Justia New Mexico Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Walter Brown was arrested in 2011, and indicted two weeks later on an array of charges, including first-degree felony murder and, alternatively, second-degree murder. The district court imposed a $250,000 cash or surety bond at Defendant’s arraignment. After spending more than two years in pretrial custody awaiting trial because he lacked the financial resources to post such a bond, Defendant moved the district court to review his conditions of release and to release him under the supervision of the Second Judicial District Court’s pretrial services program with appropriate nonmonetary conditions of release. After hearing from Defendant and the State, the district court orally denied Defendant’s motion for release on nonmonetary conditions on the ground that Defendant’s charge of first-degree felony murder carried a possible life sentence that would require at least thirty years of imprisonment. The district court subsequently filed a written order setting forth detailed factual findings. Based on the evidence presented at the motion hearing, the district court found that the pretrial services program could fashion appropriate conditions of release for Defendant and that Defendant could live with his father and return to his former job if released. After several more months of pretrial confinement, Defendant filed a second motion, again seeking release under the supervision of the pretrial services program with appropriate nonmonetary release conditions. At a hearing on the second motion, defense counsel reiterated the information presented at the first hearing five months earlier and argued that Defendant’s unique personal history made him likely to comply with conditions of release and unlikely to commit additional crimes while released. After the district court denied Defendant’s second motion to amend the conditions of release, Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals by filing a motion under Rule 12-204 NMRA. After its review, the Supreme Court found that defendant presented the district court with uncontroverted evidence demonstrating that nonmonetary conditions of pretrial release were sufficient to reasonably assure that Defendant was not likely to pose a flight or safety risk. Despite this evidence, the district court ordered that Defendant be held in jail unless he posted a $250,000 cash or surety bond, based solely on the nature and seriousness of the charged offense. The Court concluded that the district court erred by requiring a $250,000 bond when the evidence demonstrated that less restrictive conditions of pretrial release would be sufficient. The Court therefore reversed the district court’s pretrial release order and instructed the district court to release Defendant on appropriate nonmonetary conditions. View "New Mexico v. Brown" on Justia Law

Antonio T., a seventeen-year-old high school student, was taken to the principal's office because he was suspected of being under the influence of alcohol. The assistant principal questioned Antonio about his possession of alcohol in the presence of a deputy sheriff. Antonio admitted that he had brought alcohol to school, where he drank it. At the principal's request, the deputy administered a breath alcohol test to Antonio, which was positive for alcohol. After administering the test, the deputy advised Antonio of his right to remain silent, and Antonio declined to answer the questions. Antonio was charged with the delinquent act of possession of alcohol by a minor. He filed a motion to suppress the statements he made to the assistant principal because his statements were elicited without a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to remain silent. The district court denied his motion, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court reversed both the district court and the Court of Appeals: although a school official may insist that a child answer questions for purposes of school disciplinary proceedings, any statements elicited by the official may not be used against the child in a delinquency proceeding unless the child made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his or her right to remain silent. Because the State failed to prove that Antonio effectively waived this right, his statements were inadmissible in the delinquency proceeding. View "New Mexico v. Antonio T." on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant Vincent Montoya of kidnapping with the intent to inflict a sexual offense upon his girlfriend (Victim). Defendant was also convicted of two other crimes not relevant to this appeal. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on "the confusing interplay" between an accused's Sixth Amendment right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him," and New Mexico's rape shield law designed to protect a victim's privacy. Because the Court determined that the accused was denied an opportunity to fully confront his accuser and because this error could have affected the jury's verdict, it reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "New Mexico v. Montoya" on Justia Law

A jury returned a guilty verdict against defendant for intentional and negligent child abuse causing great bodily harm to an infant, which the Court of Appeals affirmed in a memorandum opinion. Upon review of the case, the Supreme Court held that under the particular circumstances of this case, the district court erred: (1) when it rejected defense counsel's request for separate jury instructions for intentional and negligent child abuse; (2) that the evidence offered to support the charge of criminally negligent child abuse resulting in great bodily harm failed, according to the State's own witnesses, to prove that Defendant's actions caused the infant's injuries; and (3) that the evidence of intentional child abuse resulting in great bodily harm, in this case, an allegation that the accused intentionally suffocated the infant, failed to prove that charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court and order the charges dismissed with prejudice for lack of sufficient evidence. View "New Mexico v. Consaul" on Justia Law

A Curry County grand jury indicted Defendant Julian Gutierrez on three counts of criminal sexual contact of a minor based on the testimony of Defendant’s daughter that he touched or pinched her breasts on several occasions when she was fifteen years old. At the time of the alleged incidents, Defendant was estranged from his daughter’s mother, who lived in Lubbock, Texas. After Defendant’s indictment, his daughter moved out of their home to stay next door with her paternal grandparents. On the first scheduled day of trial, Defendant informed his attorney that he had been provided with a statement written by his daughter that related to a recent visit by prosecution representatives to her school. When defense counsel asked for a hearing on the new revelations, the prosecutor admitted not having disclosed to the defense anything about the pretrial encounter at which the daughter attempted to recant her grand jury testimony. The next morning, when Defendant’s daughter did not appear to testify and the State could not locate her, the State asked the district court to make a finding of manifest necessity and declare a mistrial. Two weeks later, the daughter still not having been located, the district court declared a mistrial over the objection of the defense and permanently discharged the jury. The court rejected Defendant’s argument that determining manifest necessity required considering the “intertwined” matter of prosecutorial misconduct in the encounter with the daughter, saying that it would address the propriety of that encounter separately “at a later date.” Another two weeks passed, and the daughter had been arrested on the bench warrant. The court held hearings on Defendant’s motions to dismiss for prosecutorial misconduct and to preclude retrial for lack of manifest necessity justifying the mistrial. The ultimate issue this case presented to for the Supreme Court's review centered on the boundaries between proper and improper prosecutorial conduct in dealing with recalcitrant witnesses and of the circumstances in which a mistrial and retrial may take place without violating constitutional double jeopardy protections when a witness does not appear for trial. Following federal double jeopardy principles in United States Supreme Court precedent, the New Mexico Court concluded that a prosecution witness’s failure to appear for Defendant’s trial did not constitute manifest necessity for granting a mistrial after a jury had been selected and sworn to hear his case. Because empaneling a new jury and retrying Defendant would violate his double jeopardy protections under the United States Constitution, the Court remanded this case to the district court with instructions to dismiss. View "New Mexico v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant Gerard Parvilus guilty of the 2008 aggravated burglary of his estranged wife’s separate dwelling, murder of her boyfriend, first-degree kidnapping of his wife and her boyfriend, aggravated assault of his wife, and interference with communications. The district court granted Defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and vacated the aggravated burglary conviction because of Defendant's claimed unrestricted right under Section 40-3-3 to make an unconsented entry into his wife's separate residence. Section 40-3-3 (1907), a civil marital property statute, recognized the rights of married women to hold separate property but provided that "neither [husband nor wife could] be excluded from the other’s dwelling." The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Supreme Court held that Section 40-3-3 did not preclude a conviction for burglary of a spouse's separate dwelling, and reversed the contrary rulings of both lower courts. View "New Mexico v. Parvilus" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with trafficking controlled substances and possession of drug paraphernalia based on evidence obtained by the police, who found evidence of methamphetamine manufacturing in the dumpster of the Choice Inn in Clovis where Defendant rented a room. Prior to trial, Defendant moved for the suppression of evidence found in the dumpster, as well as evidence obtained from the room, which was acquired by a search warrant that was based in part on the evidence recovered from the dumpster. He argued that the police's warrantless search of the garbage and subsequent immediate searches violated his constitutional right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. The district court granted the motion to suppress. With this opinion the Supreme Court addressed whether, pursuant to Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution, Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage left out for collection in the motel dumpster. The Court of Appeals upheld the district court's ruling. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ ultimate holding, but on slightly different grounds. View "New Mexico v. Crane" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kathrin Kinzer-Ellington was appointed guardian ad litem pursuant to Rule 1-053.3 NMRA to help determine the best interests of minor children whose parents were involved in a custody dispute. As the case grew more and more contentious, Father David Kimbrell sued both Mother Lorraine Kimbrell and the guardian ad litem in tort as next friend of his oldest daughter, Lily Kimbrell, alleging that their conduct had injured the child. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a parent has standing to sue a Rule 1-053.3 guardian ad litem during a pending custody proceeding. The Court held that a Rule 1-053.3 guardian ad litem is protected by absolute quasi-judicial immunity from suit arising from the performance of his or her duties unless the guardian ad litem’s alleged tortious conduct is clearly and completely outside the scope of his or her appointment. A parent does not have standing to sue a guardian ad litem appointed in a custody proceeding on behalf of the child because: (1) the parent has been found to be unable to act in the best interests of the child, and (2) such a lawsuit would create a conflict of interest in the custody case. View "Kimbrell v. Kimbrell" on Justia Law

In 1997, Martin Ramirez was arrested and charged with possession of up to one ounce of marijuana and two other misdemeanors. He appeared in metropolitan court for a custody arraignment two days later and pleaded guilty to all three charges on the advice of his public defender. In 2009, Ramirez learned that his guilty pleas in 1997 rendered him "inadmissable to the United States." Ramirez filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis in the district court, seeking to vacate his metropolitan court guilty pleas on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. In "New Mexico v. Paredez," (101 P.3d 799), the New Mexico Supreme Court held that a criminal defense attorney who represents a noncitizen client "must advise that client of the specific immigration consequences of pleading guilty" to pending charges. An attorney’s failure to do so will be ineffective assistance of counsel if the client is prejudiced. The question in this case was whether the holding in Paredez applied retroactively and, if it did, whether Ramirez has a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel that could justify withdrawal of his pleas. The Court held that Paredez applied retroactively to 1990, the year that the Court began to prohibit courts from accepting a guilty plea from a defendant without: (1) ascertaining that the defendant understood that a conviction may have an effect on the defendant’s immigration status; (2) obtaining an affidavit from the defendant that the judge personally advised the defendant of the possible effect of a conviction on the defendant’s immigration status; and (3) obtaining a certification from the defendant’s attorney that the attorney had conferred with the defendant and explained in detail the contents of the affidavit signed by the defendant. These requirements were not new in 1997 at the time Ramirez pleaded guilty, and they were "designed to ensure a guilty plea is made knowingly and voluntarily." View "Ramirez v. New Mexico" on Justia Law

In 2004, Defendant Anthony Samora pled guilty to the charge of criminal sexual penetration (CSP) in the second degree for raping a fourteen year-old boy. He served a sentence of three years' incarceration. Nearly ten years later, a jury convicted Defendant of CSP in the second degree (in the commission of another felony) for raping a fifteen year-old boy. Because this was Defendant's second such conviction, the State sought to impose a mandatory life sentence. However, the district court concluded that the mandatory life sentence enhancement under Section 31-18-25 did not apply to this case, finding a "legislative infirmity," in the statutes. Before sentencing and before the district court released the jury from service, the State effectively appealed the district court's refusal to impose a mandatory life sentence. The Supreme Court granted the State's emergency petition for writ of superintending control. Subsection D of Section 30-9-11 previously defined CSP in the second degree; a 2007 legislative reorganization of the statute moved the definition of CSP in the second degree to Subsection E. Subsection D has since defined CSP in the first degree, which was not applicable to Defendant's convictions. Solely by its reference to Subsection D of Section 30-9-11, which as of 2007 defined CSP in the first degree, the definition of a violent sexual offense in Section 31-18-25(F)(2) no longer included repeated convictions of CSP in the second degree. On that basis, Defendant argued and the district court concluded that a mandatory life sentence was not authorized. The Supreme Court was "skeptical of reading too much into a passive and incidental legislative act." The 2009 amendment of Section 30-9-11 did not effectively repeal Section 31-18-25(F)(2), and therefore it did not repeal a district court's authority to impose the mandatory life sentence for a second conviction of a violent sexual offense under Section 31-18-25(A). The current Section 31-18-25(F) continues to define a violent sexual offense as either first- or second-degree CSP, despite referencing two subsections in Section 30-9-11 that define first-degree CSP and aggravated CSP pursuant to the 2007 renumbering of the Section 30-9-11 subsections. The Court invited the New Mexico Legislature to address this statutory anomaly to clarify what was essentially a clerical error. View "State of New Mexico ex rel. Brandenburg v. Sanchez" on Justia Law