia Law

In this first-degree murder case, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant Lawrence Gallegos' convictions for murder, aggravated arson and conspiracy to commit murder. The Court found, however, that Defendant's convictions for two other conspiracies violated constitutional principles against double jeopardy. In so doing, the Court applied an analysis of double jeopardy jurisprudence to multiple conspiracy convictions. In the course of that analysis, the Court clarified existing case law and set a new course for the future application of double jeopardy principles to multiple conspiracy convictions. View "New Mexico v. Gallegos" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the question of whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits an under-clothing search as part of a search incident to arrest when the arresting officer has reason to suspect that the person arrested is concealing a weapon or contraband under his or her clothing. The State appealed the holding of the Court of Appeals that the roadside search of Defendant Terry Williams, incident to his arrest on an outstanding felony warrant, violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court concluded the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct an under-clothing search and the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. View "New Mexico v. Williams" on Justia Law

The crux of this appeal is whether Defendant Albert Ramirez knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered into his plea agreement with the State of New Mexico. At his plea hearing, Defendant expressed confusion about sentencing, the premeditation element of his first-degree murder charge and culpability for his assault and battery charges. Apparently recognizing Defendant's hesitation and confusion, the prosecutor asked the district court to inquire further on the record whether Defendant understood the plea and that he was "willfully" entering into the plea agreement. Although the district court acknowledged the need to do so, the court failed to adequately confirm on the record Defendant's understanding of the plea and its consequences as required by New Mexico law. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to allow Defendant to withdraw his plea. View "New Mexico v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

Sixteen-year-old Defendant Oden Gutierrez confessed to shooting and killing Thomas Powell in Powell's home and stealing his car. Defendant was charged by criminal information with an open charge of murder, aggravated burglary, armed robbery for stealing a car while armed with a deadly weapon, and unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. A jury found him guilty on all counts and he was sentenced to life in prison plus nineteen and one-half years. Defendant appealed his sentence. He raised several issues which fell into four categories: (1) the suppression of evidence pertaining to his confession; (2) change of venue due to prejudicial pre-trial publicity; (3) a double jeopardy violation for his convictions of both armed robbery and the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle; and (4) an unlawful sentence based on constitutional grounds, mainly that a life sentence was cruel and unusual punishment for a youthful offender. Upon careful consideration of Defendant's arguments, the trial record, and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court reversed Defendant's sentence and remanded the case for re-sentencing with instructions that a pre-sentence report be prepared. The Court also vacated Defendant's conviction for unlawful taking of a motor vehicle because it violated the proscription against double jeopardy in this case. The Court affirmed the district court on all other issues. View "New Mexico v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

The issue presented in this appeal was whether a police officer could temporarily remove a visible firearm from a vehicle to prevent immediate access to it by an occupant during the short duration of a lawful traffic stop. In November 2008, officers from the Hobbs Police Department stopped a GMC Jimmy with expired temporary tags. On his approach towards the vehicle, an officer saw a black nine millimeter handgun lying on the back seat floorboard. The officer asked Defendant Gregory Ketelson to step out of the vehicle, and his partner retrieved the firearm from the back seat floorboard. Neither Defendant nor his passenger was in the vehicle when the officers retrieved the firearm. After the firearm was removed, Defendant signed a card consenting to the search and admitted that the firearm belonged to him. Officers ran a background check and found that Defendant had a prior felony conviction. Officers then arrested Defendant as a felon in possession of a firearm. Prior to trial, Defendant moved to suppress the firearm and statements made to the police regarding its ownership. The State responded that the entry into the vehicle and removing the firearm were lawful as a "minimal intrusion" necessary for officer safety while the officers determined that Defendant was a felon. The district court found that the State did not make a showing sufficient to support exigent circumstances. Rather, the court found that both Defendant and the driver of the car were "at all times cooperative, and they created no apparent threat or imminent danger to life or serious damage to property." Accordingly, the district court granted the motion to suppress, noting that non-felons may legally carry loaded handguns in private automobiles, and thus, the State must make some showing beyond the mere presence of a firearm in the car before officers effect a warrantless "seizure." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that with respect to the Fourth Amendment, the officers had a reasonable articulable suspicion permitting them to remove the weapon. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the officers' removal of the firearm was a minimal intrusion, which was reasonable given the grave need for officer safety during traffic stops. The Court reversed the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "New Mexico v. Ketelson" on Justia Law

Defendant Timothy Sandoval was convicted of the second-degree murder of Jeff McCormick. The central issue at trial was whether McCormick was a mere bystander or an actual participant with the two other men involved in an altercation that ended with his death. The Court of Appeals determined that the "self-defense" and "defense of another" jury instructions issued at Defendant's trial constituted fundamental error because the instructions failed "to adequately and accurately describe Defendant's theory of defense" and misstated the applicable law. Upon review of the trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the instructions were not a correct statement of the law, but because the jury could have found that Defendant acted in self-defense and defense of another without considering McCormick as an assailant, the trial court's use of the instructions did not constitute fundamental error. The Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings with the appellate court. View "New Mexico v. Sandoval" on Justia Law

The issue presented in this appeal was whether Defendant's requested involuntary manslaughter jury instruction was properly denied by the district court. Defendant Clinton Skippings was convicted in a jury trial of voluntary manslaughter. Defendant's conviction arose from a series of interactions with Christy Rogers (Victim) that ultimately culminated in her death. At Defendant's trial, the jury was instructed regarding second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. The district court denied Defendant's requested involuntary manslaughter instruction. The jury returned a conviction on the voluntary manslaughter charge. Upon review of the trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that where there is sufficient evidence of both criminal negligence and accident, it is proper to grant an involuntary manslaughter instruction. The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, which found that the district court improperly denied the instruction. The Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "New Mexico v. Skippings" on Justia Law

Carol Sloan, a New Mexico Public Regulation Commission (PRC) Commissioner, was convicted and subsequently sentenced for aggravated battery and burglary. That same day, the Attorney General filed a petition for a writ of quo warranto asking the Supreme Court remove Ms. Sloan from office because of her felony convictions. Although Ms. Sloan did not dispute that she was convicted and sentenced for two felony offenses, she nonetheless maintained that those convictions did not disqualify her from continuing to hold public office until the expiration of the term for which she was elected. Ultimately the Court found that because Ms. Sloan was a convicted felon, forfeiture of her office was automatic. View "State ex rel. King v. Sloan" on Justia Law

Petitioners are organized labor representatives actively involved in representing public employees. They sought a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court to prohibit the Governor from removing two members of the Public Employee Labor Relations Board. Those members had responsibility to adjudicate the merits of disputes that involved the Governor. The Governor appointed those members and now she sought to remove them. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that none of the PELRB members served at the pleasure of the Governor, though the Public Employee Bargaining Act obligates the Governor to appoint them. The Court found that constitutional due process required a "neutral tribunal with members who were free to deliberate without fear of removal by a frequent litigant" such as the Governor. The Governor was enjoined from removing the PELRB members.