Justia New Mexico Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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The Public Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Moongate Water Company (Moongate) a certificate of public convenience and necessity (CCN) authorizing Moongate, as a public utility, to provide water to an area located outside the city limits of Las Cruces (the "certificated area.") Las Cruces later annexed three undeveloped tracts of land within Moongate's certificated area, and Las Cruces committed itself to provide water to this area despite Moongate's CCN. The Supreme Court addressed two questions in this appeal: (1) did Moongate have a right to provide water within the certificated area to the exclusion of Las Cruces?; and (2) did Las Cruces engage in an unlawful taking of Moongate's property entitling Moongate to just compensation when Las Cruces chose to provide water within the certificated area? The Court answered both questions in the negative: (1) because Las Cruces was not subject to the Public Utilities Act (the PUA); and (2) because on the record before the Court, Moongate did not prove that it had established infrastructure and was already serving customers in the annexed area. "Absent such proof of a tangible loss, a public utility is not entitled to just compensation when a municipality lawfully exercises its right to serve in the public utility's certificated area." The Court therefore affirmed the Court of Appeals and reversed the district court. View "Moongate Water Co., Inc. v. City of Las Cruces" on Justia Law

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A fire destroyed a hydroponic tomato facility belonging to a new business, Sunnyland Farms, Inc. The day before the fire, Sunnyland's electricity had been shut off by its local utility, the Central New Mexico Electrical Cooperative (CNMEC), for nonpayment. Sunnyland's water pumps were powered by electricity, and without power, Sunnyland's facility had no water. Sunnyland sued CNMEC, alleging both that CNMEC had wrongfully suspended service, and if its electrical service had been in place, firefighters and Sunnyland employees would have been able to stop the fire from consuming the facility. After a bench trial, the court found CNMEC liable for negligence and breach of contract. The trial court awarded damages, including lost profits, of over $21 million in contract and tort, but reduced the tort damages by 80% for Sunnyland's comparative fault. It also awarded $100,000 in punitive damages. The parties cross-appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the contract judgment, vacated the punitive damages, held that the lost profit damages were not supported by sufficient evidence, affirmed the trial court's offset of damages based on CNMEC's purchase of a subrogation lien, and affirmed the trial court's rulings on pre- and post-judgment interest. Sunnyland appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals regarding the contract judgment, punitive damages, and interest, and reversed on the lost profit damages and the offset. The Court also took the opportunity of this case to re-examine the standard for consequential contract damages in New Mexico. View "Sunnyland Farms, Inc. v. Central N.M. Electric Cooperative, Inc." on Justia Law

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Defendant-Appellee Donovan King was suspected of aggravated battery. In an interrogation room at the Farmington Police Department, a detective advised King of his rights and asked if he understood them. King replied, "Yeah." The detective then asked him if King wished to answer any questions. King answered, "Not at the moment. Kind of intoxicated." After telling King that intoxication was not a reason that King could not talk to him, the detective placed a waiver of rights form in front of King, tossed a pen in King's direction, and said, "Sign this for me if you wish to answer questions," indicating where King should sign. King responded, "Like I said[,] not at the moment." Undeterred, the detective repeated that intoxication was not a reason for not giving a statement, persisted in questioning King, and eventually elicited an incriminating statement from him. The district court granted King's motion to suppress the statement because King had twice unambiguously invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Because King was ultimately charged with an open count of first-degree murder, the State appealed the district court's ruling to the Supreme Court. Finding no error in the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Mexico v. King" on Justia Law

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In 2002, Pojoaque Tribal Police Officer Kevin Schultz drowned while rescuing a twelve-year-old boy from the Rio Grande near Pilar. On the day of the accident, he had taken the day off from work to chaperone a group of children from his church on a recreational outing. This case arose when Schultz's widow, Cheryl, filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits resulting from her husband's death, but only after the statute of limitations had expired. Notwithstanding the late filing, Mrs. Schultz contended that the conduct of the Pojoaque Tribal Police Department caused her to file after the deadline, and thus, the Supreme Court should consider her complaint timely filed. Both the Workers' Compensation Judge (WCJ) and the Court of Appeals decided that Mrs. Schultz's complaint was not timely filed. However, upon review, the Supreme Court found that based on the fact of this case, the statute was tolled. Therefore the Court reversed and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "Schultz v. Pojoaque Tribal Police Department" on Justia Law

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Defendant Fernanda Cobrera was charged with criminal damage to property having a value greater than $1,000, resulting from her alleged destruction of household goods located in the home of her estranged husband. The question before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the prosecution had to present evidence of the property's age and condition in order to satisfy its burden of proving the monetary value of the property. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that that in cases where common household items have been irreparably damaged, it is sufficient for the State to introduce evidence of the items' purchase price. View "New Mexico v. Cobrera" on Justia Law

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Defendant Alicia Gonzales got into her car after a night of heavy drinking and began to drive to the Albuquerque International Sunport to pick up her husband. On the interstate, Defendant, sideswiped one vehicle and plowed into the back of another in which two children, Manuel Delfino and Deandre Fortune, were riding. While the adults in the front seats were uninjured, one of the children died from their injuries, and the other received minor injuries. Defendant was later indicted on multiple charges stemming from the crash. She was charged with one count of intentional child abuse resulting in death (or negligent in the alternative), one count of intentional child abuse not resulting in death or great bodily harm (or negligent in the alternative), one count of aggravated DWI, and one count of leaving the scene of an accident. "Curiously," the State did not charge Defendant with vehicular homicide. Defendant was convicted of negligent child abuse, but that charge was later reversed by the Court of Appeals for lack of substantial evidence. She was also convicted of DWI and leaving the scene of an accident. The State, barred by double jeopardy from retrying Defendant for child abuse, then sought to prosecute Defendant for vehicular homicide. The Court of Appeals did not allow the vehicular homicide charge, again, on double jeopardy grounds. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviewed only that portion of the Court of Appeals opinion denying the State a new trial for vehicular homicide. The Court of Appeals concluded that under the facts of this case, vehicular homicide was a lesser included offense of negligent child abuse resulting in death, and as a result, double jeopardy barred a new trial. The Supreme Court did not find it necessary to decide whether vehicular homicide was such a lesser included offense. Instead, the Court came to a similar conclusion based on the related principle of joinder. "This is not a case in which the charge the State now [sought] to bring, vehicular homicide, was unknown at the time Defendant was indicted. The State had at least three different opportunities to join these offenses." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals but on somewhat different grounds. View "New Mexico v. Gonzales" on Justia Law

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Defendant Paul Wayne Lovett was charged with murdering two women in two separate, unrelated incidents as well as criminal sexual penetration with respect to one of the victims. Pursuant to Rule 5-203(A) NMRA the two murder charges were joined in one complaint, indictment or information with the intent to try the two murder charges together in one trial. Pursuant to Rule 5-203(C) NMRA Defendant moved to sever the two murder charges into two separate trials. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to sever, and Defendant was subsequently convicted of both counts of first-degree murder in one joint trial. Upon review of the case, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred when it failed to sever the murder charges into separate trials. Because the error constituted reversible, non-harmless error in relation to one of the murder convictions, the Court vacated that conviction while upholding the other first-degree murder conviction as well as the conviction for criminal sexual penetration.View "New Mexico v. Lovett" on Justia Law

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Defendant Greg Collier was indicted in August 2006 for fourth-degree extreme cruelty to animals after a horse he owned died. A jury acquitted Defendant of felony extreme cruelty to animals but was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor cruelty to animals, on which the district court, at the State's request, instructed the jury without objection from Defendant. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the State could retry Defendant for the lesser offense, which was not explicitly charged in the indictment, without running afoul of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the State could retry Defendant for the lesser included offense because retrial after a mistrial caused by jury deadlock does not violate the constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy. Furthermore, the Court held that the applicable statute of limitations did not bar retrial on the lesser included offense. View "New Mexico v. Collier" on Justia Law

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Respondents the State of New Mexico and Warden Erasmo Bravo appealed the district court's grant of Petitioner George Quintana's petition for writ of habeas corpus. The district court granted the petition based exclusively on the allegations contained in petitioner's amended petition, together with a supporting affidavit from one of petitioner's trial counsel admitting to being ineffective in her representation of him. The district court's rationale for this "unorthodox" decision was Respondents' failure to timely file a response to the amended petition and their failure to appear at a scheduled motions hearing, despite having received notice of the hearing. The reason for Respondents' failure to file a response and appear at the hearing was due to a conflict of interest that arose when the attorney affiant went to work for the District Attorney in the same jurisdiction. The district court was aware of the conflict and the confusion regarding whether an attorney from the Attorney General's office or an attorney from a district attorney's office from another jurisdiction would represent Respondents. Despite acknowledging the existence of the conflict and the confusion about who would represent Respondents, the district court vacated petitioner's convictions and granted him a new trial. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the conduct of the District Attorney and the Attorney General did not rise to the level of stubborn resistance to the district court's orders that would justify the extreme sanction of vacating petitioner's jury convictions without both considering a response from Respondents and after having had a full evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Quintana v. Bravo" on Justia Law

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The City of Santa Fe (City) charged Julio Marquez with two violations of the Santa Fe City Code (SFCC), including Operating a Motor Vehicle Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor or Drugs (DWI). After the City rested its case at trial, the district court sua sponte ruled that the arresting officer's DWI investigation was unlawful and on that basis entered an order suppressing all evidence from the investigation, therefore dismissing the DWI charge against Marquez. The City appealed. Under New Mexico law statutes, constitutional double jeopardy principles bar the City from retrying Marquez and therefore the appeal should have been dismissed. The Court nonetheless wrote to cast light on the unintended consequences that could follow (and, in this case, did follow) from waiting until trial to consider suppression issues; to clarify that the Rules of Criminal Procedure require a motion to suppress evidence to be made within twenty days of entry of a defendant's plea, absent good cause shown; and to expand the applicable rule to require district courts to adjudicate the suppression of possibly illegally obtained evidence prior to trial, unless good cause exists for delaying such rulings until trial.View "City of Santa Fe v. Marquez" on Justia Law