Justia New Mexico Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Freddie Montoya passed a vehicle in which a single female was driving, and positioned his truck across the roadway to block her path. He and his passenger got out of the truck, forcibly entered the victim’s vehicle, and raped her. Among other crimes, Montoya was convicted of first-degree kidnapping and second-degree criminal sexual penetration (CSP II). Montoya was required to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), due exclusively to the CSP II conviction. However, the CSP II conviction was vacated because Montoya’s actions supported his convictions for both first-degree kidnapping and CSP II, which could have resulted in double punishment for the same conduct, in violation of the Double Jeopardy. Montoya argued that he was no longer required to register under SORNA because the CSP II conviction was vacated. The Supreme Court disagreed: "registration under SORNA is not considered punishment in New Mexico. . . . Montoya’s conviction of a qualifying sex offense remains valid for purposes of SORNA because the CSP II conviction is what elevated the kidnapping to a first-degree felony." View "Montoya v. Driggers" on Justia Law

In 2006, Joseph and Mary Romero signed a mortgage contract with the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) as nominee for Equity One, Inc. They pledged their home as collateral for the loan. The Romeros alleged that Equity One urged them to refinance their home for access to the home's equity. The terms of the new loan were not an improvement over their then-current loan: the interest rate was higher and the loan amount due was higher. Despite that, the Romeros would receive a net cash payout they planned to use to pay other debts. The Romeros later became delinquent on their increased loan payments. A third party, Bank of New York (BONY), identified itself as a trustee for Popular Financial Services Mortgage, filed suit to foreclose on the Romeros' home. BONY claimed to hold the Romeros' note and mortgage with the right of enforcement. The Romeros defended by arguing that BONY lacked standing to foreclose because nothing in the complaint established how BONY held their note and mortgage, and that the contracts they signed were with Equity One. The district court found that BONY had established itself as holder of the Romeros' mortgage, and that the bank had standing to foreclose. That decision was appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in finding BONY's evidence demonstrated that it had standing to foreclose. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bank of New York v. Romero" on Justia Law

The New Mexico Cultural Properties Review Committee recognized approximately 400,000 acres of public land on Mount Taylor as a registered cultural property under the New Mexico Cultural Properties Act. One month after the Committee issued its final order, Rayellen Resources, Inc., and numerous other parties including the Cebolleta Land Grant (the Rayellen parties) appealed that decision. The Pueblo of Acoma, which joined the Committee in defending the listing, challenged whether the Rayellen parties who are private landowners had standing to appeal because they were explicitly excluded from the listing. In reaching the merits of the case, the district court found that the listing did not violate constitutional protections against the establishment of religion and that the Committee did not violate due process guarantees by following federal guidelines for the listing. The district court reversed the listing nevertheless on the grounds that personal notice of the permanent listing’s public comment period was not provided to all affected property owners, including mineral rights holders, in violation of due process guarantees, and that both the mountain’s sheer size and the private property exclusions made it impracticable to comply with provisions in the Cultural Properties Act relating to integrity of place, required inspections, and required maintenance. The district court also reversed the inclusion of the 19,000 acres of Cebolleta Land Grant common lands in the listing because land grant common lands are not subject to regulation as state land under the Cultural Properties Act. Acoma Pueblo petitioned for certiorari in the Court of Appeals on the three listing issues which the district court reversed, and the Rayellen parties cross-petitioned on other issues as to which they had not prevailed in the district court. The Court of Appeals granted those petitions as well as motions to intervene from Laguna Pueblo and the Committee. Without deciding any of the issues, the Court of Appeals then certified the entire case to the Supreme Court. After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part the Committee’s decision and held that the Mount Taylor listing was lawful under the Cultural Properties Act and that the proceedings before the Committee did not violate the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. The Court reversed the Committee’s inclusion of 19,000 acres of Cebolleta Land Grant property and held that land grant property is not state land as defined in the Cultural Properties Act. View "Rayellen Resources, Inc. v. Lyons" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a motion to quash his indictment, arguing that the district court improperly enlisted the aid of the district attorney’s office in the selection of the grand jury panel that indicted Petitioner. Agreeing that the integrity of the grand jury process was undermined by the manner in which grand jurors had been selected, the Supreme Court issued a writ of superintending control directing the district court to quash the indictment without prejudice to the State’s right to reinstate new criminal proceedings against Petitioner. Upon further review, the Supreme Court issued this opinion to explain the reasons for its decision to quash the indictment. View "de Leon v. Hartley" on Justia Law

"Prohibiting same-gender marriages is not substantially related to the governmental interests advanced by the parties opposing same-gender marriage or to the purposes [the New Mexico Supreme Court has] identified. Therefore, barring individuals from marrying and depriving them of the rights, protections, and responsibilities of civil marriage solely because of their sexual orientation violates the Equal Protection Clause under Article II, Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution. [The Court held] that the State of New Mexico is constitutionally required to allow same-gender couples to marry and must extend to them the rights, protections, and responsibilities that derive from civil marriage under New Mexico law." View "Griego v. Oliver" on Justia Law

Petitioners were retired teachers, professors and other public education employees who sought a writ of mandamus against the New Mexico Education Retirement Board (ERB). They sought to compel the ERB to pay them an annual cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) to their retirement benefits, calculated according to the statutes “in effect at the time of Petitioners’ date of maturity of their rights,” instead of the current statutes as recently modified by the Legislature. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the New Mexico Constitution affords Retirees no such right, and therefore denied the writ of mandamus. View "Bartlett v. Cameron" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether the phrase "at the scene" in NMSA 1978 Section 31-1-7(A) (1995) authorized law enforcement to make a warrantless arrest for domestic violence where the alleged act took place in a different place from where a party was arrested. Defendant Daniel Almanzar was arrested without a warrant across the street from where he allegedly hit his girlfriend. After searching defendant, police found a "golf-ball-sized mass of cocaine" in his pocket. He was subsequently charged with drug trafficking. Defendant moved to suppress evidence of the cocaine because he was not arrested "at the scene." The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court, after its interpretation of the legislative intent of 31-1-7(A), concluded that defendant's arrest was lawful because it was reasonably close to where the domestic violence took place. View "New Mexico v. Almanzar" on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Sisneros was convicted in 2011 of first-degree murder, felony murder, shooting from a motor vehicle resulting in great bodily harm, and aggravated fleeing from a law enforcement officer. Sentenced to life imprisonment plus sixteen and one-half years, Defendant appealed his conviction directly to the Supreme Court. After finding that defendant was subject to Double Jeopardy, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court to vacate his convictions for felony murder and shooting from a motor vehicle and re-sentencing. View "New Mexico v. Sisneros" on Justia Law

In 2008, Defendant Andrew Miller faced sixty-one counts consisting mostly of fraud and embezzlement charges between two indictments against him. He entered into a plea agreement with the State covering both indictments, which the district court accepted. Defendant pleaded Guilty or No Contest to four second-degree felonies and two third-degree felonies. In exchange for Defendant's pleas, the State dropped all but six charges against him. The Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision that the district court's sentence of Defendant Andrew Miller violated the terms of a plea agreement that the district court had accepted. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that defendant's sentence violated the plea agreement. However, the high court disagreed with the remedy that the Court of Appeals ordered and clarify case law on this account. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "New Mexico v. Miller" on Justia Law

Defendant Aquilino Lopez was stopped for speeding and arrested for driving with a suspended license. While performing a search incident to arrest, the arresting officer discovered a clear bag containing a green leafy substance suspected to be marijuana. During an inventory of the contents of Defendant’s car, officers discovered another bag containing a white powdery substance they believed to be cocaine. Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, possession of marijuana, and driving with a suspended or revoked license. Defendant entered a special appearance in the district court and filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to remand the case to the magistrate court for another preliminary examination. The motion alleged that the magistrate had violated Defendant’s confrontation rights under both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution by admitting the forensic laboratory report into evidence at the preliminary hearing without an opportunity for the defense to personally cross-examine the laboratory analyst who prepared the report. The motion argued that as a result the district court did not have jurisdiction to proceed further in the case. After a hearing, the district court denied Defendant’s motion. Defendant subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea. The Court of Appeals certified the appeal directly to the Supreme Court. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court concluded that the full constitutional right of confrontation in criminal prosecutions does not apply at pretrial probable cause determinations. The right of confrontation in Article II, Section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution, and the right of confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applies only at a criminal trial where guilt or innocence is determined. The Court overruled the contrary precedent of "Mascarenas v. New Mexico," (458 P.2d 789), to the extent that it held otherwise. View "New Mexico v. Lopez" on Justia Law