Justia New Mexico Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Anthony Samora was accused of luring a sixteen-year-old male into his truck by deception, driving him to a secluded location in Albuquerque, and then forcibly having sex. A jury convicted Defendant of second-degree criminal sexual penetration in the commission of a felony (CSP-felony), and first-degree kidnapping. Due to sentencing enhancements, Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after thirty years for his CSP-felony conviction plus a consecutive eighteen-year sentence for his kidnapping conviction. In a direct appeal, Defendant raised a variety of challenges to both convictions, including a challenge to the district court for omitting that the sexual act had to be non-consensual when instructing the jury on CSP-felony. The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that it was fundamental error to omit the phrase “without consent” from the jury instructions relevant to CSP-felony, and accordingly reversed and remanded on Defendant’s CSP conviction. The same fundamental error also infected the jury’s findings with respect to Defendant’s intent to inflict a sexual offense against the alleged victim, and that too was reversed. This case was remanded back to the district court, where Defendant could be retried on both charges. View "New Mexico v. Samora" on Justia Law

In 2004, defendant Lucas Trammell pled guilty in part, to false imprisonment of a minor victim. At the time, a conviction of false imprisonment of a minor victim required that defendant register as a sex offender under the New Mexico Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). Defendant’s attorney failed to realize that defendant’s plea included a sex offense requiring SORNA registration. Defendant moved to withdraw his plea six years later, after he was arrested and found to have violated the terms of his probation. After review, the New Mexico Supreme Court, concluded that although counsel’s failure to advise Defendant of the SORNA registration requirement in his plea agreement was per se deficient performance under the first prong of the "Strickland" test for ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant failed to show that under the second prong of Strickland, he had been prejudiced by that deficient performance. The Court of Appeals was reversed for holding otherwise, and remanded this case back to the district court for entry of an order denying defendant's motion to withdraw his plea agreement. View "New Mexico v. Trammell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court addressed whether shooting at or from a motor vehicle could serve as a predicate for felony murder. A jury found Defendant Eric Marquez guilty of first-degree felony murder, and shooting from a motor vehicle causing great bodily harm. The underlying felony supporting Defendant’s felony murder conviction was the felony of shooting from a motor vehicle. To avoid double jeopardy concerns, the district court vacated Defendant’s conviction of shooting from a motor vehicle, then sentenced Defendant to a term of life imprisonment followed by a minimum period of five years of parole supervision. In his direct appeal, Defendant claimed that: (1) shooting at a motor vehicle cannot serve as a predicate felony in the context of a felony murder conviction; (2) the court erred in precluding evidence of drive-by shootings at Defendant’s home before 2010; (3) the jury instructions on felony murder and self-defense failed to instruct on the essential elements that Defendant did not act in self-defense or with sufficient provocation; and (4) admission of the Medical Investigator’s testimony violated Defendant’s confrontation rights. After review, the Supreme Court held that the crime of shooting at or from a motor vehicle may not serve as the predicate felony in support of a felony murder charge and vacated Defendant’s felony murder conviction. The Court rejected Defendant’s second, third, and fourth claims, and remanded this case back to the district court for entry of an amended judgment reinstating his conviction for shooting from a motor vehicle. View "New Mexico v. Marquez" on Justia Law

While on routine patrol in San Juan County, New Mexico State Police Officer James Rempe entered the license plate number of the vehicle Defendant Joann Yazzie was driving into his patrol car’s mobile data terminal (MDT). The query returned a result indicating that the compliance status of the vehicle was “unknown.” Upon receiving the report of “unknown” compliance status (compliance with the New Mexico Mandatory Financial Responsibility Act), Officer Rempe activated his emergency lights and pulled over Defendant’s vehicle to investigate further. The “unknown” query return was the only basis for the traffic stop. Based on further information the officer acquired as a result of the stop, Defendant was arrested and charged in magistrate court with driving while under the influence of alcohol and failure to maintain insurance. Defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained during the course of the stop, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop and thereby violated her right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. The ultimate question this case posed for the Supreme Court's review was whether the "unknown" status could serve as the basis for the traffic stop. The Supreme Court held that an officer learning of a vehicle's "unknown" compliance status in MVD records has constitutionally reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle and investigate further. The Court reversed the appellate court's holding to the contrary. View "New Mexico v. Yazzie" on Justia Law

In 2010, Guadalupe Ashford’s body was found partially hidden behind a trash can at the edge of a small parking lot. Drag marks and blood spatter indicated that Ashford had initially been assaulted in the lot and then dragged a short distance to its edge where her body was found. An Albuquerque Police Department (APD) forensic scientist analyst performed DNA measurements of samples collected from Ashford’s body and from a six-inch by six-inch bloodied brick described as “paver stone” and believed to be the murder weapon, generating DNA profiles of Ashford and of the presumed perpetrator. Unidentified DNA was also discovered on the paver stone, though in smaller amounts than the DNA evidence matching either of the full profiles. The forensic analyst entered the presumed perpetrator’s profile into the CODIS database, which resulted in a match to Defendant Truett Thomas. Defendant was arrested and charged on the basis of this DNA evidence, but he denied ever having met Ashford. Defendant was held in pretrial custody for twenty-two months before he moved to dismiss the charges for violation of his right to a speedy trial. The district court denied the motion and set the trial to begin approximately twenty-six months after Defendant’s arrest. By the time the case came to trial, the State’s forensic analyst had moved out of New Mexico. At a hearing two weeks before trial, the prosecutor expressed concerns about securing the presence of that forensic analyst at trial and suggested that she be allowed to testify over the live, two-way audio-video communications application Skype as an alternative. At another pretrial hearing in the following week, the court asked if there were “any other matters” that needed to be addressed before trial. In response, defense counsel expressed hesitation at the use of Skype testimony. The prosecutor replied that the State had not sought an enforceable subpoena for the witness in reliance on defense counsel’s statement a week earlier that Skype would “work.” The district court judge took the position that Defendant had waived any objection to the use of two-way video by defense counsel’s initial informal acquiescence. Defendant appealed after he was convicted for first-degree deliberate murder and first-degree kidnapping on multiple grounds, including an asserted violation of the Confrontation Clause through the admission of Skype testimony of the DNA analyst. After review, the Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s convictions on this basis but remanded for a new trial on the murder charge only, having concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support the kidnapping conviction. View "New Mexico v.Thomas" on Justia Law

Defendant Edward Armijo was convicted for driving while intoxicated (DWI). The district court affirmed his conviction, but the Court of Appeal reversed. The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the State’s arguments that the Court of Appeals lacked appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s decision in an on-record appeal from metropolitan court, and that a defendant had no right to that secondary record review. Addressing only these two issues and declining to conduct a third appellate review of the underlying merits of this case, the Supreme Court held that the Legislature vested the Court of Appeals with appellate jurisdiction over a district court’s on-record appellate review of a metropolitan court proceeding and has provided an aggrieved party the right to such an appeal. View "New Mexico v. Armijo" on Justia Law

Defendant Muziwokuthula Madonda was interrogated after he was arrested for the deaths of two men in Tucumcari. At the outset, law enforcement officers advised Defendant of his Miranda rights, and he unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. However, the officers continued to interrogate Defendant, and Defendant eventually made incriminating statements. Defendant then moved pretrial to have the statements suppressed, arguing that they were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. The district court granted Defendant’s motion to suppress the statements, and the State, in turn, filed this interlocutory appeal. Finding no reversible error in the suppression order, the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Mexico v. Madonda" on Justia Law

On petition for a writ of superintending control, the issue this case presented for the New Mexico Supreme Court's review was an order issued by the Twelfth Judicial District Court in the criminal prosecutions against Santiago Carrillo. The district court’s order held that the flat-fee rates paid to indigent defense contract counsel by the Law Office of the Public Defender (LOPD) contravened the right to counsel and nullified the Legislature’s prohibition of the payment of hourly rates to contract counsel. The district court also issued a remedial order directing the LOPD to pay every contract attorney no less than $85 per hour and the State to provide the funding necessary for the LOPD to render such compensation. The Supreme Court held that the General Appropriations Act of 2015, Chapter 101, Section 4(C) of New Mexico Laws of 2015, did not violate the right to the effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution. "We do not presume that the flat-fee rates paid to Carrillo’s contract attorney violate his right to counsel." Accordingly, the Court granted the writ of superintending control, vacated the district court’s orders, and remanded to the district court with instructions to proceed with the State’s prosecutions against Carrillo. View "Kerr v. Parsons" on Justia Law

Defendant Robert Tufts, a man in his late thirties, filmed himself masturbating, saved the electronic image on a secure digital (SD) memory card, inserted the card into a cell phone, handed the cell phone to a fifteen-year-old girl (Child) with whom he had developed an intimate but non-sexual relationship, and told her there was a surprise on the phone for her. Defendant was convicted of criminal sexual communication with a child. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that “ ‘to send[,]’ when used to describe the act of causing another person to receive a physical object[,] evoke[d] the notion of a third-party carrier,” and therefore, when Defendant hand-delivered obscene electronic images to Child, he did not “send” the images to her by means of an electronic communication device. The New Mexico Supreme Court construed "sending" as used by the applicable statute, to give effect to the Legislature's objective and purpose, and found that defendant effectively "sent" the offending images to the child, in violation of Section 30-37-3.3(A). The Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals' determination and remanded the case back for further consideration of defendant's other arguments on appeal. View "New Mexico v. Tufts" on Justia Law

Anthony Holt had partially removed a window screen from a residential dwelling when he the homeowner detected him. He fled. In the process of removing the screen, he placed his fingers behind the screen and inside the outer boundary of the home. Holt was subsequently arrested and charged with breaking and entering. An “unauthorized entry” was an essential element of the offense, and the issue this case presented for the New Mexico Supreme Court's review was whether Holt’s conduct constituted an “entry.” It did. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Holt’s conviction. View "New Mexico v. Holt" on Justia Law